PhD by Thompson, Janice L.
TOWARD A CRITICAL NURSING PROCESS: 
NURSING PRAXIS 
by 
Janice L. Thompson 
A dissertation submitted to the faculty of 
The University of Utah 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
College of Nursing 
The University of Utah 
August 1983 
CE) 1983 Janice L. Thompson 
All Rights Reserved 
THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH GRADUATE SCHOOL 
SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE APPROVAL 
of a dissertation submitted by 
Janice L. Thompson 
This dissertation has been read by each member of the following supervisory committee and by 
majority vote has been found to be satisfactory. 
Chairman: Pe 
Linda K. Amos, Ed.D., F.A.o. 
Paul J. H anstad, Ph.D. 
101953 
]<. Michael Higgins, Ph.D. 
THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH GRADUATE SCHOOL 
FINAL READING APPROVAL 
To the Graduate Council of The University of Utah: 
I have read the dissertation of Jan ice L. Thompson in its 
final form and have found that (I) its format. citations. and bibliographic style are 
consistent and acceptable; (2) its illustrative materials including figures. tables. and 
charts are in place; and (3) the final manuscript is satisfactory to the Supervisory 
Committee and is ready for submission to the Graduate School. 
Approved for the Major Department 
Linda K. Amos, Ed.D., F.A.A.N. 
Chairman/ Dean 
Approved for the Graduate Council 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to develop a critical 
perspective which can be used to address the social reality of 
nursing. The study uses the tradition of the Frankfurt School 
and critical theory as the primary intellectual frameworks for 
developing this perspective. The investigation is primarily an 
exploratory, reflective study which seeks to develop a critical 
consciousness about nursing. 
The methodology used in this study differs significantly 
from empirical-analytic modes of inquiry. The investigation 
proceeds via the process of reflection. Radical reflection, the 
method used in this study, contains five stages or steps. They 
include: bracketing, historical recovery, critique, dialectical 
imagination and negotiation. The study proceeds in an 
exploratory way through each of these steps. 
As in other forms of reflection, findings produced in this 
study take the form of hypotheses. The study generates insights 
or interpretive hypotheses about the social construction of 
reality in nursing. As in other examples of reflection, these 
are hypotheses whose confirmation depends upon continued 
negotiation among nurses. 
Specific findings generated in this study include 1) a 
critique of scientistic consciousness in nursing, 2) a critique 
of bourgeois professional ideology in nursing and 3) a critique 
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1.1 Purpose and Rationale 
The purpose of this study is to develop a critical 
perspective which focuses on the practice and the ideology of 
nursing. The study uses the tradition of the Frankfurt School 
and critical theory as the primary intellectual frameworks for 
developing this perspective. Along with critical theory, 
however, the investigation also explores other intellectual 
strands in a contemporary European tradition. It explores 
recent developments in the critical theory of Jurgen Habermas 
and in the political philosophy of Hannah Arendt. It touches 
briefly on the hermeneutic arguments of H.G. Gadamer. It 
explores content from the sociology of knowledge tradition in 
the work of Berger and Luckman. It touches briefly on the 
existentialist-phenomenology of M. Merleau-Ponty. And finally, 
it explores feminist arguments in the analysis of Sheila 
Rowbotham. 
These explorations in a European intellectual tradition 
provide a background for the development of a critical 
perspective which focuses on the social institution of nursing. 
This is a study then, which explores strands in a contemporary 
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neo-Marxist tradition, borrowing insights, reconstructing some 
of these insights and applying these insights to contemporary 
issues in nursing practice. 
Because of the exploratory nature of the study and because 
of its subject matter, it seems important to make some 
preliminary comments about this eclectic neo-Marxist tradition 
and its reception among American audiences. U.S. interpreta-
tions of critical theory, for example, frequently are biased be-
cause of the tradition1s link to Marxian thought and because of 
the cultural distance which separates American and German tradi-
tions. The reception of Jurgen Habermas' work in America, for 
instance, testifies to the difficulty which American audiences 
have in interpreting this European tradition. 
With the translation in recent years of a growing number of 
his books and articles, Habermas's influence has gradually 
spread to the English speaking world. But his reception by 
Anglo-American thinkers has by no means been painless. It 
has been hindered by the usual problems of cultural 
distance attending the penetration of any work that is 
deeply rooted in German tradition .•. Moreover, the 
tradition of Western Marxism Habermas seeks to renew has 
remained comparatively underdeveloped here: a number of 
important works by Lukacs, Korsch, Horkeimer, Adorno and 
Marx himself were only recently translated. Then there are 
problems deriving from Habermas's own approach. In our 
empirically and analytically inclined culture, we are bound 
to be dismayed by someone who seems to thrive in the 
rarefied atmosphere of general ideas and who views social 
theory so broadly as to include virtually the entire range 
of systematic knowledge about man. Clearly, these are 
formidable obstacles to an intelligent reception of 
Habermas's work. If one adds to this the fact that his 
writings assume the readers' familiarity with a wide range 
of disciplines, authors and approaches, that he often makes 
his point by reviewing broad areas of research and steering 
ongoing discussions in new directions, the obstacles seem 
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insuperable [1]. 
These are obstacles which occur in the process of 
translation and interpretation; barriers which make it very 
difficult for an American (nursing) audience to appropriate a 
neo-Marxist tradition. Still, translation ~ possible and one 
can begin to adopt the orientation of a Western Marxian 
perspective, so long as the commitment is retained to lay aside 
a priori prejudices about this tradition. This is a kind of 
exploration in which participants must suspend preconceived 
prejudices about Marxian discourse. 
A very common misconception about Marxist thought is that 
it invariably collapses into dogma or absolutist doctrine. With 
this kind of a priori assumption, the intent or purpose of this 
investigation will be misinterpreted. The reader may misjudge 
the study as attempting to produce a critique of nursing 
practice, which then collapses into Marxist dogma. The study 
may be mistaken as attempting to develop its own manifesto, 
doctrine or "blueprint" concerning the social practice of 
nursing. A critical nursing perspective may be misinterpreted 
as an example of a revolutionary elitism which criticizes the 
consciousness of the "masses" as "false. 1I 
These are all intentions which the study will not fulfill, 
purposes which the investigation does not have. Critical theory 
has been chosen as a primary theoretical framework and as 
a methodology precisely because it avoids dogmatic arguments. 
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The pages which follow contain no manifesto and no doctrine. 
They resist the production of dogma in any form. The 
investigation does not criticize the consciousness of nursing as 
"false" and it does not speculate about a utopian form of 
nursing practice. It will be difficult therefore to 
characterize the study as "Marxist" in its analysis, although 
it most certainly is based upon Marxian premises. 
The intent of the study instead is to explore a broad range 
of social theory which addresses the human condition. This is 
exploring content in the humanities in a way which teaches us 
something new and unrecognized about ourselves. This 
exploration occurs through the use of critical method, a kind of 
critical, radical reflection. Through the use of this method, 
the study seeks to develop a new reflexivity [2] about nursing. 
This is exploring traditions and using methods which help to 
develop a new consciousness about nursing. It is acquiring new 
language and shaping new conversations or a new discourse about 
the social reality of nursing. 
A person learns a new language and, as we say, gets a new 
soul. He puts himself into the attitude of those that make 
use of that language. He cannot read its literature, 
cannot converse with those that belong to that community, 
without taking on its peculiar attitudes. He becomes, in 
that sense, a different individual [3]. 
1.2 Background: Critical Theory, 
--- Habermas and the Theory of 
Knowledge and Human --
Interests 
Critical theory originated as a German intellectual 
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movement in the 1920s. The movement was identified with the 
Frankfurt School, an intellectual circle which housed itself at 
the Institute of Social Research, established in affiliation 
with the University of Frankfurt in 1923. Work generated by the 
Frankfurt School came to be labeled "critical theory," an 
appelation which captures the critical spirit of the movement. 
The school was part of a more general European intellectual 
trend to rethink the social philosophy of Marx, a form of 
critique which surfaced as fundamentally Marxian, although it 
questioned orthodox Marxist doctrine. 
In the last ten years, the work of the best-known 
representatives of the Frankfurt School has come to be 
associated with two basic concerns: social philosophy and 
social psychology. The theoretical innovations for which 
they are most often recognized are their analyses of the 
structure of reason and technique and of the entanglement 
of enlightenment, myth, domination and nature; while their 
best known empirical studies relate to authoritarianism and 
the authoritarian personality ••• Sympathetic interpreters 
of the Institute's work have come to see these writings as 
amounting to a "radical and sustained critique of bourgeois 
society," although developed and presented in a frag-
mentary way. Critics have charged that these works re-
present a pessimistic cultural critique which does less to 
integrate Marxist political economy with sociocultural and 
psychological dimensions than to replace the former with 
the later[4]. 
Some of the objections leveled against critical theory have 
perhaps been well taken. The movement lost much of its momentum 
in Europe following World War II, while a third generation of 
critical theory has gained ascendance in the United States [5]. 
But this may have been due, in part, to the emigration of many 
members of the Frankfurt School to the United States during the 
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Second World War. 
However fragmentary the work may seem, it has provided some 
provocative and important insights via the critique of bourgeois 
society. Its more or less systematic accounts of the 
development of capitalism have been attempts to rethink Marxian 
philosophy. Collectively, they constitute an historically real 
ideology or world view which has surfaced in modern industrial 
capitalism. If for no other reason than because of its real 
historical presence, critical theory should be viewed as a 
significant phenomenon. It was and is an actual, historically 
real occurrence of critical spirit which has surfaced in the 
twentieth century. 
The perspective developed by Jurgen Habermas has focused 
primarily on the themes mentioned above: the structure of 
reason and technique, the entanglement of enlightenment, 
authoritarianism, domination and nature, and historical 
transformations in social philosophy [6]. While much of his 
more recent work has demonstrated a progression to theories of 
communicative conlpetence (universal pragmatics) and to a theory 
of social evolution, the present discussion will focus on those 
topics addressed in his earlier works, especially the structure 
of reason and technique (It will be noted at the outset that 
Habermas' interest in this problematique perhaps makes him more 
vulnerable to those criticisms mentioned earlier: particularly 
the criticism that he deflects the focus away from the role of 
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class conflict in history by centering his analysis on reason. 
Still, Habermas does incorporate the phenomena of class and 
class conflict in a very meaningful way into his philosophical 
frame of reference}. 
The Theory of Knowledge and 
HUman Interests 
In his Knowledge and Human Interests[7], Habermas advanced 
a theory of knowledge which has become perhaps his most familiar 
work in the United States. The work contained his famous thesis 
concerning species-rooted cognitive interests or IIquasi-
transcendental·· interests which guide the constitution of 
reality. 
It is his central thesis that lithe specific viewpoints from 
which we apprehend reality," the general cognitive 
strategies that guide systematic inquiry, have their basis 
in the natural history of the human species. They are tied 
to imperatives of the sociocultural form of life [8]. 
The imperatives which Habermas identified were the 
interests pursued by the human species in the course of its 
self-formative process. These are "quasi-transcendental" 
commitments to which reason adheres in the preservation of life 
at the cultural level. 
The concept of lIinterest" is not meant to imply a 
naturalistic reduction of transcendental-logical properties 
to empirical ones. Indeed, it is meant to prevent just 
such a reduction. Knowledge constitutive interests mediate 
the natural history of the human species with the logic of 
its self-formative process ••• 1 term interests the basic 
orientations rooted in specific fundamental conditions of 
the possible reproduction and self-constitution of the 
human species, namely work and interaction. Hence these 
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basic orientations do not aim at the gratification of 
immediately empirical needs but at the solution of systems 
problems in general •.• Knowledge-constitutive interests 
can be defined exclusively as a function of the objectively 
constituted problems of the preservation of life that have 
been solved by the cultural form of existence as such [9]. 
The commitments which drive reason are thus not to be 
understood within a biological/sociobiological, sociologistic or 
psychologistic framework. The interests which reason pursues 
are to be found within the cultural frame of reference; this is 
a frame of reference which illuminates the fundamental 
conditions of man's self-formative process. 
Habermas explicitly identifies these existential conditions 
as work (labor) and interaction. By interaction, Habermas 
refers specifically to the use of symbols, so that he is 
actually designating symbolic interaction as an existential 
requirement for humans. In the categories of labor and 
communicative interaction, then, Habermas established an 
existential grounding for his theory of knowledge. 
Species Rooted Interests 
Habermas begins from a premise that labor is an existential 
condition peculiar to the human species. labor is the invariant 
relation which binds humans to the natural environment; it is 
"the perpetual necessity of human life." 
The nature that surrounds us constitutes itself as 
objective nature for us only in being mediated by the 
subjective nature-oT man through processes of social 
labor. That is why labor, or work is not only a 
fundamental category of human existence, but also an 
epistemological category. The system of objective 
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activities creates the tactical conditions of the possible 
reproduction of social life and at the same time the 
transcendental conditions of the]possibTelDbjectivity of 
experience. The category of man as a tool making animal 
signifies a schema both of action and of apprehending the 
world. Although a natural process, labor is at the same 
time more than a mere natural process; for it regulates 
material exchange with nature and constitutes a world [10]. 
This argument contains the Marxist percept that labor is an 
irreducible category of human existence. Labor is the category 
of activity in which man "takes over" nature and because of this 
taking over, is able to reproduce his own life. Labor, as 
externalized embodied activity, regulates material exchange with 
the natural environment. It pulls resources from the 
environment and creates human products. In this material 
exchange, labor creates factual conditions -- conditions which 
then make possible the ongoing reproduction of social life. 
But the argument also contains another point. Labor is not 
only an existential category, a way for humans to reproduce 
their own life. It is also an epistemological category. As it 
regulates material exchange, labor also constitutes the world. 
In its objectivation, labor constitutes the natural environment 
as an objectivity, as something object-like. In labor, we come 
to apprehend the natural environment as a fixed "something" 
characterized by various predicates; i.e., we constitute the 
natural environment as "nature." 
Labor then becomes a kind of activity which discloses 
reality. It is at once a mode of action and a way of 
apprehending the world, a kind of activity which literally gives 
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humans access to reality. The significance of this point is that 
the constitution of reality, or what humans apprehend as 
objectivity, cannot be separated from the category of labor. 
The "natural attitude" or the "general thesis," however it is 
inherited from generation to generation, moves within the 
parameters of labor in its historically changing forms. 
While epistemologically, we must presuppose nature as 
existing in itself, we ourselves have access to nature only 
within the historical dimension disclosed by labor 
processes ••• "Nature in itselfll is therefore an 
abstraction, which is a requisite of our thought; but we 
always encounter nature within the horizon of the world 
historical self-formative process of mankind [11]. 
If labor is then accepted as both an existential and 
epistemological category, it becomes important to identify the 
characteristics of labor, to see what kind of action and 
thinking this is [12]. Habermas characterizes labor as 
instrumental action; action that is, which gives man control 
over th~ natural environment. While this is not exactly the 
nihilating action of Hegel, nor the objectivation and alienation 
of Marx, instrumental action seems to lend itself to either of 
these interpretations. 
On the one hand, labor as instrumental action denotes 
technical control over natural processes; an interpretation 
which can be taken as anihilating nature. On the other hand, 
instrumental action also denotes reproduction of the material 
base of life and reproduction of human existence, an 
interpretation which can be taken as the externalization and 
11 
objectivation of man -- or the humanization of nature. Habermas 
preserves both of these interpretations in a treatment of labor 
which emphasizes the cultural, historical analyses of Marx. 
(Marx discloses) the invariant relation of the species to 
its natural environment, which is established by the 
behavioral system of "instrumental action" -- for labor 
processes are the "perpetual, natural necessity of human 
life." The conditions of instrumental action arose 
contingently in the natural evolution of the human species. 
At the same time, however, with transcendental necessity, 
they bind our knowledge of nature to the interest of 
possible technical control over natural processes. The 
objectivity of the possible objects of experience is 
constituted within a conceptual-perceptual scheme rooted 
in deep-seated structures of human action; this scheme is 
equally binding on all subjects that keep alive through 
labor. The objectivity of the possible objects of 
experience is thus grounded in the identity of a natural 
substratum, namely that of the bodily organization of man, 
which is oriented toward action ••• [13] 
The behavioral mode of instrumental action is an 
existential category which arose contingently in the evolution 
of the human species. It is a mode of action which arose 
primarily because of man1s bodily organization; i.e., because of 
certain structural properties (e.g., the ability to make tools) 
and because of an underdeveloped instinctual organization (the 
completion of organismic developments in the human infant after 
birth). Instrumental action arose as humans secured their own 
survival and produced environmental conditions which could sup-
port life. 
But while it arose contingently, instrumental action binds 
our knowledge of nature to an instrumental orientation. This 
involves the argument that instrumental action is both an 
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existential and an epistemological category. As a way of 
apprehending nature~ instrumental action contains a conceptual-
perceptual scheme which discloses reality from the standpoint of 
possible prediction and control. This cognitive interest in 
possible technical control over natural processes is a 
conceptual-perceptual scheme which is rooted in the existential 
requirement of instrumental action. It may not be eliminated, 
so long as human subjects stay alive through instrumental 
action. 
The cognitive-perceptual scheme associated with labor was 
labeled by Habermas as technical interest. This was one of 
three cognitive interests which Habermas characterized as 
knowledge-constitutive. It was presented as a fundamental 
epistemological orientation, rooted in the existential 
requirements of man. Knowledge-constitutive interests, like 
technical interest, were then presented as fundamental 
cognitive-perceptual orientations which mediate access to 
reality. 
These cognitive interests are of significance neither for 
the psychology nor for the sociology of knowledge, nor for 
the critique of ideology in any narrower sense; for they 
are invariant. [They are notJ influences on cognition that 
have to be eliminated for the sake of objectivity of 
knowledge; rather they themselves determine the aspect 
under which reality can be objectified, and thus made 
accessible to experience in the first place [14J. 
Habermas argued that the history of the human species 
demonstrates one quasi transcendental cognitive orientation which 
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he labeled technical interest. This was an "anthropologically 
deep seated II interest in predicting and controlling natural 
processes; a cognitive interest which is grounded in the 
existential requirement of labor or instrumental action. 
The reproduction of human life is irrevocably bound to the 
reproduction of the material base of life. From the most 
elementary forms of wrestling an existence from nature, 
through the organized crafts and technical professions, to 
the development of a technologically based industry, the 
IImaterial exchange process" with nature has transpired in 
structures of social labor that depend on knowledge that 
makes a claim to truth. The history of this confrontation 
with nature has, from the epistemological point of view, 
lithe form of a 'learning process. III Habermas's thesis is 
that the general orientation guiding the sciences of nature 
is rooted in an lIanthropologically deep-seated interest" in 
predicting and controlling events in the natural 
environment, which he calls the technical interest [15]. 
The human interest in technical control is then a cognitive 
orientation which provides technically exploitable knowledge. 
It discloses reality from the standpoint of possible prediction 
and control, generating knowledge which makes these truth 
claims. This is a knowledge constitutive orientation of humans 
writ large which finds its extension in the general orientation 
guiding the sciences of nature. These sciences generate 
technically exploitable knowledge; knowledge with truth claims 
concerning prediction and control of natural processes. 
It seems important to emphasize that the human interest in 
technical control was characterized by Habermas as "quasi-
transcendental." This is a somewhat problematic 
characterization which has been the target of some legitimate 
criticism [15]. Here it will only be noted that by using the 
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label "quasi-transcendental," Habermas reveals the synthesis in 
his work of perspectives taken from Kant, Hegel and Marx. He 
retains enough of Kant to argue that such a technical interest 
is transcendental; i.e., this cognitive orientation is the basis 
(or one condition) of possible experience. But against Kant and 
somewhere between Hegel and Marx, Habermas does not use the 
technical interest to fix an ahistorical knowing subject or an 
ahistorical knowing process. 
The technical interest in predicting and controlling events 
in the natural environment is an historically changing 
orientation, one which is mediated by human learning and the 
accumulation of technical control. Increasing competence in the 
human level of production is acquired in feedback (learning) 
controlled, trial and error instrumental action. This means 
that the technical interest discloses reality from a standpoint 
which is "cumulative" or inherited; it rests on the level of 
prediction and control achieved in previous generations. 
Technically exploitable knowledge ••• is acquired through 
trial and error in the realm of feedback controlled action • 
• • the level [of productionJ designates that of a 
cumulative learning process and thus determines the 
conditions under which new technical knowledge arises [17J. 
Beyond the existential requirement for instrumental action 
and its associated technical interest, Habermas also identified 
a second existential requirement for humans. The condition he 
labeled "interaction," a term which refers to the processes of 
symbolic or communicative action. Habermas presents his 
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argument concerning communicative interaction as a corrective 
for a fundamental error in the work of Marx. According to 
Habermas, Marx reduced the self-formative process of the species 
to the single condition of labor. For Marx, the category of 
material activity (labor) designated the only dimension in which 
the history of the species moves. The sphere of communicative 
interaction, which includes institutionalized social relations 
was not ignored by Marx. But it was not (according to Habermas) 
incorporated in the philosophical frame of reference as a 
primary condition of existence at the cultural level. In his 
opposition to Marx, Habermas argues that the category of 
symbolic interaction designates equally the limits within which 
natural history moves. 
[It is necessary] to make visible an indecision that has 
its foundation in Marx's theoretical approach itself. For 
the analysis of the development of economic formations of 
society, he adopts a concept of the system of social labor 
that contains more elements than are admitted in the idea 
of a species that produces itself through social labor. 
Self-constitution through social labor is conceived at the 
categorical level as a process of production; instrumentar-
action, labor in the sense of material activity, or work 
designates the dimension in which natural history moves. 
At the level of his material investigations, on the other 
nan~arx always takes account of social practice that en-
compasses both work and interaction. The processes of na-
tural history are mediated by the productive activity of 
individuals and the organization of their interrelations. 
These relations are subject to norms that decide, with the 
force of institutions, how responsibilities and rewards, 
obligations and charges to the social budget are distri-
buted among members. The medium in which these relations 
of subjects and of groups are normatively regulated is cul-
tural tradition. It forms the linguistic communication 
structure on the basis of which subjects interpret both 
nature and themselves in their environment. While instru-
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mental action corresponds to the constraint of external na-
ture and the level of the forces of production determines 
the extent of technical control over natural forces, commu-
nicative action stands in correspondence to the suppression 
of manis own nature. The institutional framework deter-
mines the extent of repression by the unreflected, 
"natural" force of social dependence and political power, 
which is rooted in prior history and tradition ••• Taken 
together both categories of social practice [instrumental 
and communicative activity] make possible ••• the self-
generative act of the species [18]. 
In his identification of a second existential requirement 
for humans, Habermas has attempted to preserve the category of 
symbolic interaction as an irreducible part of life. The 
category of interaction or communicative action however, has a 
slightly different connotation than that commonly associated 
with symbolic interaction. It is a less conservative 
interpretation, one which denotes conflict more than consensus. 
By communicative action, Habermas means action which 
coincides with an inherited structure of power relations. This 
is a behavioral mode which produces and reproduces a structure 
of social relations (e.g., class society). It is action which 
produces social norms, social responsibilities, rewards and 
obligations. It is action which reproduces these conditions in 
social institutions and institutionalized role behavior passed 
on to succeeding generations. Habermas is here arguing that the 
production of this institutionalized power structure requires a 
mode of human action which is different than the instrumental, 
material activity of labor. 
For Marx, the category of material activity (labor) 
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designated the only dimension in which the history of the 
species moves. The mode of communicative action, which produces 
institutionalized social relations was not ignored by Marx. But 
it was not incorporated in his philosophical frame of reference; 
i.e., his historical materialism placed primary emphasis upon 
the instrumental activity of labor. 
Against Marx, Habermas argues that the category of symbolic 
interaction designates equally the limits within which natural 
history moves. The dimension of symbolic interaction or 
communicative action contains the configurations of action and 
consciousness which Marx labeled ideology. In communicative 
action, men and women produce the ideological dimension of 
culture; they produce institutionalized social relations and 
commonly held interpretations of these. 
The ideological conditions are held by Habermas to be 
irreducible and essential to human existence. Institutionalized 
social relations and mutually accepted interpretations of these 
are necessary conditions for existence at the cultural level. 
Disturbances in this dimension of communicative interaction 
threaten the survival of the species just as surely as do 
disturbances in the category of technical control. 
This interpretation again reflects Habermas· tendency to 
synthesize European intellectual history. This particular 
interpretation of communicative action and ideology presented by 
Habermas reflects his synthesis of Marx and Freud [19]. By 
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communicative action, Habermas is referring to a behavioral mode 
which produces and reproduces power relations. But 
communicative action has the additional connotation of being a 
behavioral mode in which humans suppress their own instincts. 
When an institutionalized structure of power relations is 
internalized, humans learn, concomitantly, to suppress their own 
nature. While in labor, men and women learn to dominate and 
control their own natural environment, in communicative action, 
humans learn to control their own nature (instinct). 
Habermas refers to the production of institutionalized 
power relations as communicative action because this network of 
relations is linguistically transmitted. It is internalized, 
externalized and objectified via language. Beginning in primary 
socialization, children learn to suppress instinct (their own 
nature) via the communicative action of parents. In language 
(and within an authoritarian mode) parents deposit a whole range 
of expectations and rules (i.e., norms) which regulate the 
behavior of children. This "linguistically deposited" 
experience is a transmission of institutionalized power 
relations. Through it, children learn to suppress their own in-
stincts and to accept the authority and domination of others. 
Once the structure of power relations has become 
internalized, there is a compulsion (a repression) of "internal 
nature" which humans carry with them through life. That 
compulsion is normatively regulated, legitimated or reinforced 
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by social institutions which preserve an existing structure of 
power relations. Power relations are preserved and reproduced, 
again through communicative processes of ordinary language. As 
was the case in childhood, communicative action, especially 
unreflected and uncritical interaction, continues to suppress 
man's own nature throughout life. This suppression occurs in 
the communicative processes of ordinary language use. 
Habermas is here presenting a critically important point. 
He is arguing that the behavioral mode of communicative action, 
the production, internalization and reproduction of 
institutionalized power relations, is a mode of human action 
which determines equally (vis a vis labor) the dimension in 
which the history of the species moves. He is arguing with 
Freud, that at given levels of technology or productive 
efficiency, species survival requires certain levels of 
compulsion to work and renunciation of instinct [20]. The 
collective repression of instinct, like that reproduced in 
institutionalized power relations, is an existential 
requirement, a condition which must be present, if the human 
species is to survive. Humans have accumulated increasing 
levels of technical competence and productive efficiency 
precisely because of the complementary capacity to suppress 
instincts and engage in instrumental action. 
Habermas is arguing again with Freud, that communicative 
action is the behavioral mode which symbolically redirects human 
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instinct. Communicative action uses symbols to legitimate 
certain levels of compulsion, so that the suppression of 
instinct is accepted. In other words, the compulsion to work and 
to accept authority becomes a social norm which is not 
challenged or questioned. This human use of symbols to 
"redirect instinct" means that the compulsion to work is 
reproduced among successive generations; that the internalized 
compulsion to accept authority is reproduced in successive 
generations and that an institutionalized network of power 
relations is reproduced in successive generations. 
Communicative action ;s then a category of social practice which 
fixes the dimension of man's suppression of himself. 
This point, again, is critically important, for in it 
Habermas ;s struggling to fill in important gaps; to create a 
revised historical materialism. He is arguing that in 
unreflective, uncritical patterns of primary and secondary 
socialization, in unreflective modes of communicative activity, 
humans reproduce an inherited institutional framework. Such 
unreflective modes of communicative activity determine the 
continued extent of social and personal repression. Patterns of 
social dependence and domination then take on the quality of a 
"second nature." Having been received from history and cultural 
tradition without challenge or question they are accepted as 
nonhuman entities. In other words, they are reified and rigidly 
reproduced in the institutional framework of successive genera-
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tion's. Communicative activity then fixes this institutional di-
mension of human existence. Taken together with instrumental 
activity, it fixes the parameters of man's self-formative pro-
cess. 
The existential requirement for institutionalized power 
relations makes it a condition which has been present throughout 
history. As a cultural requirement, Habermas argues that 
communicative action has been accompanied by a quasitranscenden-
tal cognitive orientation which he labels practical interest. 
Like technical interest, this human interest is again knowledge 
constitutive, orienting human access to reality. 
We call the cognitive interest of [communicative action)] 
"practical." It is distinquished from the technical 
cognitive interest in that it aims not at the comprehension 
of an objectified reality but at the maintenance of the 
intersubjectivity of mutual understanding, within whose 
horizon reality can first appear as something ••. Whereas 
[technical interest] aims at disclosing and comprehending 
reality under the transcendental viewpoint of possible 
technical control [the practical interest] aims at 
maintaining the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding 
in ordinary language communication and in action according 
to common norms [22]. 
In his discussion of the practical cognitive interest, 
Habermas reveals a linguistic bias, maintaining that communica-
tive processes, rooted in ordinary language, are a fundamental 
existential condition, peculiar to the human species. He argues 
that communicative interaction is an existential requirement 
which is of equal importance (vis a vis labor) to the self-
formative process of man. 
The reproduction of human life ;s just as irrevocably based 
22 
on reliable intersubjectivity in ordinary language 
communication. The transformation of the helpless newborn 
into a social individual capable of participating in the 
life of the community marks his entrance into a network of 
communicative relations from which he is not released until 
his death. Disturbances in communication in the form of the 
nonagreement of reciprocal expectations is no less a threat 
to the reproduction of social life than the failure of 
purposive-rational action on nature ••• Habermas' thesis is 
that the general orientation guiding the "historical herme-
neutic sciences is rooted in an anthropologically deep-
seated interest in securing and expanding possibilities of 
mutual and self-understanding in the conduct of life. He 
calls this the practical interest [22]. 
A practical cognitive interest is then an orientation which 
discloses reality from the standpoint of intersubjectivity, or 
mutual understanding. This is an orientation which is achieved 
partly because of the structural and functional properties of 
language. The communicative processes of ordinary language use 
"coerce" experience into categories which provide at least 
minimal levels of mutual understanding among members of a 
linguistic community. 
Habermas here argued that since humans have always been 
faced with the need to reproduce institutionalized power rela-
tions, natural history has carried with it a general cognitive 
orientation which aims at maintaining the intersubjectivity of 
mutual understanding. This is an orientation which does not 
concern itself with the comprehension of an objectified reality, 
i.e., that it is not aimed at prediction and control. This 
orientation aims rather at orienting human action by disclosing 
reality from the standpoint of mutually accepted norms and 
meanings. The human interests which Habermas labeled practical 
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and technical were then general cognitive orientations or epis-
temological categories associated with existential conditions of 
the human species. Habermas also identified one final human 
interest which he presented in roughly the same way. This was 
again a quasitranscendental orientation which discloses reality 
from its own unique standpoint. The third human interest Haber-
mas labeled the emancipatory interest. 
In his discussion of this emancipatory interest, Habermas 
again began from a view of the human species which synthesizes 
both Marx and Freud. He argued that an emancipatory interest is 
tied very closely to the dimensions of technical control and 
practical understanding which have been achieved within 
successive generations. 
With the development of technology, the institutional 
framework which regulates the distribution of obligations 
and rewards and stabilizes a power structure that maintains 
a cultural renunciation can be loosened. Increasingly parts 
of cultural tradition that at first have only projective 
content can be changed into reality. That is, virtual 
gratification can be transposed into institutionally 
recognized gratification. "Illusions" are not merely false 
consciousness. Like what Marx called ideology, they too 
harbor utopia. If technical progress opens up the objective 
possibility of reducing socially necessary repression below 
the level of institutionally demanded repression, this 
utopian content can be freed from its fusion with the 
delusory, ideological components of culture that have been 
fashioned into legitimations of authority and be converted 
into a critique of power structures that have become 
historically obsolete [23]. 
While the argument here seems rather complex, Habermas 
appears to be moving through the following points. At given 
levels of technical competence, the human species is confronted 
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with different degrees of economic scarcity. Given these 
technoeconomic conditions, humans must defend themselves against 
libidinal and aggressive impulses which, if unchecked, would 
threaten the effectiveness of instrumental action. To provide 
such a defense, humans produce a structure of institutionally 
demanded repression, i.e., a structure of power relations through 
the communicative activity of ordinary language use. This 
institutional framework is legitimated or reinforced by 
ideological components of culture -- interpretations of the 
institutional framework which provide mutual understanding or 
intersubjectvity. 
As levels of technical competence improve, the institutional 
framework can gradually be loosened. levels of social and 
personal repression which once were necessary, gradually become 
obsolete; a new institutional framework, providing a new 
distribution of rewards and obligations is possible. But in 
order for this to occur, a mode of human action which aims at 
emancipation must emerge. 
When technical progress opens up the real possibility of 
reducing the level of socially necessary repression, then utopian 
or tlillusory" aspects of cultural tradition can be converted into 
reality. To achieve this, utopian content must be recovered, 
remembered and nourished. It must be separated from the reifying 
pattern of consciousness which legitimates historically obsolete 
power structures. Such critique gives expression to the human 
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emancipatory interest. 
The emancipatory interest then might best be understood as a 
cognitive orientation aimed at freedom; it is a form of 
consciousness which directs itself toward freedom from 
pseudonatural constraint -- constraints such as historically 
obsolete social institutions and ideology. Habermas argues (in 
the style of German idealism) that the power of these constraints 
resides in their nontransparency. In prereflective, uncritical 
communicative action, the constraint of social institutions is 
accepted dogmatically as a natural objectivity, i.e., as a second 
nature. The institutional framework, therefore, receives its 
legitimacy from its nontransparency, from the inability of humans 
to "see through" these institutions and recognize them as self-
imposed constraints. Emancipatory interest is then the cognitive 
orientation which overturns this natural attitude (general 
thesis), exposing self-imposed objectivity and making 
pseudonatural constraints transparent. 
This interest aims at reflection on oneself ••• Self-
reflection brings to consciousness those determinants of a 
self-formative process ••• which ideologically determine a 
contemporary practice and conception of the world ••• [It] 
leads to insight due to the fact that what has previously 
been unconscious is made conscious in a manner rich in 
consequences; analytic insights intervene in life [24]. 
The emancipatory interest is then a cognitive orientation 
which unmasks previously concealed determinants in man1s self-
formative process. It exposes power relations which shape social 
practice and conceptions of the world. It exposes layers of 
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compulsion which have been internalized over the course of 
personal history and natural history. This is a form of 
reflection then which is appropriately directed both at personal 
and species-wide acts of self-genesis. It is a cognitive 
orientation which aims at personal and social emancipation by 
directing consciousness into a critical mode of reflection 
(critique) [25]. 
To summarize briefly then, Habermas has presented three 
quasitranscendental, species rooted interests which he believes 
mediate the course of natural history. The technical interest is 
a general cognitive orientation which discloses reality from the 
standpoint of a possible prediction and control. The practical 
interest is similarly an orientation which discloses reality 
from the standpoint of possible intersubjectivity and mutual un-
derstanding. The emancipatory interest is the general orienta-
tion which discloses reality from the standpoint of possible 
freedom from pseudonatural, historically obsolete constraints. 
These cognitive orientations have been presented as "an-
thropologically deep seated tt interests which are present at the 
pretheoretical, prescientific level of everyday life. Habermas 
argues additionally, that because these human interests are 
knowledge constitutive, they find their extensions in more ab-
stract levels of human activity -- specifically in the theoreti-
cal activity of empirical-analytic SCiences, the historical her-
meneutic sciences and in philosophy and the critically oriented 
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sciences (e.g., critical sociology). 
Epistemology 
Habermas offers an account of natural-scientific inquiry 
which links empirical-analytic science with the human interest 
in technical control. (The empirical-analytic sciences are not 
exactly coextensive with the natural sciences. Social science 
may also have empirical-analytic components to the extent that 
it produces statements about the covariance of observable 
events, with a view toward prediction.)[26]. 
As the systematic continuation of the cumulative learning 
process that proceeds on the prescientific level within the 
behavioral system of instrumental action, empirical-analy-
tic inquiry aims at the production of technically exploita-
ble knowledge and discloses reality from the viewpoint of 
possible technical control over objectified processes. The 
law-like hypotheses characteristic of this type of science 
can be interpreted as statements about the covariance of 
events. Given a set of initial conditions, they make pre-
dictions possible. Empirical-analytic knowledge is thus 
possible predictive knowledge. The connection of hypo-
theses to experience is established through controlled ob-
servation, typically an experiment. We generate initial 
conditions and measure the result of operations carried out 
under these conditions. In reality then, basic statements 
do not provide immediate evidence with no admixture of sub-jectivity. They are not "simple representations of facts 
in themselves, but express the success or failure of our 
operations [27]. 
This interpretation of empirical-analytic science is a cri-
tically important argument for an emerging generation of nurse 
scientists to consider. His interpretation of normal science is 
making an extremely controversial point about the meaning of 
scientific statements. This is the controversy between a quasi-
instrumental interpretation of science and a realist interpre-
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tation of science. 
To illustrate this point for nursing, it might help to look 
at a hypothetical example of empirical-analytic inquiry in nur-
sing research [28J. In experimental research carried out with 
victims of port-wine stain, researchers engage in controlled ob-
servation to measure the effects of laser treatment. After ge-
nerating initial conditions (e.g., standardized sampling, stan-
dardized treatment protocol), experimental research measures the 
results of operations (experimental intervention) carried out 
under these conditions. The knowledge which is generated in 
this process has technical utility because it discloses reality 
from the viewpoint of possible prediction and control over 
objectified processes (most would argue that this is prediction 
and control of hemodynamic processes). 
Up to this point, most hard scientists would have little 
argument with Habermas. The controversy begins, however, with 
his interpretation of the meaning of scientific statements. 
According to Habermas, empirical-analytic inquiry in nursing 
science is not presenting or approximating a true picture of the 
regular order of a nature-in-itself (e.g., hemodynamic proces-
ses). This interpretation of the meaning of scientific state-
ments would coincide with scientific realism and a correspon-
dence theory of truth. Habermas is arguing instead that this 
kind of knowledge is the expression of the success or failure of 
instrumental action. It is measuring the pragmatic consequence 
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of belief about reality; it is not measuring reality in itself. 
Habermas developed this somewhat controversial interpreta-
tion of empirical-analytic science in his examination of pragma-
tism as it was expressed by Charles Saunders Peirce [29]. From 
Peirce, Habermas appropriates a pragmatic interpretation of the 
meaning of scientific beliefs/statements • 
• • • for Peirce, the concept of truth is not derivable 
merely from the logical rules of the process of inquiry, but 
rather only from the objective life context in which the 
process of inquiry fulfills specificable functions: the 
settlement of opinions, the elimination of uncertainties, 
fixation of belief ••• the definition of a belief is that we 
orient our behavior according to it. " ••• Belief consists 
mainly in being deliberately prepared to adopt the formula 
believed in as a guide to action." The "essence of belief" 
is the establishment of a habit; and different beliefs are 
distinguished by the different modes of action to which they 
give rise [30]. 
On this account, empirical inquiry fixes belief about the 
covariance of events. Empirical-analytic inquiry in nursing 
fixes belief about the covariance of laser treatment and treat-
ment outcome. But the definition of this belief is that we 
orient our behavior according to 1l. The belief is not a mirror 
image of reality, but rather a formula which is adopted to guide 
action. The meaning of scientific statements about laser treat-
ment is not that they provide "knowledge of ••• " This is the 
interpretation of scientific realism. A pragmatic interpreta-
tion argues that the meaning of scientific statements about 
laser treatments is that they provide "knowledge that •• 




fix belief, they generate behavioral certainty; this is knowing 
that "if I engage in this specific form of instrumental action, 
under these specific conditions, I will achieve this level of 
success.'1 The meaning of scientific statements is then that 
they establish habits -- they generate habitual forms of 
(successful) instrumental action. 
The significance of this kind of pragmatism for nursing is 
not just that it is a controversial or an "interesting" inter-
pretation of what "hard" nurse scientists do. Habermas is not 
engaging in bourgeois abstraction about epistemology. He is 
making a critically important point about the nature of scienti-
fic activity as real human activity and he is presenting criti-
cally important insights about an appropriate way for nurse 
scientists to justify/legitimate their activity. 
He is making the point that empirical-analytic inquiry is 
nothing more than the isolation of a learning process contained 
in labor. The feedback controlled process of labor is a mecha-
nism which stores or accumulates layers of recipe knowledge. 
Over history, humans have accumulated an immense stock of formu-
las which guide instrumental action. Empirical-analytic 
inquiry, like that found in modern "hard" science, has appro-
priated this learning process, in many instances, isolating it 
from everyday life. 
Empirical-analytic inquiry then is human activity modeled 
on a feedback-control or learning process. This is a learning 
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process which provides humans with the behavioral certainty re-
quired for successful instrumental action. Empirical-analytic 
inquiry produces this behavioral certainty by adhering to a 
fixed procedure for learning, which is the pattern of inference 
contained in normal science. 
Peirce identified three forms of inference which, taken to-
gether, constitute the logic of empirical-analytic inquiry. 
Peirce distinguishes three forms of inference: deduction, 
induction, and abduction. Deduction proves that something 
must behave in a certain manner; induction that something 
does in fact behave in a certain manner; and abduction that 
something probably will behave in a certain manner ••• It is 
abduction and induction that are important for the topic of 
inquiry. It is through them that the information input from 
experience enters our interpretations. The content of our 
theories about reality is extended abductive1y through the 
discovery of new hypotheses, whereas we inductively check 
the agreement of our hypothesis with the facts [31]. 
Peirce and Habermas both have taken the additional tran-
scendental logical step of asking about the validity of this 
pattern of inference. How is it to be justified? Why is the pat-
tern of deduction, induction and abduction a valid form of in-
ference for human inquiry? This is the same question which con-
cerned Kant: It is asking after the conditions of possible 
knowledge. 
Peirce eventually answered this question through the stra-
tegy of ontologizing. According to Habermas, he projected the 
schema of human instrumental action onto nature, proposing Laws 
of Nature, and Cases arising under these laws. The three modes 
of inference then correspond to the discovery of laws, the dis-
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covery of causes, and the prediction of effects [32]. 
Habermas maintains however that a genuinely "quasi-tran-
scendental" pragmatism would have answered this question about 
the logic of inquiry in a different way. 
If we assume that reality is not constituted independently 
of the rules to which the process of inquiry is subject, 
then we cannot refer to this reality to justify the validity 
of the rules of the process of inquiry, that is the modes of 
inference ••• The logical rules of the process of inquiry 
owe their validity to the circumstance ••. that they 
establish a procedure that increases intersubjectively 
recognized beliefs, if it is carried out continuously under 
empirical conditions. If this method is the sole guarantee 
of obtaining true statements, then these rules, as 
specifications of a method, have the function of 
transcendental conditions of possible objects of experience. 
But unlike other transcendental conditions, they cannot be 
derived from the constitution of consciousness per sea They 
remain contingent as a whole [33]. 
The validity of the logic of empirical-analytic inquiry 
then resides in its ability to generate intersubjectively recog-
nized beliefs. It is a method for settling differences of 
opinion, eliminating behavioral uncertainty, i.e., it is a hu-
manly created procedure for fixing belief. The logic of 
empirical-analytic inquiry, therefore, has the property of a 
transcendental condition (a condition of possible knowledge). 
Objectified reality cannot be constituted independently of the 
rules of inquiry. But these rules are only a IIquasi-
transcendental ll condition of possible knowledge. They do not 
represent an ahistorical, fixed structure of consciousness which 
limits (absolutely) human access to reality. 
Rather, the logic of empirical-analytic inquiry is a system 
33 
of rules which has been produced contingently in the history of 
the human species. Deduction, induction and abduction are rules 
which have been created by real, live people. They are rules 
which have been accepted because they provide behavioral 
certainty, because they generate successful instrumental action. 
Pragmatism ••• [legitimates] the validity of synthetic modes 
of inference on the basis of the transcendental structure of 
instrumental action ••• The correction and amplification of 
concepts occurs in processes of syllogistic reasoning, in 
which abduction, deduction and induction supplement each 
other. But this "movement of the concept" is neither 
absolute or self-sufficient. It acquires its meaning only 
from the system of reference of possible feedback-controlled 
action. Its goal is the elimination of behavioral 
uncertainty. The primary form of relation is expressed in 
the conditional prediction of what events will occur under 
specifiable conditions, which means in principle conditions 
that can be manipulated. Thus the meaning of the validity 
of statements is determined with reference to possible 
technical control of the connection of empirical variables 
[34]. 
These are arguments which struggle for a compromise between 
an absolute historicism and an absolute transcendentalism in 
epistemology. On the one hand, Habermas is arguing for a form 
of historical relativity in conditions of possible knowledge. 
But that relativity is not completely anarchistic, since it is 
grounded in a species rooted requirement for behavioral certainty. 
For nursing, the significance of these arguments seems to 
coincide with the following pOints. Empirical-analytic inquiry 
(normal science) in nursing is the extension of a learning process 
which is built into instrumental action. The pattern of inference 
found in this mode of inquiry (deduction, induction and abduction) 
derives its validity from the transcendental structure of instru-
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mental action. The logic of inquiry found in normal science has 
validity because it coincides with a learning process which elimi-
nates behavioral uncertainty. It provides nurses with a stock of 
recipe knowledge to guide instrumental action. Hard science in 
nursing, therefore, does not produce "privileged representations" 
or "pictures" of reality which are more accurate than lay repre-
setations. Hard science only produces formulas which make us 
better technicians than the general public. 
While nursing science might have a hard enough time accep-
ting this pragmatic view of empirical-analytic inquiry, Haber-
mas' interpretation presents one additional bite. In his criti-
cism of Peirce, he goes on to argue that the sphere of instru-
mental action, in and of itself, does not provide sufficient 
justification for the logic of empirical-analytic inquiry. It 
does not explain how humans achieved consensus about normal 
science, how they came to agree upon this mode of inquiry_ 
Reflection on the community of investigators, through whose 
communication, scientific progress is realized from the 
transcendental point of view of possible technical control, 
would necessarily burst the pragmatist framework. Precisely 
this self-reflection would show that the subject of the 
process of inquiry forms itself on the foundation of an 
intersubjectivity that as such extends beyond the 
transcendental framework of instrumental action. In the 
dialogic clarification of metatheoretical problems, the com-
munication of investigators avails itself of a mode of 
knowledge linked to the framework of symbolic interaction. 
This cognitive mode is presupposed in the acquisition of 
technically exploitable knowledge (Wissen) but cannot itself 
be justified in terms of the latteris categories [35J. 
Habermas is here arguing that the existential framework of 
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instrumental action is not only the transcendental condition 
making knowledge possible. Taken alone, the framework of in-
strumental action does not explain how or why humans have been 
able to agree in the learning process of normal science. The 
logic of inquiry found there can be used by solitary persons, 
individual investigators can think in its pattern of inference. 
But they do not argue with each other in the confines of deduc-
tion, induction and abduction. 
Rather, a community of investigators achieves consensus 
about metatheoretical problems in a mode of thinking and acting 
which is outside instrumental action. If investigators were 
only able to constitute reality from the standpoint of 
instrumental action, they could not recognize and reciprocally 
know each other as unmistakable individuals. They could not 
achieve consensus. The framework of instrumental action, in and 
of itself, cannot provide the ground of intersubjectivity which 
is presumed in normal science. This foundation of intersubjec-
tivity is provided by another existential framework, another 
cognitive orientation which is presupposed (but rarely expli-
cated) in the process of empirical-analytic inquiry_ That cog-
nitive orientation is the mode of symbolic interaction or commu-
nicative action. In it, investigators engage in the dialogic 
clarification of metatheoretical problems; they achieve mutual 
understanding. 
What does this mean in nursing? It means that as we develop 
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our expertise in empirical-analytic inquiry, we need to stay 
focused on two kinds of understanding. We need to pay attention 
to the logic of scientific inquiry we have adopted and learn how 
it can provide us with good formulas. But we also need to pay 
attention to the communicative processes which are presupposed in 
our use of normal science. We need to learn how we achieve 
mutual understanding concerning the use of normal science; how we 
dialogically clarify metatheoretical problems; how we achieve 
intersubjectivity; how we justify our use of empirical-analytic 
inquiry. If we stay focused exclusively on our skills in 
empirical-analytic inquiry, we end up being unable to justify our 
use of normal science, literally not knowing what we are doing or 
why. 
This is a critically important point which justifies some 
reiteration. If empirical-analytic inquiry (conforming to the 
pattern of deduction-induction-abduction) is accepted as a valid 
mode of understanding in nursing, then we have chosen to accept 
the logic and method of the natural sciences to help us become 
better technicians; to increase our success at instrumental 
action. But if this is the only mode of understanding which we 
accept as valid, then we have chosen a form of human 
understanding which cannot account for itself. 
The existential framework of instrumental action can only 
frame reality from the perspective of technical control. It will 
only admit problems and questions related to instrumental 
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activity. It will not admit questions concerning understanding, 
if by understanding we mean mutually accepted meaning. It will 
not admit questions or debate on the topic of itself; it will not 
admit questions such as "why is this a valid form of knowing." 
It literally is a kind of understanding which cannot account for 
itself or justify itself. 
To feel comfortable and confident in our use of normal 
science, nurses need to recognize another form of understanding 
which is presupposed in empirical-analytic inquiry. This is the 
kind of understanding which Habermas identified in the dialogic 
activity of investigators. It is a kind of knowing which is 
outside the pragmatist program of Peirce. This is hermeneutic 
understanding, the ground of intersubjectivity which is achieved 
not in instrumental action, but in communicative (symbolic) 
interaction. 
In its very structure, hermeneutic understanding is designed 
to guarantee, within cultural traditions, the possible 
action-orienting self-undertstanding of individuals and 
groups as well as reciprocal understanding between different 
individuals and groups. It makes possible the form of 
unconstrained consensus and type of open intersubject1vity 
on which communicative action depends. It bans the danger 
of communication breakdown in both dimensions: the vertical 
one of one's own individual life history and the collective 
tradition to which one belongs, and the horizontal one of 
mediating between the traditions of different individuals, 
groups and cultures. When these communication flows break 
off and the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding is 
either rigidified or falls apart, a condition of survival is 
disturbed, one that is as elementary as the complementary 
condition of the success of instrumental action: namely the 
possibility of unconstrained agreement and non-violent 
recognition. Because this is the presupposition of 
practice, we call the knowledge constructive interest of 
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the cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) "practical" 
[36]. 
Habermas is here arguing that the dialogic activity of 
humans, those forms of communicative interaction which occur via 
ordinary language use, produce a dimension of understanding which 
is presupposed in scientific inquiry. This is a dimension of 
understanding which he called hermeneutic, meaning that it 
produces reciprocal understanding, or shared, common interpreta-
tions among different individuals and groups. In its structure 
or in its logic, hermeneutic understanding differs fundamentally 
from the logic of scientific inquiry. This is a structure which 
does not follow the lines of deduction, induction and abduction. 
The structure of hermeneutic understanding is dialogic, it takes 
its form from the logic of ordinary language. 
The historical-hermeneutic sciences gain knowledge in a 
different methodological framework. Here the meaning of the 
validity of propositions is not constituted in the frame of 
reference of technical control ••• theories are not 
constructed deductively and experience is not organized with 
regard to the success of operations. Access to the facts is 
provided by the undertstanding of meaning, not observation. 
The verification of lawlike hypotheses in the empirical-
analytic sciences has its counterpart here in the 
interpretation of texts. Thus the rules of hermeneutics 
determine the possible meaning of the validity of statements 
of the cultural sciences ••• The subject of hermeneutic 
understanding establishes communication between (two) 
worlds ••• hermeneutic inquiry discloses reality subject to 
a constitute interest in the preservation and expansion of 
the intersubjectivity of possible action-orienting mutual 
understanding. The understanding of meaning is directed in 
its very structure toward the attainment of possible 
consensus among actors in the framework of a self-
understanding derived from tradition [37] 
Understanding in the (nonpositivistic) historical-
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hermeneutic sciences then proceeds according to the rules of 
interpretation. This is a process of interpreting texts, 
clarifying meaning or of understanding another tradition, where 
subjects can, ~ principle, reach consensus or mutual agreement. 
This is the kind of action-orienting intersubjectivity which 
makes possible the taken for granted, unconstrained agreement 
and nonviolent recognition which is presupposed in ordinary 
language use and in everyday life [38]. The historical-
hermeneutic sciences then differ fundamentally from the 
empirical-analytic sciences, in both their goals or purposes, in 
their access to data, in their processes of verification, and in 
the meaning of their statements. The clarification of these 
differences and an appropriate use of both forms of science 
remains as an important task for nurse-intellectuals [39]. 
A final form of understanding identified by Habermas was 
again linked to the existential requirement for emancipation. 
Habermas described the critical sciences and philosophy as forms 
of knowledge which objectify emancipatory reason. He 
characterized this form of knowing as follows: 
When reason constitutes itself in terms of a critique of 
reified consciousness, then its viewpoint, namely idealism, 
cannot be compelled by means of arguments according to the 
rules of logic alone. In order to divest oneself rationally 
of the limitations of dogmatism, one must first have made 
the interest of reason one's own: The ultimate basis of the 
difference between the idealist and the dogmatist is thus 
the difference of interest. The desire for emancipation and 
an original act of freedom are presupposed •.• [40]. 
A form of reason which is driven by an interest ;n freedom 
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is something which is different, in kind, than that natural 
attitude which Habermas calls reified consciousness. The 
commonly held, natural attitude takes itself to be reflecting 
reality or nature as if it (the natural attitude) were a mirror 
[41]. Emancipatory reason, on the other hand, begins from a 
desire for freedom. This original act takes emancipatory reason 
(idealism) beyond the reified images of reality held in any 
particular epoch. Emancipatory reason is thus a strange bird, 
something which refuses to be confined to the cages of existent 
reality/experience. 
Habermas finds reason, in all its forms to be committed or 
guided by a human interest. Reason in the form of the natural 
attitude is consciousness committed to the human interests of 
technical control and practical communicative competence. 
Reason, so committed, takes on the form of the natural attitude 
with a view toward disclosing reality. But at both the 
prescientific and scientific levels of practice, this disclosure 
of reality is always committed. It is a view of reality oriented 
toward technical control or practical symbolic interaction. 
Empirical-analytic sciences disclose reality in so far as it 
appears within the behavior system of instrumental action. 
nomological statements about this object domain ••• grasp 
reality with regard to technical control that, under 
specified conditions, is possible everywhere and at all 
times. The hermeneutic sciences do not disclose reality 
under a different transcendental framework. Rather, they 
are directed toward the transcendental structures of various 
actual forms of life, within each of which reality is 
interpreted according to a specific grammar of world-
apprehension, and of action. They grasp interpretations of 
reality with regard to intersubjectivity of action-orienting 
41 
understanding possible from a given hermeneutic starting 
point [42]. 
While the natural and behavioral sciences are reason 
committed either to hermeneutic understanding or instrumental 
action, critical consciousness is reason no less committed. 
Critical thought commits itself to the emancipatory interest of 
liberation from dogmatic dependence. This is the interest in 
exposing "ideologically frozen" relations of dependence, 
institutionalized social relations that in principle can be 
transformed. 
[Emancipatory] reason takes up a partisan position in the 
controversy between critique and dogmatism and with each new 
stage of emancipation it wins a further victory. In this 
kind of [critical] reason, insight and explicit interest in 
liberation by means of reflection converge. The higher 
level of reflection coincides with a step forward in the 
progress toward the autonomy of the individual, with the 
elimination of suffering and the furthering of concrete 
happiness. Reason involved in this argument against 
dogmatism has definitely taken up this interest as its own. 
• . . [It] presupposes the experience of emancipation by means 
of critical insight into relationships of power, the 
objectivity of which has as its source solely in that the 
relationships have not been seen through. • • • Rea~on has not 
yet renounced the wi 11 to the rat i ona 1 [43]. 
Emancipatory reason is here a form of consciousness which is 
committed on two counts. In the first instance, it is reason 
committed to a number of existential ends. These include the 
elimination of suffering and the furthering of concrete 
happiness. But importantly, critical thought is also committed 
to human liberation from dogma. In the twin moments of insight 
and emancipation from dogmatic assumptions, critical thought aims 
at a particular form of liberation which is freedom from child-
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like dependent consciousness. 
Emancipatory reason is thus committed to the autonomy of the 
individual; to autonomous, adult existence, liberated from child-
like dogmatic dependence. The metaphor of human cognitive 
development is used frequently to describe this transformation, 
emphasizing common moments of critical reflection and insight, 
where child-like dependent cognition gives way to adult, 
autonomous thought [44]. 
An adult state of liberation from dogmatically held maxims 
and doctrine is then an important existential end to which 
critical thought commits itself. But beyond its commitment to 
certain humanistic ends, emancipatory reason also contains a 
commitment to means. It commits itself to reason as the 
appropriate means for achieving emancipatory ends. 
Emancipatory consciousness, under Habermas, presupposes an 
original act of liberation by means of critical insight into the 
relationships of power. Here, emancipation happens in the 
simultaneous moments of insight and rejection of dogma. The 
objectivity or legitimacy of dogma comes from its 
nontransparency. It has not been "seen through." Under 
emancipatory reason, liberation occurs in an act of recognition 
which clarifies, exposes or demystifies relationships of power. 
In the concept of reason active as critique of (dogma), 
knowledge and commitment are related dialectically: on the 
one hand, it is only possible to see through the dogmatism 
of a congealed society to the degree to which knowledge has 
committed itself to being guided by the anticipation of an 
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emancipated society and actualized adult autonomy for all 
human beings; at the same time, on the other hand, this 
interest demands that insights into the processes of social 
development be already attained, because only in these 
processes can such insight be constituted as objective [45]. 
Having achieved liberation in such an original, critical act 
of reason, emancipatory consciousness then commits itself to this 
form of reason as both a legitimate-liberating means and a 
legitimate-liberating end. In this kind of critical thought, 
"insight and explicit interest in liberation by means of 
reflection converge. 11 This is reason committed to the will to 
reason [46]. 
Under Habermas, critical thought commits itself to rational 
discourse. This is reason committed to itself as an emancipatory 
end and an emancipatory means. In these commitments, 
emancipatory reason is much different than technical and 
practical reason. It is a kind of thinking and acting which 
takes up "the seriousness, pain, patience and work of the 
negative" [47]. It is a form of reason which never stops 
searching, which never accepts the status quo, which continually 
negates reified assumptions. 
We never cease living in the world of perception, but we go 
beyond it in critical thought -- almost to the point of 
forgetting the contribution of perception to our idea of 
truth. For critical thought encounters only bare 
propositions which it discusses, accepts or rejects. 
Critical thought has broken with the naive evidence of 
things and when it affirms, it is because it no longer finds 
any means of denial [48]. 
Habermas maintains that this form of critical thought or 
emancipatory reason finds its extension in the critical sciences 
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and philosophy. 
The systematic sciences of social action, that is economics, 
sociology, and political science, have the goal, as do the 
empirical analytic sciences, of producing nomological 
knowledge. A critical social sCience, however, will not 
remain satisfied with this. It is concerned with going 
beyond this goal to determine when theoretical statements 
grasp invariant regularities of social action as such and 
when they express ideologically frozen relations of 
dependence that can in principle be transformed [49]. 
To reiterate, this last epistemological category of 
emancipatory reason or critical thought is a category which 
differs from instrumental reason in the empirical-analytic 
sciences and from practical reason in the historical-hermeneutic 
sciences in its goals and purposes, access to data, processes of 
verification and in the meaning of its statements. It is a 
category which has been the target of some important criticism 
and a segment of Habermas' work which has been revised and 
changed over the years. The clarification of this kind of 
understanding and an exploration of its use in nursing research 
remains as an important task for organic intellectuals in nursing 
(those who preserve an organic link to the working class)[5l]. 
1.3 Concept Definition: The Phenomenon 
- of Ideology-
The preceding sections have attempted to clarify the 
tradition of critical theory and the epistemological framework 
contained therein. This study will borrow insights and 
assumptions from this tradition, in an effort to develop a 
critical perspective which focuses on the social institution of 
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nursing. An important part of this study will include a look at 
contemporary ideology in nursing. This is a critical 
exploration, in other words, which struggles to examine both the 
ideology and the practice of nurses in bourgeois society. 
Because the study seeks, in part, to explore ideology and to 
develop a critical perspective about ideology in nursing, it 
seems important to make some preliminary comments to clarify the 
definition of ideology, as this concept is used in the following 
pages. 
In a descriptive sense, ideology usually refers to the 
ideational sphere of culture. In this sense, ideology usually 
includes aspects of culture such as values, norms, religious 
beliefs, philosophy, sentiments, ethical principles, world views, 
etc. [51J. In a very loose descriptive sense, ideology may be 
equated with We1tanschuung, a term which translates roughly into 
the English counterpart, "wor1d view. II Here, ideology or "world 
view" captures a subset of characteristic beliefs, values, 
principles, etc. which are widely shared among members of a 
society. 
The intuition which motivates the introduction of a concept 
of ideology as "wor1d-view ll is that individuals and groups 
don't just "have ll randomly collected bundles of beliefs, 
attitudes, life-goals, etc. The bundles generally have some 
coherency ••• the elements in (ideological bundles) are 
widely shared among agents in the group, the beliefs are 
systematically interconnected, they are IIcentral II to the 
agents' conceptual scheme, i.e., the agents won't easily 
give them up, the beliefs have a wide and deep influence on 
the agents' behavior, and the beliefs in the world are 
"central" in that they deal with central issues of human 
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life (i.e., they give interpretations of such things as 
death, the need to work, sexuality, etc.) or central 
metaphysical issues [52J. 
Ideology, in this descriptive sense, refers to a form of 
consciousness which is deeply embedded -- a perspective or a way 
of apprehending reality which exerts a wide influence on human 
action. In this investigation, ideology (so defined) will be 
examined using several neo-Marxian premises or assumptions. 
These assumptions about ideology also coincide with the 
perspective found in critical theory. 
With the early Marx (and Habermas), this study will view 
ideology as existentially determined: 
The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness is 
at first directly interwoven with the material activity and 
the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. 
Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas etc. 
real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite 
development of their productive forces and of the 
intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest 
forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than 
conscious existence, and the existence of men is their 
actual life-process. In direct contrast to German 
philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we 
ascend from earth to heaven. We set out from real active 
men, and on the basis of their real life process we 
demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and 
echoes of this life process. Morality, religion, 
metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their 
corresponding forms of consciousness thus no longer retain 
the semblance of independence. They have no history, no 
development, but men, developing their material production 
and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their 
real existence, their thinking and the products of their 
thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but 
consciousness by life [53J. 
Here, the significant assumption is that ideology, 
Weltanschuung or consciousness may only be understood in its re-
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1ation to real existential conditions, or in its connection to 
the real bodily activity of humans. While Marx may have empha-
sized the category of labor as the primary mode of human activi-
ty grounding ideology, this study will also emphasize the cate-
gory of communicative action or language as an existential 
determinant of ideology. 
The study will then contain the following three primary as-
sumptions about ideology: 
1. That ideology is existentially determined. (That 
existence or existential conditions shape consciousness.) 
2. That one fundamental category of existential activity is 
labor. That economic activity and class or social position are 
primary influences shaping ideology. 
3. That another fundamental category of existential 
activity is communicative activity. That the use of symbols, 
especially language, is an existential activity which also shapes 
the formation of ideology. 
These three assumptions -- an existential grounding, the 
importance of labor and language -- have been present in other 
descriptions of ideology. The sociology of knowledge 
tradition (particularly the work of Mannheim) and the tradition 
of symbolic interactionism were both perspectives which shared 
these assumptions about ideology, perspective or consciousness. 
Along with Marx and Habermas, Karl Mannheim [54] preserved 
the existential grounding of ideology in real human activity. 
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He maintained that ideology is rooted in the existential category 
of labor, as did Marx and Habermas. But along with Habermas, 
Mannheim argued that Marx had collapsed too much existential 
activity into the category of labor. He objected to Marx's 
"undifferentiated" notion of class, which reduced so much 
existential activity to economic position [55]. Mannheim then 
extended the existential basis of ideology, including other 
categories beyond economic position as examples of social 
context which ground ideology. 
Mannheim, objecting to the assumption of what he termed a 
"dogmatic Marxism" which asserts that all social thought is 
traceable to a class basis, postulates a series of other 
social groups which are bearers of social ideologies or 
perspectives ••• Mannheim does not merely impute thought to 
be a class basis, but rather, he holds the opinion, held by 
many social psychologists, that IIreference groups" are also 
basis of perspectives ••• Mannheim's primary objection to 
what he terms an "undifferentiated class concept" is that it 
is too narrow. Again, he broadens the Marxian base to 
include such groups as "generations, status groups, sects, 
occupational groups, etc." [56]. 
While preserving the existential determination of ideology, 
this tradition broadened that existential base. Mannheim still 
argued that class stratification was the primary or most 
significant form of social grouping to influence ideology. He 
thereby preserved the Marxian emphasis on labor as a fundamental 
category of existential activity. 
But he also extended this existential grounding to include 
other related aspects of social context, e.g., generations. This 
is a way of grounding ideology in social context and existential 
activity, as did Habermas. These are existential assumptions, in 
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other words, which relate consciousness, cognitive orientations, 
world views or ideology to real human activity and to the social 
context in which human actors find themselves. 
With these kinds of assumptions, a critical analysis of 
nursing ideology would relate that ideology to the social context 
of nurses, to their economic activity and to their social 
positions. It would view economic position and economic activity 
as primary influences on nursing ideology. But it would also 
capture other aspects of social context; e.g •• , generation, 
gender, etc. It would view nursing ideology as a "collective 
perspective" which is produced in the socioeconomic activity of 
nurses. 
Beyond this prejudice or assumption concerning labor and 
social context as an existential basis for ideology, the study 
will also share a linguistic assumption which was found in the 
tradition of symbolic interactionism and in the work of 
Habermas. The addition of a "linguistic turn" in the analysis 
of ideology is a corrective which would have strengthened the 
Marxian/Mannheim perspective. 
Mannheim does not deal adequately with the mechanisms that 
connect thought to its social matrix. G.H. Mead, however, 
does develop a theoretical bridge between thought and 
existential reality: . he identifies language and role taking 
as the principle connecting mechanism [57]. -----
In its emphasis upon language, the tradition of symbolic 
interactionism appropriated insights from the "linguistic turn" in 
twentieth century thought. As with Habermas and most other forms 
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of social theory, the work of Mead reflected a twentieth century 
acknowledgment of the role of language in shaping ideological and 
material conditions of existence. These are interpretations which 
preserve the notion of humans as a cultural, that is, a symbol 
producing, species. 
Mead does not argue that language expresses ideas which 
exist antecedently in all minds, nor does it reflect "data" 
from the objective environment. More correctly, language 
is a socially constituted product that focuses attention on 
specific aspects of the environment in specialized ways; 
the prevailing universe of discourse establishes a 
framework for our perspectives of social reality [58]. 
Linguistic assumptions, such as those found in symbolic 
interactionism and critical theory, are an important bias in 
this investigation. They emphasize the role of language as an 
existential basis or determinant of ideology. These are 
assumptions which relate social perspectives to a matrix of 
discourse or to language and symbols, as these shape our 
perspectives of social reality [59]. 
Linguistic assumptions, such as those found in critical 
theory, and symbolic interactionism, would relate nursing 
ideology not only to the economic activity of nurses and to 
their social positions, but also to the universe of discourse 
shared by humans in the twentieth century industrial capitalism. 
Nursing ideology would then be linked to the communicative 
interaction of nurses, to the use of symbols and language by 
nurses as participants in modern industrial society. 
These assumptions, then, produce a perspective about 
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ideology which links it to real human activity. This is 
focusing on ideology as a collective perspective or a frame of 
reference which is produced in the bodily activity of humans. 
In its existential assumptions, this critical perspective would 
emphasize the kind of class activity experienced by nurses 
(their bodily labor) as having a primary influence on the 
production of nursing ideology. Additionally, this kind of 
critical perspective would emphasize the language used by nurses 
and the universe of discourse they share with others as a second 
existential activity shaping the ideology of nurses. Ideology 
is then seen as a collective perspective or frame of reference, 
produced in the existential activities of labor and language, 
which orients human access to reality. 
These kinds of assumptions about ideology have been found 
in the work of many twentieth century intellectuals. In 
addition to Habermas, Mannheim and Mead, the work of M. Merleau-
Ponty also reflected assumptions about labor and language. 
Merleau-Ponty attempted to blend a Marxist-existentialist 
analysis with his version of phenomenology. From the 
phenomenological tradition, Merleau-Ponty appropriated insights 
concerning consciousness as a frame of reference or medium which 
orients human access to reality. But against Husserl, and with 
Heidegger (and Habermas), Merleau-Ponty argued for the 
existential grounding of consciousness. 
For Merleau-Ponty, consciousness, ideology, or perspective 
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was viewed as a pretheoretical foundation of existence. In 
analyses which resemble some of Habermas' work, Merleau-Ponty 
argued that ideological formations or perspectives are practical 
categories or frames of reference which are produced in the real 
material activity of humans. Ideology was then presented as a 
practical category which orients human being-in-the-world. 
Marx's materialism is the idea that all the ideological 
formations of a given society are synonymous with or 
complementary to, a certain type of praxis, i.e., the way 
this society has set up its basic relationship with 
nature. It is the idea that economy and ideology have 
interior ties within the totality of history ••• The 
spirit of society is realized, transmitted and perceived 
through the cultural objects which it bestows upon itself 
and in the midst of which it lives. It is there that the 
deposit of its practical categories is built up, and these 
categories, in turn, suggest a way of being and thinking 
[60J. 
This is a way of viewing ideology which recognizes its 
"centrality" or its fundamental function as a frame of reference 
which orients. The investigation will share these Marxian-
existentialist biases about ideology. With Merleau-Ponty and 
with Habermas, the study will view ideology as a pretheoretical 
foundation of existence or as a "quasi-transcendental" frame of 
reference which orients human access to reality. Ideology will 
then be seen as both an epistemological category and as an exis-
tential category, as a frame of reference which orients human ac-
cess to reality and as a frame of reference which orients human 
being-in-the-world. 
These sorts of assumptions about ideology suggest the use 
53 
of a Marxian/existentialist slant in the analysis of nursing 
ideology. That analysis would situate nursing ideology within 
the broader, sociohistorical structure of twentieth century 
Western ideology writ large. Nursing ideology would then be 
viewed as an example of those "pretheoretical foundations" which 
orient human existence in twentieth century industrial/capita-
list society. 
Nursing ideology would be seen as a collective perspective. 
It would be viewed as a "practical category," or as a frame of 
reference which "prejudices" nurses, suggesting both a way of 
being and a way of knowing. These are existential and 
epistemological consequences of nursing ideology which can be 
traced to the real embodied labor of nurses and to the use of 
symbols or language within the social institution of nursing. 
1.3 Methodology 
Since the investigation seeks to explore segments of 
ideology and practice within the social institution of nursing, 
this section will discuss the method which will be used to 
make this exploration. The method of analysis used in this 
investigation will be labeled radical reflection. This is a 
method of analysis which takes its intellectual origins again 
from existentialist phenomenology and critical theory. Here the 
discussion will attempt to briefly explicate the steps or 
structure of this method, as it will be applied in this 
investigation. 
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As method, radical reflection appropriates an attitude or a 
veiwpoint which owes some of its origin to Husserlian 
phenomenology. For Husserl, reflection was a method of analysis 
used to investigate the a priori (not psychological) structure of 
consciousness. Husserl argued for a radical use of the method 
to investigate phenomena or "objects-as-they-are experienced." 
He undertook the development of a new discipline, phenome-
nology, which he believed could be a radical "root" or 
foundation for science and logic itself. In phenomenology then, 
reflection would have been a method of analysis which preceded 
ontological and epistemological investigations. 
The current investigation does not share the Husserlian 
interest in transcendental subjectivity. It resists the 
tendency in Husserlian phenomenology (and Kantian epistemology) 
to search for an ahistorical knowing subject and an ahistorical 
knowing process. It resists the attempt to focus on'a logically 
necessary structure of consciousness and logically necessary 
conditions of possible knowledge. 
However, from Husserl, this method does appropriate a key 
phenomenological insight concerning the "natural attitude." 
Husserl labeled a naive, nonreflexive interpretation of reality, 
"the general thesis of the natural standpoint." He described 
this natural attitude as follows: 
I find continually present and standing over against me the 
one spatio-temporal fact-word to which I myself belong, as 
do all other men found in it and related in the same way to 
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it. This "fact-word," as the world already tells us, I 
~ind to be out there, ~nd also ~ j! just ~ it A~les 
ltself to me as somethln, that eXlsts out there. 
doubting-ana rejecting 0 ~data of the natural world 
leaves standing the general thesis of the natural 
standpoint. liThe" world is as fact-worlcf always there •. 
• "it" remains ever, in the sense of the general thesis, a 
world that has its being out there [61]. 
For Husserl, the general thesis of a world or reality with 
its own independent eXistence, is the characteristic attitude of 
a natural (naive) standpoint. Husserl proposed a method, or a 
series of steps, which he believed could radically alter the 
natural thesis. 
Instead now of remaining at this standpoint, we propose to 
alter it radically ••• We put out of action the general 
thesis which belongs to the essence of the natural 
standpoint, we place in brackets whatever it includes 
respecting the nature of Being: this entire natural world 
therefore which is continually "there for us," "present to 
our hand" and will ever remain there is a "fact-world ll of 
which we continue to be conscious ••• If I do this, I do 
not then deny this "world," as though I were a sophist, I 
do not douor-that it is there as though I were a skeptic; 
but I use the phenomenological epoche, which completely 
bars me from using any judgment that concerns spatio-
temporal existence (Oasein) [62]. 
Bracketing 
From Husserl, this investigation will retain a modified 
version of this methodological step. An important first step in 
radical reflection is a "bracketing" of the natural thesis. As 
Husserl (and later Merleau-Ponty) argued, this "bracketing" is a 
step which includes neither doubt nor denial of the world. 
Bracketing is rather a kind of suspension, where all judgment 
concerning a spatiotemporal world is placed in abeyance. 
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Reflection does not withdraw from the world towards the 
unity of consciousness as the world's basis; it steps back 
to watch the forms of transcendence fly up like sparks from 
a fire; it slakens the intentional threads which attach us 
to the world and thus brings them to our notice ••• in 
order to see the world and grasp i~as-paradoxical, we must 
break with our familiar acceptance of it ••• [63J. 
In this investigation, radical reflection begins with this 
kind of suspension, bracketing or epoche. This a temporary 
"slackening" of intentional ties to an external world. It is 
temporarily suspending all judgment about a given, external 
reality. The first step of radical reflection is then a 
bracketing of the natural thesis. 
In successive steps, the method takes its inspiration 
primarily from the existentialist version of phenomenology. 
With Merleau-Pointy, this method does not find pure 
consciousness as a residuum which is left over after the 
reduction$ Instead, as the method suspends the natural 
attitude, it discovers the existential layer of the Lebenswelt 
or "life world;" it discovers the prereflective foundation of 
being-in-the-world. 
[From this e~ocheJ we can learn nothing but the unmotivated 
upsurge of t e world. The most important lesson which the 
reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete 
reduction ••• since we are in the world, since indeed our 
reflections are carried out in the temporal flux on to 
which we are trying to seize, there is no thought which 
embraces all our thought. The philosopher is a perpetual 
beginner ... radical reflection amounts to a consciousness 
of its own dependence on an unreflective life ••• [64J. 
In this investigation, the initial step of bracketing helps 
to suspend judgment about a given, external spatio-temporal 
57 
reality. But this bracketing is only a IItemporary slackening" 
of intentional ties to the world. What it discovers behind 
those ties is an "unmotivated upsurge of the world," or more 
precisely, of human-being-in-the-world. After the epoche, the 
method does not find pure consciousness, but rather a 
prereflective layer of being-in-the-world. The reduction helps 
us to discover the impossibility of a complete reduction. It 
draws our attention not to an external reality-in-itself and not 
to a pure eidetic consciousness -- but rather to a prereflective 
foundation of being-in-the-world. This is discovering, again, 
the existential foundation of consciousness. 
Historia: Historical Recovery 
The next step in radical reflection goes on to explore this 
prereflective "life-world." In its second step, the method 
includes a process of historical recovery_ In this step, the 
method attempts to reconstruct or recover other historical 
traditions which have led to our current existential modes, our 
unreflective ways of being-in-the-world and our interpretations 
of rea1ity. This kind of historical reflection resembles 
introspection, since it attempts to remember or reconstruct the 
genesis of our historical selves. 
In this step of historical reflection, the method recovers 
concrete historical examples of human being-in-the-world as this 
has changed over time. This is remembering other times in 
history, other modes of human conduct (real, existential 
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activity) and other ideological formations, as human traditions 
which have preceded this one. 
Remembering in this way, or passing through stages of 
reflection and recovery, helps to establish a self-understanding 
or a reflexivity about our historical selves. It helps to keep 
the natural attitude partially suspended, so that an external 
reality does not become reified, as fixed, given or fully 
determinate. It helps us to recognize that other interpretations 
of reality are possible, since other interpretations have 
occurred in history. 
In its first two steps then, the method suspends the 
general thesis of a reified world, and reconstructs the genesis 
of our historical selves, our unreflective mode of being-in-the-
world and our interpretations of reality. This is a kind of 
reflection which helps us to recognize ourselves as historical 
knowing subjects who use an historical knowing process to 
constitute reality. 
The observing consciousness of phenomenology knows that it 
itself is incorporated in the experience of reflection as 
one of its elements. Beginning with natural consciousness, 
it's genesis must be reconstructed up to the point of view 
provisionally taken by the phenomenological observer. Then 
the position of the critique of knowledge can coincide with 
the constituted self-consciousness of a consciousness that 
has become aware of its own self-formative process; ••. 
For the consciousness that is about to begin the task of 
examination, the subject of epistemological investigation 
is not yet at hand. It is first given to itself only with 
the result of its self-ascertainment [65]. 
In its initial steps, radical reflection brackets the 
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natural attitude and becomes aware of consciousness as an active 
ingredient in the constitution of reality. But bracketing, in 
and of itself, is only the first step in a process of achieving 
self-consciousness. Consciousness which has just become aware 
of itself, must then go on to reconstruct its genesis, 
ascertaining its own self-formative process. This is 
recognizing how we came to be the historical knowing subjects 
we are. With this historical recovery, the historical knowing 
subject is given to itself. This is another way of saying that 
consciousness achieves self-consciousness or self-understanding. 
Having established this kind of reflexivity, the method then 
goes on to include a third step of critique. In this step, the 
method identifies epistemic, functional or genetic problems 
which may be present, in human interpretations of reality or in 
various ideological formationse The critique of ideology is 
therefore an important third step in the methodology of radical 
reflection. 
Critique 
The step of critique is an episode of self-consciousness; 
it is consciousness examining itself and becoming critical of 
itself. Kant engaged in this kind of critique when he examined 
pure and practical reason. Hegel extended that analysis, 
arguing that consciousness cannot become radically critical of 
itself, until it has reconstructed its own genesis. 
Here, the step of critique follows historical recovery. 
60 
Radical reflection can include a moment of critique, when 
consciousness has become aware of its own self-formative 
process. This is reiterating the Hegelian emphasis in critical 
theory: the critique of knowledge coincides with self-
consciousness. Radical reflection cannot engage in the task of 
self-examination until the subject of epistemological 
investigation is "at hand," -- until consciousness has 
reconstructed its own historical genesis. 
When historical recovery produces this kind of self-
consciousness, then reflection can also include the moment of 
critique. This is the hallmark of epistemological 
investigations; it is consciousness becoming critical of itself. 
For Kant, critique was consciousness struggling to identify its 
own limits. For Habermas, critique was consciousness struggling 
to radicalize the experience of critique. 
Here, the discussion will explicate some guidelines for 
the step of critique. In the tradition of Marxian discourse, 
the critique of ideology is a kind of critical examination which 
illustrates this moment of critical self-consciousness. It is 
consciousness becoming critical of itself, examining problems or 
limits contained in itself. Ideologiekritik then can be 
examined as an example of the third step in radical reflection, 
critique. 
As mentioned previously, a critique of ideology 
will be focusing on the "collective perspective" or the 
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"pretheoretical" frame of reference used by social actors. This 
is becoming reflective and critical about those prereflective 
and uncritical frames of reference which orient human action in 
the world. Ideologiekritik is then a temporary "slackening" of 
intentional ties; it is a temporary suspension of those frames of 
reference which orient our action-in-the-world, and it is a 
critical examination which begins to identify problems or limits 
in those frames of reference. 
In its critical examination, ideologiekritik begins to 
identify problems or limitations in our commonly held world 
views. It becomes critical of ideology, uncovering aspects of 
consciousness which, though once accepted as true or accurate, 
now seem delusional. This critical examination then identifies 
some aspects of consciousness or ideology as "false." Geuss 
discussed three ways in which ideology may be judged false. 
1. Ideology may be judged false in virtue of some 
epistemic properties of the beliefs which are its constituents. 
2. Ideology may be judged false in virtue of its 
functional properties. 
3. Ideology may be judged false in virtue of some of its 
genetic properties [66]. 
In the first instance, above, ideology may be judged false 
because of some problem with its epistemic properties. This 
might occur because ideology misinterprets or confuses the 
epistemic status of some of its beliefs. For example, ideology 
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might contain both normative beliefs (or value statements) and 
descriptive beliefs (statements concerning empirically 
verifiable phenomena). These are different kinds of knowledge; 
i.e., they require different conditions of verification. When 
ideology confuses these two kinds of beliefs or overlooks the 
difference in their epistemic standing, it makes a "category 
mistake" (metabasis) and might be judged false. This problem 
occurs (rather frequently) when normative beliefs are presented 
as statements of fact, or when normative-analytic theories 
present themselves as empirical-analytic constructions. 
In the social reality of nursing, contemporary nursing 
ideology might then be judged false if it confuses the epistemic 
standing of some of its beliefs. This criticism might be made, 
for example, when nursing theory presents normative beliefs as 
statements of fact. Some examples of nursing theory which 
surfaced in the 1960s (e.g., Weidenbach, Orlando, Trave1bee) 
contained many normative beliefs about nursing practice. They 
were largely normative-analytic statements which presented value 
judgments concerning the "good" or "right" conduct in nursing. 
"Therapeutic use of self" and the presence of "compassion" were 
normative features in these theories which defined good nursing 
practice. 
So long as nursing ideology recognizes statements such as 
these as normative-analytic constructions, it does not make a 
category mistake. But when nursing ideology confuses normative-
63 
analytic statements like these for empirical-analytic 
statements, then it might be judged "false" in view of a 
metabasis. When these examples of normative judgments are 
accepted as statements of fact, then nursing theory might be 
criticized as "false" in view of an epistemic problem. 
Other problems concerning the epistemic properties of 
ideology occur when descriptive beliefs are not supported by 
available empirical evidence. For example, ideology might be 
judged false when it contains beliefs to the effect that the 
particular interest of some subgroup is the general interest 
of the group as a whole. Frequently, this descriptive belief is 
not supported by available empirical evidence. This sort of 
epistemic problem might occur, for example, when empirical 
evidence demonstrates that the particular interest which nurses 
have in professionalism may not always coincide with the general 
interest of society (e.g., competent practitioners) .• Pro-
fessional ideology also exp.resses an elitist perspective in 
which a subset of social actors (professionals) are granted 
prestige/privilege which may eventually come in conflict with 
the interest of society as a whole. (The obvious example here is 
the escalating cost of health care in industrial societies and 
the cost of educating health care professionals.) 
Additionally, ideology may be judged false when it contains 
descriptive beliefs to the effect that empirical phenomena are 
static or unchanging, although available empirical evidence 
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fails to support this view. This last problem occurs when 
ideology contains an "objectification mistake." This is the 
mistake of constituting social phenomena in the same manner as 
natural phenomena. For example, when social agents "falsely 
objectify" their own activity, they take the activity to be a 
natural process, something beyond their control. This is a 
belief which is ideologically delusive or false, in the sense 
that it rests on an objectification mistake and that it is not 
supported by available empirical evidence. 
These are examples of ideologies which may be judged false 
in view of some problem with their epistemic properties. But an 
ideology may also be judged false because of some of its 
functional properties. Here ideology carries a pejorative 
connotation when it functions to stabilize or legitimize certain 
kinds of social institutions and practices or when it functions 
to obscure or to conceal the repressive nature of certain social 
formations. Ideology may then be judged false when it supports 
or justifies reprehensible social relations, unjust social 
practices, exploitative institutions, hegemony or domination. 
This is the sense in which Habermas described the 
legitimating function of ideology in social formations under 
capitalism: 
With private ownership of the means of production, a power 
relationship is institutionalized in class societies, which 
in the long run threatens social integration; for the 
opposition of interests established in the class 
relationship represents a conflict potential. Of course, 
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within the framework of a legitimate order of authority, 
the opposition of interests can be kept latent and 
integrated for a certain time. This is the achievement of 
legitimating world-views or ideologies. They remove the 
counter factual validity claims of normative structures 
from the sphere of public thematization and testing. The 
order of authority is justified by falling back on 
traditional world views and a conventional civic ethic 
[67]. 
Here, ideology legitimizes authority structures by 
removing them from the sphere of public testing. Under 
capitalism, power relationships continue because of 
"ideologically false," counterfactual validity claims. That is, 
the normative components of ideology commonly make a validity 
claim concerning the existing authority structure; e.g., that 
the current corporate employer/employee authority structure is 
a valid form of social organization. 
But this is a validity claim which does not derive from 
empirical testing. The authority structure is prevented from 
ever reaching the stage of public testing because traditional 
world views and "conventional civic ethics" close off the 
possibility of verification/falsification. "Class society is 
valid; there is no reason to test it." 
The function of justifying or stabilizing certain hegemonic 
aspects of social reality by removing them from the sphere of 
empirical verification is a property which makes ideology 
"false" or delusive. It is delusive because it obscures 
exploitative conditions or domination or repression, never 
allowing these to be tested empirically. But this criticism of 
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"false" consciousness does not imply that all forms of 
domination, authority or repression may just be eliminated; or 
that the legitimacy of any and all power relations is to be 
questioned. Rather, ideology may be judged false if it 
legitimizes a level of domination or repression which is more 
extensive than that required for human existence. 
Marxists are committed to the view that at certain levels 
of development of material forces of production, an unequal 
distribution of repressive normative power is historically 
necessary, i.e., necessary for the society to maintain and 
reproduce itself. If a certain distribution of power is 
"necessary," there seems no point in questioning its 
legitimacy ••• Showing that a form of consciousness 
supports unequal distribution of power does not, in itself, 
give us reason to reject the form of consciousness --
unless we also know that this distribution of power is not 
at present necessary. To say that a society imposes 
"surplus repression" on its members is to say that it 
frustrates their preferences to a greater extent than is 
necessary for it to maintain and reproduce itself ••• We 
could then define ideology as a (false) form of 
consciousness when it supports or legitimizes surplus 
[repression] [68]. 
This analysis raises points which have been made by both 
Marx and Freud. At the human level, both have argued that 
species survival requires the collective effort of individuals 
to secure technical control over the external environment. 
Economic scarcity, in turn, requires that aggressive and 
libidinal impulses be suppressed; that society restrict the 
number of its members and divert their energies from sexual 
activity to work. But as the forces of production expand, 
institutionalized repressions are not just eliminated. They 
become linked to the organization of society, specifically to 
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the organization of labor processes and to the distribution of 
wealth. At any given level of technological development, then, 
there will be a certain socially necessary level of repression 
(necessary in the sense that it is demanded by economic 
scarcity). But there will also be institutionalized sources of 
repression (including class specific privations and 
prohibitions) which are superfluous; they function mainly to 
secure a particular system of social labor and maintain the 
distribution of wealth. The difference between the existing 
level of institutionalized repression and the degree of 
repression that is necessary at a given level of technological 
development is a measure of surplus (superfluous) domination. 
In his work on the theory of civilization, Freud recognized 
the use of institutionalized repression as a mechanism which 
functions to maintain a hegemonic social order. 
With the recognition that every civilization rests on a 
compulsion to work and a renunciation of instinct and 
therefore inevitably provokes opposition from those 
affected by these demands, it has become clear that 
civilization cannot consist principally or solely in wealth 
itself and the means of acquiring it and the agreements of 
its distribution; for these things are threatened by the 
rebelliousness and destructive mania of participants in 
civilization. Alongside of wealth we now come upon the 
means by which civilization can be defended -- measures of 
coercion and other measures that are intended to reconcile 
men to it and recompense them for their sacrifices. The 
latter may be described as the mental assets of 
civilization [69]. 
Here, Freud captured the influence of coercion and power 
relations in ideology as they function to reproduce an existing 
hegemonic social order. Institutionalized sources of repression 
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are power relations; they impose sanctions on specific forms of 
social action to the end that an existing social order is 
reproduced. Ideology becomes .coercive when it is translated 
into an inner compulsion to conform; to accept superfluous forms 
of domination. An institutionalized authority structure does 
not require compulsion through open force when it has been 
legitimized by inner compulsion through the affective force of 
unconscious mechanisms. Under these conditions of inner 
compulsion, ideology becomes "power" and "coercion" just because 
it has removed institutionalized power relations from the sphere 
of public testing. 
The coercive force of ideology may then be thought of as a 
distorted form of communication [70]. The "mental assets" of a 
civilization, its "world views," ideals, values, etc. are shared 
in the sphere of symbolic interaction. When symbols transform a 
superfluous level of domination into socially acceptable norms, 
ideology then contains symbolically redirected sources of 
repression, "world views" which legitimate existing power 
relations. Institutionalized sources of surplus repression are 
then not eliminated; they are retained and transformed in symbol 
laden compulsions. 
Humans who internalize these ideological sources of 
repression shrink to a dimension of existence which is one-
dimensional [71]. They are locked into a pattern of relatively 
rigid behavior, reproducing an existing social order without 
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ever criticizing the conventional rationalizations for this 
order. By conforming to a sphere of symbolically transformed 
power relations, humans learn to accept substitute 
gratitification and compensation for their sacrifices. In this 
process, existing power relations are mystified, hidden, 
obscured. Systematic distortions in communication remove the 
sources of repression from criticism and the institutional 
structure of power relations is legitimized, ~ absentia, so to 
speak. 
From this perspective, ideology may be judged false when it 
prevents humans from seeing that the boundaries of existence are 
movable and that there could (conceivably) be other dimensions of 
social relations which are excluded by the present structure of 
domination. 
With the development of technology, the institutional 
framework, which regulates the distribution of obligations 
and rewards and stabilizes a power structure that maintains 
cultural renunciation, can be loosened. Increasingly, 
parts of cultural tradition that at first have only 
projective content can be changed into reality ••• If 
technical progress opens up the objective possibility of 
reducing socially necessary repression below the level of 
institutionally demanded repression ••• ideological 
components of culture that have been fashioned into 
legitimations of authority [canJ be converted into a 
critique of power structures that have become historically 
obsolete [72J. 
The critique of ideology is then the critique of "frozen" 
authority structures. When technology advances to a sufficient 
level, obsolete forms of substitute gratification can ~ 
principle be loosened. This "loosening," in Habermas' account, 
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is "helped along" by the conversion of "false consciousness" 
into a critical consciousness, this is the conversion of frozen 
world views or legitimation of authority into a critique of 
those authority structures as historically obsolete. 
Beyond these problems with its functional and epistemic 
properties, ideology may also take on a pejorative connotation 
because of some problem with its genetic properties. This is 
the argument that consciousness is false in virtue of some facts 
about its origin, genesis, or history or in virtue of some facts 
about how it arises and comes to be acquired or held by agents. 
Mannheim, it may be recalled, argued that the origin of 
ideology is to be found in the characteristic life experience 
and perspectives of various social groups. Here, the genesis of 
ideology was not limited narrowly to class position, but also 
included other reference groups such as generations, status 
groups, occupational groups, etc. From this analysis, ideology 
may be judged false (;n the sense of being a partial or 
incomplete Weltanschauung) because of its particularity; because 
it only expresses the experience, perceptions and interests of 
particular social groups. This is another way of saying that 
ideology is false because it is a partial perspective and that 
it is partial because it is existentially determined. 
The ideas expressed by the subject are thus regarded as 
functions of his existence. This means that opinions, 
statements, propositions, and systems of ideas are not 
taken at their face value, but are interpreted in light of 
the life-situation of the one who expresses them. It 
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signifies further that the specific character and life 
situation of the subject influence his opinions, 
perceptions and interpretations [73J. 
To label ideology false because it is existentially 
determined, because it originates in the life experience of 
social groups, or because it expresses only partial 
perspectives, raises a number of questions: 
If a form of consciousness is an "expression" of the class 
position of a group in society, not merely in the sense 
that it arose out of their experience, but also in the 
sense that it is appropriate only to those who share that 
class position, e.g., if it speaks only to their particular 
needs, problems, and values, then it may be irrelevant to 
those of us who do not share that class-position. But to 
say that it is irrelevant is not to say that it is a 
delusion -- it certainly wouldn't seem to be any kind of 
delusion for them, if we do reject it, it is because it is 
"not appropriate" for us and that is something we may 
determine without any knowledge of its causal history [74J. 
This is an argument which raises the problem of the 
"genetic fallacy" or the criticism that nothing is demonstrated 
about the truth or falsity of a belief by showing how it arose. 
The discovery that ideology originates in the particular 
existential conditions of social groups gives no information 
about the truth claims of ideology; this is another way of 
acknowledging (as criticisms of the genetic fallacy do) that the 
context of discovery and the context of justification are 
separate spheres of inquiry_ By discovering how ideology arises 
or how it is maintained among humans, we still have not 
demonstrated its truth. Showing that a particular form of 
consciousness arises from the social conditions of groups does 
not tell us whether or not the form of consciousness is 
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justified. The context of discovery does not answer the 
question, "Is thi~ form of consciousness a legitimate one for 
humans to hold?" 
Against criticisms of the genetic fallacy, Habermas and 
earlier members of the Frankfurt School held that ideology could 
be judged false in virtue of its genetic properties, or because 
of problems with the social conditions in which ideology arises. 
Here, a form of consciousness may be judged false in virtue of 
its genetic properties if it originates in conditions of 
distorted communication about which humans are basically 
ignorant. This is the argument that humans accept ideologically 
frozen world views under conditions of coercion which are not 
acknowledged or recognized. 
In the case of ideologies, it isn't just that they are said 
to have been adopted for unacknowledged ••• reasons 
[coercionJ but for [reasons] which could not be 
aCknowledged by the agents. This presumably means that if 
the agents had to acknowledge that these were their --
[reasons], they would thereby not only no longer be 
motivated as they were to continue to accept the ideology, 
but they would see that there is no reason for them to 
accept it ••• The form of conscioUSness is false in that it 
requires ignorance or false belief on the part of the 
agents of their true (reasons) to accept it [75J. 
When humans accept and adhere to hypostatized world views 
under genetic conditions involving unrecognized coercion, they 
have accepted ideology for unacknowledged reasons. If the 
coercion is recognized, that is, if humans gradually learn that 
they have accepted world views because of coercion, they may 
still adhere to the world view, admitting that they accept it 
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because of coercion. This is accepting the validity of coercive 
social conditions and accepting coercion as a legitimate 
condition of genesis. It is also accepting the world views 
which arise from these conditions or denying the claim that 
ideology is false because it originates in coercion. In this 
situation, ideology may not be judged false, because humans 
basically accept its coercive genetic properties [76]. 
On the other hand, humans may also learn that they have 
accepted ideology because of coercion and with this recognition, 
they may reject the world view. This process may occur rapidly 
or it may require an extended period of tension and struggle, 
with hesitance, reluctance and reversals. For some, learning 
that a form of ideology originates under coercive conditions is 
learning that one's world views have a reprehensible causal 
history. This insight can make us suspicious of our ideology 
and we may begin to examine our beliefs and assumptions with 
more care. At any point along the way, we may decide that just 
because our beliefs have this unpleasant genetic history, still 
this is not a sufficient reason to reject our inherited 
ideology. 
But for others, learning that we have accepted a prevailing 
ideology because of distorted communication is an insight which 
does more than create uneasiness or suspicion. Here the 
recognition that one's world views have been generated under 
conditions of surplus coercion is reason enough and more than 
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reason to reject the world view. 
Among some then, ideology may be judged false and may be 
rejected when its distorted genetic properties are recognized. 
In this situation, ideology is judged false because it cannot be 
retained once we recognize the false conditions in which it 
arises. This is rejecting the validity of coercive social 
conditions. It is denying the claim that coercion is a 
legitimate condition of genesis. It is also rejecting the world 
views which arise from these conditions. It is rejecting the 
truth claims of any statement which originates in superfluous 
coercion. In this situation, ideology is judged false because 
humans basically reject its coercive genetic properties. 
In summary then, the third step of radical reflection 
involves the process of critique. Ideologiekritik has provided 
one possible set of guidelines for the critical examination of 
consciousness. Within three frames of reference, the critique 
of ideology may judge consciousness or interpretations of 
reality to be false. Ideology may be judged false or delusive 
in virtue of its epistemic, functional or genetic properties. 
It may be criticized because, as ideology, it makes unacceptable 
category mistakes, or because it has become historically 
obsolete or because it originates in reprehensible conditions. 
These are all properties of ideology which might make it 
reflectively unacceptable. 
Reaching this point of critical self-consciousness can 
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leave one in a fairly disoriented state of cynicism or 
skepticism. If there are so many problems or limitations in our 
commonly held world views, how is it possible to go back to the 
intentional world and have the same taken-for-granted confidence 
in a Weltanschauung? Can there be forms of ideology which are 
reflectively acceptable? Or shall we give up confidence in the 
ideational sphere of culture remaining permanently cynical or 
skeptical of it? 
Fortunately, ideology cannot be dismissed this easily. 
Though they may be problematic, our inherited world views cannot 
simply be dismissed as a superfluous part of existence. Having 
a Weltanschauung, using a collection of discursive and 
nondiscursive processes for achieving signification, is an 
irrevocable part of existence at the cultural level. 
Culture is a closed segment abstracted from the infinity of 
events which is endowed with meaning and signification only 
for man. The transcendental condition of all cultural 
science is not that we find this or that culture valuable 
but the fact that we are cultural men endowed with the 
capacity consciously to take a position with regard to the 
world and to give meaning to it. Whatever this meaning 
might be its consequence is that ;n living we abstract 
certain phenomena of human coexistence and in order to judge them, we take a position (positive or negative) with 
regard to their significance [77]. 
So if, as Merleau-Ponty would argue, we are "condemned to 
meaning," [78] if humans are "stuck", so to speak, with the 
requirement for ideology, the question then arises as to the 
proper form of ideology. What kind of world view would escape 
all the preceding pejorative connotations? What would ideology 
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which is "reflectively acceptable" look like? 
Questions like this raise the discussion of ideology in the 
positive sense. This is wondering what kind of ideology or what 
form of Weltanschauung could be appropriate or suitable for 
human existence. Ideology in this positive or laudatory sense 
presumably would satisfy the human requirement for meaning while 
at the same time, it would escape all the distortions and 
problems which were uncovered in "false" consciousness. 
Geuss introduces the notion of ideology in the positive 
sense as follows: 
Traditional religious world-views owe their persistence to 
their ability to meet some [basic eXistential] needs. They 
do this by providing agents with approved models of action, 
goals, ideals, and values and by furnishing interpretations 
of such important existential features of human life as 
birth and death, suffering, evil, etc. In addition to such 
basic existential needs, human agents and groups have more 
mundane needs, wants and interests which a given set of 
habits, beliefs, and attitudes, a given "culture" can 
satisfy more or less adequately. Starting then from the 
wants needs, interests, and the objective situation of a 
given human group, we can set ourselves the task of 
determining what kind of sociocultural system or what world 
view would be most appropriate for that group, i.e., what 
"ideology" (in some descriptive sense of the term) is most 
likely to enable the members of the group to satisfy their 
wants and needs and further their interests. I will call 
this task of producing for the group an "ideology in the 
positive or laudatory sense" [79]. 
Discovering a new ideology, a fully human Weltanschauung in 
the laudatory sense is something like the appeal made by and to 
the new left of the 1970s. "Ideology in the positive sense" 
resembles the following exhortation. 
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Over the next few years, left praxis must create new 
ideology and movement ••• In the United States, sexism, 
racism and authoritarianism are crucial factors in all 
people's lives and in all revolutionary calculations. A 
new ideology must perceive that reality, understand it and 
create strategies to change it, in ways relevant to our 
specific contexts •.• We can expect that our [ideology] 
will be very concerned with the role of ideas, race, sex, 
and authority, and that it will be aware of the multiplicity 
of dynamics that actually constitute most historical 
situations. We can reasonably expect that it will have a 
powerful perspective that sees in human nature a relatively 
constant good, or at worst a neutral basis upon which 
personality develops, due to upbringing, education, 
culture, work and all other kinds of socialization. But a 
new ideology won't stop with theory ••• a new strategy 
needs to provide guidelines for building a movement, 
contesting the authorities for power and developing the 
institutions and values of a new society ••• we can expect 
that such a new strategy will include a process through 
which revolutionaries not only contest power, but through 
which they also learn how to create and "administer" a new 
society. We can expect that within factories, schools, 
hos¥itals*, and all other institutions, the new strategy 
wil call for the creation of more and more revolutionaries, 
each of whom is self-confident and able to function strate-
gically and thereby able to contribute to the development of 
a wholly new society [80]. 
So a new ideology, in this instance, a revolutionary one, 
is positive to the extent that it furnishes interpretation for 
important existential features of human life (e.g •. , birth, death 
and suffering in its contemporary forms of racism, sexism and 
authoriatarianism). It is also positive if it enables humans to 
satisfy mundane needs, wants and interests; if it helps humans to 
satisfy all of the existential requirements which arise from the 
real objective conditions of human life. Finally, ideology is 
positive if it shows humans how to transcend unacceptable 
conditions of existence; if it shows them how to develop new 
forms of being. 
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Ideology in this positive sense is something addressed by 
the fourth step in radical reflectio~. Until this point, the 
method has suspended a natural standpoint, bracketing an 
hypostatized interpretation of reality. It then establishes a 
level of reflexivity by uncovering the genesis of our historical 
selves and by recognizing the hidden problems in our world 
views. In the next step, the method uses this foundation of 
reflexivity to imagine or project other interpretations of 
reality, other ideological alternatives, other existential 
modes. 
Dialectical Imagination 
As a fourth step in the method of radical reflection, 
imagination again takes some of its inspiration from 
phenomenological method. "Free variation in imagination" was a 
step in Huserl's method which followed "reduction of the natural 
attitude." Edward Casey described the process of imagination as 
follows: 
The full procedure of full-variation proper consists in one 
or more of three complementary methodological moves: 1) 
the attempted removal of all significant traits from the 
phenomenon in the example -- the effort to imagine such 
traits as absent from the phenomenon. Those traits that 
cannot be removed in this way ••• are shown to be 
essential to the phenomenon .•• 2) the substitution of new 
traits for the original ones. Here one imagines different 
traits in place of those that are initially given as 
characterizing the phenomenon ••• 3) The productive 
imagination of additional traits which are not given in the 
grasping of example and which do not merely replace those 
that are. These extra traits act to fill out an example 
that is incomplete or ambiguous as first presented [81]. 
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The use of dialectical imagination is then another 
cognitive step which helps the user to recognize characteristics 
of phenomena which are "core" or "essential" and other 
characteristics which might make the phenomenon "other than 
thus." When applied to the phenomenon of ideology, this step 
helps the user to imagine new forms of ideology and new 
existential modes which might make this ideology possible. For 
example, Habermas imagines an egalitarian society with social 
relations which are free from coercion and domination in a 
situation which he labels the "ideal speech situation." Here, 
social actors participate freely and equally in an open society 
-- where the opportunity to participate in speech situations is 
equal among all participants [82]. 
In this use of imagination, the emphasis is placed upon the 
process of imagining new possibilities, with a reflexive 
awareness that humans participate in the social construction of 
reality. "Essences" or essential structures may be identified 
in this process (e.g., the existential layer of being-in-the-
world is taken as an essential structure). But the emphasis is 
placed upon imagining other, new possibilities. 
Imagination is also called for because of its ability to 
process manifold possibilities -- possibilities which are 
"pure ll by virtue of their independence of the realm of 
fact •.• (this is) the ability to entertain such 
possibilities, whether by treating already existing objects 
or events as sheerly possible, or by projecting altogether 
new possibilities [83]. 
The fourth step in reflection, dialectical imagination then 
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helps to stabilize and extend the user's reflexivity. It helps 
humans to recognize properties or features of reality which have 
remained relatively invariant. But more importantly, it helps 
the user to recognize alternatives or potentialities which 
remain unfulfilled or frozen within hypostatized world views. 
It helps to restore a recognition that the real is evolving into 
something else. 
Dialectical method seeks to free all being from the 
appearance of rigidity and from ahistorical 
interpretations. It treats all objects as many faced, 
coming-into-being, acting and passing away in time. As a 
result, reality is comprehended as a process of becoming, 
in which reality as a whole, as well as each particular, 
individual part, is understood as developing out of an 
earlier stage of its existence and as evolving into 
something else. This entails grasping not only an 
object's positive features but also its negative qualities 
-- what it is becoming and what it is not -- for all these 
things contribute to its character [84]. 
Negotiation 
A fifth and final step in radical reflection involves a 
process which might be called negotiation. Until this point, 
the method enables users to suspend hypostatized interpretations 
of reality contained in the natural attitude. It helps users to 
recognize the genesis of their historical selves and the genesis 
of common sense interpretations. It helps users uncover 
epistemic problems and unrecognized conditions of coercion which 
have contributed to acceptance of an hypostatized world view. 
Finally, the method helps users to project other alternatives or 
potentialities which might replace these "unacceptable" 
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interpretations of reality. 
The final step in reflection, negotiation, is a process 
which occurs when these insights start to interact with the 
user, transforming unreflective interpretations of reality into 
reflexive ones, transforming unreflexive life routines into 
reflexive, conscious ones. This step very much resembles the 
kind of confirmation and transformation described in 
psychoanalytic theory. This step has been described as follows: 
In [psychoanalytic dialogue], the "patient" must recognize 
himself in the interpretations offered by the therapist. 
If he does, then such interpretations are recognized by the 
therapist as true. The important distinction between this 
method of truth testing and the method applied in the 
analytic stage is that the hypothesis itself is active and 
operative in creating conditions in which it can become 
true ••• It is the protracted negotiation of the 
alternative interpretation which may eventually generate a 
new situation in which this interpertation "becomes" true 
by having been assimilated into the consciousness of the 
patient, and thereby "authenticated" [85]. 
In the step of negotiation, critical reflection offers an 
interpretation of the historical experience of persons or 
groups. This is an interpretation which has not been recognized 
before; it is the suggestion of a new or different meaning in 
the historical experience of individuals or groups. In this 
step, meanings are negotiated. This occurs where unreflexive 
interpretations of reality collide with critical reflexive ones. 
Significantly, the meaning offered by the "therapist" is 
itself active. The new interpretation is active, for example, 
when it gains ascendancy, "capturing" the experience of the 
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individual or group with power and cogency. If, in the process 
of negotiation, the interpretation is adopted/accepted by a 
reflective individual or group, then the interpretation is 
recognized as "true" by both "patient" and "therapist." It is 
confirmed only in the process of active negotiation, where it is 
accepted by the individual, assimilated into his or her 
conscious experience, and therefore authenticated. 
Negotiation is, therefore, a step when a critical 
perspective or new interpretation is offered, an individual 
reflectively recognizes himself or herself in this 
interpretation and reflectively adopts or accepts this new 
interpretation. 
In the case of re-interpreting the historical experience of 
a group, the authentication of an alternative interpretation 
requires the previous active presence of a relevant 
hypothesis and a properly organized process of its 
negotiation ••• the enlightenment process consists, 
therefore, in a dialogue in which critical theorists 
attempt to negotiate the alternative meanings they offer 
and apply persuasion to convince their partners of their 
adequacy. Whether they will succeed or not depends, on the 
whole on the degree of correspondence between the 
interpretive formula contained in the critical theory and 
the volume of experience collectively accumulated and 
common sensically assimilated by the group. Such 
correspondence must be given the opportunity of being 
carefully considered -- and scrupulously assessed by all 
participants ••• The sign of authentication is precisely 
the former patient's emerging from his subordinate position 
on the receiving end of the dialogue, and assuming the role 
of a fully developed creative agent of meaning negotiation 
[86]. 
Negotiation is then a step where participants emerge as 
partners in the dialogue. This is a kind of discourse (ideal 
speech situation) where participants' involvement is 
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egalitarian, a dialogue free of distorted communication, 
coercion or dominance. When negotiation produces this kind of 
dialogue, that is, when two partners emerge as creative agents 
of "meaning negotiation," then radical reflection has reproduced 
itself. It has regenerated reflexive humans and re-initiated a 
cycle in which humans recover the capacity for self-
understanding, suspending an hypostatized, reified world. 
The ideal which rests within radical reflection is then 
something like a utopian dream for the ideal speech situation. 
This is the hope for a mode of human existence where various 
interpretations of reality may coexist, a mode of existence free 
of distorted communication. If, in the process of negotiation, 
a newly accepted set of meanings are established there follows 
a need for practical action which can adjust social reality to 
coincide with those new interpretations. To be consistent, this 
practical action must continue to operate within the 
methodological tenets of radical reflection. That is, it 
struggles to find interpretations which are reflectively 
acceptable to partners -- never closing off dialogue. This is 
the quality of critical method (praxis) which distinguishes it 
from an orthodox Marxist revolutionary method. 
Particularly important in this context is the choice 
between the continuation of the dialogue or its 
termination, on the assumption that the communication has 
been broken definitely and beyond all chance of repair. 
The crucial decision, in other words, concerns the 
classification of the opposite number as a partner in the 
dialogue or implaccable enemy. That is the choice between 
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the pragmatics of persuasion and the pragmatics of 
struggle •.. one has to emphasize as strongly as possible 
that, whatever the course of idealogue, it will never supply 
conclusive evidence for a hypothesis that one of its 
partners is inherently unable to embrace the truth and that 
therefore struggle is the only rational and visible 
attitude [87]. 
The final step in reflection is then a commitment to remain 
in negotiation. This is a commitment to political attitudes and 
action which continue to search for interpretations that are 
reflectively acceptable to partners. If the interpretations 
offered by critical theorists are not accepted, then the 
commitment remains to continue reflection and negotiation. This 
is a commitment which opts for the "pragmatics of persuasion" 
against the "pragmatics of struggle." 
1.4 The Archeology of Tradition 
- -in Nursing ["S'S] 
These introductory remarks have attempted to sketch some 
epistemological and methodological prejudices of the study. 
Remaining chapters will apply the method, in an attempt to 
recover some segments of tradition and ideology inherited in the 
contemporary social institution of nursing. This is using 
radical reflection in an effort to develop new levels of 
reflexivity about nursing. 
Chapter Two engages in the step of historical recovery_ It 
presupposes an act of bracketing or a suspension of the natural 
attitude. This epoche is possible if one accepts Habermas ' 
arguments concerning the human species and its quasitranscenden-
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tal orientations. It is possible, in other words, to temporarily 
bracket these orientations, if one views them as quasitranscen-
dental traditions which have been inherited in the natural 
history of the species. 
With a "slackening" or a temporary suspension of the 
natural attitude, the study attempts to recover or to 
reconstruct segments of tradition which have preceded ours in 
history. This is remembering or reconstructing the genesis of 
our historical selves. It is recovering traditions which have 
contributed to an historical knowing process; recovering 
perspectives which have been inherited by historical knowing 
subjects. Chapter Two attempts, in a very brief way, to recover 
traditions which preceded those found in modern industrial 
capitalism. It remembers modes of human conduct and examples of 
ideology found in early Greek society and in Renaissance 
society. It discovers a fusion in the genesis of a new 
tradition during the transition to capitalism and bourgeois 
society. 
With these steps of historical recovery, the investigation 
then goes on, in Chapter Three to engage in the step of 
critique. It briefly reviews Western Intellectual traditions, 
including British Empiricism, Kantian philosophy, Hegelian 
metaphysics, positivism and phenomenology. In an act of 
critique, this chapter identifies a dialectic in these 
traditions. This step of reflection argues that Western 
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intellectual traditions have been characterized as a fundamental 
tension between constrained, hypostatized modes of reality 
construction (those characterized by the natural attitude) and 
critical, emancipatory modes of reality construction, or 
interpretations which struggle against reified world views. 
This step of critique argues that nursing has inherited Western 
intellectual traditions which continue to demonstrate this 
dialectic of constraint versus struggle. 
Chapter Four uses these critical, historical insights as a 
foundation for the steps of imagination and negotiation. This 
Chapter struggles to imagine other structural alternatives for 
nursing practice and ideology. It imagines other modes of human 
conduct and other forms of ideology which could (in principle) 
be inherited and produced by nurses as social actors. In an act 
of negotiation, the study identifies three important dimensions 
of nursing practice in bourgeois society which need continued 
reflective investigation and negotiation. This Chapter develops 
critical hypotheses concerning scientism in nursing, bourgeois 
professionalism in nursing and feminism in nursing. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE RECOVERY OF PRECAPITALIST MODES 
OF HUMAN ACTION 
2.1 Introduction 
Historia is a totally different source of truth from 
theoretical reason. It exists in its own right because 
human passions cannot be governed by the universal 
prescriptions of reason. In this sphere one needs, rather, 
convincing examples as only history can offer them [1]. 
This chapter begins the hermeneutic step which Gadamer 
called historia. This is recovering the memory of precapitalist 
modes of human action. It is remembering how humans have 
conducted themselves under existential conditions which place 
different constraints on them. This recovery has the practical 
intent of providing convincing examples, as only history can 
offer them; examples which provoke the awareness that humans can 
and have enjoyed different modes of being. 
The step of recovery is itself an important piece of 
reflection, for in it, human memory recalls other traditions 
which have preceded this current one. This is an episode of 
remembering then which recalls past experience or past 
traditions. It is a step which produces insights about the 
genesis of our historical selves, generating a "self" 
consciousness or an awareness of how we have come to be the 
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subjects we are, with these interpretations or views of reality. 
This is learning more about our own tradition through the 
reflective recovery of other traditions. 
This recovery seems important. Under modern capitalism, 
modes of thinking and acting have become so reified that it has 
become difficult to imagine any other form of being. This 
chapter enters the hermeneutic circle of remembering because 
historia can and does provoke a "dialectical imagination." It 
helps human passion to believe and hope that things might be 
"other than thus." Historia provokes the realization that modes 
of human conduct undergo historical alteration; that modes of 
being go on changing and that human conduct could have a 
different structure, with different properties in the future. 
In its concrete, convincing examples, historia shows us that 
current modes of being, so massive and unmoving under 
capitalism, are not the only alternative available to man [2]. 
The chapter enters this step of historical recovery by 
directing its attention to early Greek society. 
2.2 The Greek Distinction between Modes 
of Human Conduct: The Vita Activa and 
the Vi ta ContempTafi va 
Examinations of ancient Greek civilization [3] note a 
distinction which was commonly made by Greek citizens between 
two "walks of life" or two modes of human action. This 
dintinction has been labeled the Vita Activa and the Vita 
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Contemplativa [4]. The Vita Activa was a label used to describe 
the active life of practice. For the Greeks, the word 
"practice" (7T'jEi:.J <-s ) had a unique meaning; it referred 
exclusively to the sphere of political activity. The Vita 
Activa then was a lifestyle of practice devoted to matters of 
the polis; it was the life of a politician. 
The Vita Contemplativa, on the other hand, was a label used 
to describe the life of contemplation and theoretical activity • 
."",. 
For the Greeks, the term "theory" ( eewe, L-t\.) referred to 
the act of watching, the life of a spectator removed from either 
political or productive activity. The Vita Contemplativa, the 
life of contemplation, was the lifestyle of philosophers. 
Aristotle seems to have been the first Greek thinker to 
reduce the many different walks of life to ••• two, thus 
becoming the first explicitly to contrast ••• "practical" 
and "theoretical" life. As Aristotle indicates, men of 
refinement take only two kinds of life seriously into 
consideration, namely, the "practical" life of politics, 
whose representatives identify the good with honor, and the 
theoretical life of the philosopher, who strives for the 
contemplation of eternal truths ••• When the Greeks opposed 
to each other [theory] and [practice], they did not have in 
mind abstract doctrines in contrast to their concrete 
application. Rather, what they had in mind was a 
distinction between various kinds or walks of life ••• That 
which we call theory today corresponds to what Aristotle 
called "contemplative life;" and what we call "practice" 
has its origins in Aristotle1s analysis of "political 
life" ••• In the Politics, Aristotle characterizes the 
difference between these two more refined ways of life as 
follows: practical life is the life of active citizenship, 
of active participation in the life of the polis; 
"theoretical life" on the contrary is a life 0 detachment 
from political partnership, the life of someone who is 
alien to the PO~iS; [theoretical life] is the 
life of those w 0 contemplate things beautiful, first 
divine, pure and eternal [5]. 
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The distinction between practice and theory, then referred 
to social positions or to lifestyles within the Greek city 
state. The life of practice was a class privilege as was the 
life of theory. The Vita Activa and the Vita Contemplativa were 
only enjoyed by citizens, by free men, who were generally landed 
proprieters. Politicians and philosophers enjoyed the privilege 
of practice and theory since they were free from the more 
mundane necessities of everyday life. They were unencumbered by 
the struggle for survival which characterized commercial life 
(the. life of retailers/merchants), wage earning occupations (the 
life of artisans) and manual labor (the life of slaves). In 
this sense, the Vita Activa and the Vita Contemplativa already 
constitute elistist modes of human action; they were "walks of 
life" which excluded the "productive" strata of Greek society. 
While Greeks were aware of the necessity of productive 
activity, these mundane forms of labor were not included in the 
ways of life of "men of refinement" (i.e., citizens). By Greek 
standards, productive labor was a form of activity which was not 
meaningful enough to be considered a "walk of life," i.e., it 
was not a truly human mode of action. 
To understand this elitist hierarchy of productive, 
practical (political) and theoretical activity, it is helpful to 
look more closely at the specific interpretations which Greek 
society gave to each mode of action. 
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2.3 Theoria and Episteme 
As mentioned above, the Greek equivalent of our term 
"theory" originally referred to the act of watching, to the life 
of a spectator who observed sacral/divine events. The objects 
of contemplation for Greek philosophers were the eternal, 
universal or unperishable features of the universe: "the 
totality of the universe, the order of the stars, the 
mathematical realm." The Greek philosopher, in other words, was 
a spectator of things "which cannot be other than in fact they 
are; objects which exist of necessity and therefore are 
eternal." [6]. 
The "theoretical life" included what today would be called 
"scientific inquiry;" after all, the philosopher was the 
only Greek counterpart to the modern scientist. But the 
scientific inquiry in question was rooted neither in mere 
curiosity nor in "practical necessity." As Aristotle put 
it, it was owing to their wonder that men begin to 
philosophize; one philosophizes in order to escape from 
ignorance, not because one expects some use from 
philosophy ••• [in his contemplation] the philosopher is 
removed from the agitation and transitory character which 
life has for ordinary man: he contemplates the divine 
order and takes part in its eternity, thus somehow 
transcending man's most distinctive character, his 
mortality [7]. 
"Theoria," the life of contemplation, was then the most 
sublime act of watching. In it, philosophers participated in a 
peculiar kind of thinking, a form of consciousness with an 
intentionality all its own. The kind of thinking enjoyed by 
philosophers, contemplation, had very little in common with the 
intellectual activity found among modern scientists. Theoria 
differed from science in that it involved very little of the 
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abstract theorizing which today is taken as the sine qua non of 
scientific activity. The predicative and discursive activity so 
characteristic of modern science simply were not part of early 
Greek theoretical activity. Rather, contemplation was more 
on the level of intuitionism. This was a relatively passive 
"gaze," an immediate intellectual experience which had the 
subjective character of "contemplative union" with the object of 
inquiry [8]. 
In such contemplation, where consciousness is directed 
toward eternal, absolutely determinate objects, a characteristic 
intentionality emerges. Greek philosophers displayed this kind 
of thinking with its characteristic intentionality. 
Understanding for the philosopher was an apodictic recognition; 
i.e., it was a theoretical certainty of the order and nature of 
the universe. This was a form of intellectual experience which 
"does not need to articulate itself into demonstrations and 
propositions, since it amounts to an immediate contact and union 
with its object" [9]. The philosophert~ thinking, in other 
words, was a theoretical knowing which produced for him, an 
experience of absolute certainty. This form of apodictic 
thinking and the theoretical knowledge it produced were termed 
episteme [10]. 
While it may seem improbable from a contemporary 
standpoint, theoretical knowledge for the Greeks was never 
interpreted as something capable of application. Applied 
102 
science was an invention of more contemporary times. In Greek 
society, the philosopher's contemplation and his episteme were 
not means to any pragmatic end on earth. Rather, as a 
spectator, one inquired after the eternal for the sake of that 
experience alone. 
To have theoretical knowledge in the Greek sense meant that 
one had the experience of intellectual union with the eternal. 
In his contemplation, the philosopher experienced a form of 
"expanded consciousness" which, literally, was transcendent. 
His thinking transported him beyond the transitory, agitated 
sphere of human existence into another realm: i.e., the 
eternal/immortal. To experience an intellectual union with this 
realm was to participate in it. Doing philosophy or having the 
intellectual experience of episteme, then was not a means to 
some other end, but an end in itself. It was the end of 
participating in the immortal. 
It seems important to emphasize that the philosopher was 
one who could afford the luxury, or more accurately, someone who 
had inherited the privilege of watching eternal features of the 
cosmos. Those who took up the lifestyle of theoria were those 
who concerned themselves with understanding the unchangeable 
features of the world. This kind of understanding, episteme, 
was therefore not an active engagement or struggle with the 
world, since it was not concerned with "things doable." 
Instead, episteme and theoria constituted a form of 
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understanding and a mode of human action, by which the most 
elite strata of Greek society fled the contingency of human 
existence, fixing their gaze steadfastly away from the 
transitory and human, on the eternal/divine. 
2.4 Praxis and Phronesis 
In contrast to the life of contemplation, the life of 
practice, the Vita Activa was characterized by "doing" -- by an 
active, hectic engagement with other humans. As mentioned 
above, "practice" for the Greeks had a very unique connotation 
which has been lost in modern times. Practice referred 
specifically to the life of politics and not to the whole range 
of productive activity (most forms of labor) which today would 
be labeled "practical activity." 
Today we have a hard time understanding how anyone could 
possibly identify the realm of the practical with that of 
the political. Certainly even the Greeks were aware of the 
fact that political activity is not the only kind of 
activity characteristic to man ••• Nevertheless, the Greeks 
viewed their political life ••• as the most truly human 
activity. [This is] because in order to take part in 
political life, a man had to be freed from the struggle for 
survival, that is, released from all, or almost all 
activities concerned with the procurement of the 
necessities of life. It is against this background that 
the Greek dinstinction has to be understood between "mere 
life," in the sense of a mere maintaining and pursuing of 
one's ultimate physical existence, and a "good life" which 
achieved man's ultimate destination. There were activities 
which simply did not belong to a "good life," even though 
they were indispensable pre-conditions of any life and thus 
also a "good life;" labor of all kinds, handicraft, 
commerce, in fact, all activities except those of which 
"political life" consisted and to which philosophers added 
a further activity -- that of contemplation. One almost 
would be tempted to say that the Greeks considered all 
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"pre-political" activities pre-human and that only in the 
political life were they able to see a way of life which 
transcended the animal realm [11]. 
Here it seems important to emphasize the positive 
connotation which was attached to political activity in the 
Greek city-state. For the Greeks, the politician was engaged in 
the "essence" of human activity. There was no higher level of 
genuinely human action than the practice of politics. As 
indicated, it seemed to be the case that all levels of 
prepolitical activity, that is, all forms of productive activity 
were judged as prehuman; and that the theoretical activity found 
among philosophers was judged as superhuman, i.e., divine. 
This positive connotation given by the Greeks to political 
activity stands in direct contrast to the interpretation of 
politics deposited in later periods. As Hannah Arendt observed, 
traditional political philosophy has viewed political activity 
with a pejorative or negative connotation, i.e., with contempt, 
as an activity which is superficial, morally corrupting and 
degrading [12]. Instead, the Greeks viewed the politician as 
someone who proved himself as truly human precisely because of 
his political competence. 
To understand this positive value placed on politics, it 
helps to look more closely at the kind of thinking and action 
which constituted politics for the Greeks. Generally, politics 
seems to have been a mode of human action which contemporary 
thought struggles to capture in the term "jurisprudence," 
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although politics contained none of the legalistic connotation 
now associated with this term. Politics was prudent judgment, 
"prudentia -- the capacity of judging the given situation and of 
being able to do the right thing accordingly" [13]. 
Politics was prudent judgment in the face of uncertainty 
and difference of opinion. In this judgment, politicians 
directed their thinking to issues of governance [14]. Their 
activity involved argumentation, persuasion and the constitution 
of decisions about how best to cultivate and preserve virtuous 
conduct among citizens. Public-political life addressed the 
need to preserve lithe good and the just life." Importantly, 
then, politics was the extension of ethics: struggling with 
decisions concerning virtuous life meant that one was also 
struggling with judgments concerning virtue, i.e., judgments 
concerning the good and the just. 
For Aristotle, politics was continuous with ethics, the 
doctrine of the good and the just life. As such, it 
referred to the sphere of human action, praxis, and was 
directed to achieving and maintaining an order of virtuous 
conduct among its citizens. The practical intention of 
politics [was] the cultivation of virtuous character in a 
moral-political order that rendered its citizens capable of 
leading a good and just life [15]. 
And again, 
[Practice] covers those human actions and activities which 
Aristotle discusses in his ethical and political writings: 
moral conduct and political activity. Aristotle explicitly 
states that ethics is only a part of political "science" 
... [16]. 
To state that politics was the extension of ethics is to 
emphasize an historical point which may at first seem relatively 
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trivial. After all, it is a commonplace of western political 
ideology that politicians generally are expected to concern 
themselves with the preservation of "the good and just life" 
and that the execution of this responsibility entails ethical 
judgment. But the interpretations of political/ethical judgment 
found in contemporary Western ideology are not the same as those 
found in the Greek notion of practice. Prudent judgment meant 
something different than it does today. 
In the first instance, it seems important to recognize that 
when the Greeks spoke of ethical or political judgment, i.e., of 
prudent judgment, they were not referring to a cognitive 
faculty. At least since the time of Descartes and his notorious 
separation of thinking and everything else, judgment generally 
has been equated with cognition (e.g., aesthetic, moral, etc.). 
But the Greeks were fortunate enough to have escaped this 
blunder. When they spoke of prudent judgment, they were not 
referring to some solipsistic act of cognition which descends a 
ladder of ethical reasoning from axioms to conclusions. 
Judgment for the Greeks referred less to the act of cognition 
than it did to the use of language, to articulate speech. 
The Greeks of the fourth and third centuries B.C. still had 
a long way to go to reach what today is called "the idea of 
the unity of mankind." The reason why they were so far 
removed from this idea seems to have been their insight 
that man alone of the animals possesses [rationality], that 
man is an animal rationale. But rationality to the Greeks 
certainly did not primarily refer to some cognitive faculty, it 
meant rationality as it expresses itself in articulate 
speech. And this rationality a Greek did not precisely see 
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either in the slave or in the barbarian; rational and 
articulate speech for the Greek was embodied in politics 
arguing and persuading one another and reaching rational 
decisions based on common agreement [17]. 
There was a fundamental intersubjectivity in this notion of 
rationality which seems to have escaped a great deal of modern 
thought. What distinguished men from animals for the Greeks was 
the human use of language, specifically the art of argumentation 
and persuasion. The politician proved himself as genuinely 
human because of his competence in this intersubjective mode of 
action. He was not truly human because of some innate cognitive 
capacity to elaborate ethical doctrines. Politicians were truly 
human just because they used speech, because they argued with 
and persuaded each other, reaching agreement where there had 
been difference of opinion. 
In the experience of the \,liS, which not without justification has been ca ed the most talkative of all 
bodies politic, the emphasis shifted from action to speech, 
and to speech as a means of persuasion rather than the 
specifically human way of answering, talking back and 
measuring up to whatever happened or was done. To be 
political, to live in a aOliS meant that everything was 
decided through words an persuasion, and not through force 
and violence. In Greek self-understanding, to force people 
through violence, to command rather than to persuade, were 
pre-political ways to deal with people, characteristic of 
life outside the \O~iS, of home and family life, where the 
household head ru e with uncontested despotic powers, or 
of life in the barbarian empires of Asia ••• [18]. 
From a contemporary perspective, it is difficult to imagine 
a mode of action which so easily dismissed the options of 
coercion and violence in political activity. Now, to assert 
that man is a political animal is nothing more than the self-
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awareness of violence as a fundamental part of human existence 
[19]. 
But the Greeks had not inherited the social relations of 
feudalism and capitalism, nor their ethical/political 
ideologies; e.g., utilitarian, decisionistic ethics. Greek 
society was still a communal society with a relatively fixed 
roster of values, the most important of which was the notion of 
measure or, as Aristotle labeled it, the mean. 
It was the principle of the mean which dominated ethical 
judgment for Greek politicians, a principle which explains the 
absence of coercive/ruling ideology in Greek political practice. 
Thus it is possible to go too far, or not to go far enough, 
in respect of fear, courage, desire, anger, pity and 
pleasure and pain generally, and the excess and deficiency 
are alike wrong. But to experience these emotions at the 
right times and on the right occasions and towards the 
right persons and for the right causes and in the right 
manner is the mean or the supreme good, which is 
characteristic of virtue [20]. 
For the Greeks, politics was mastery of this principle of 
the mean. Politicians were truly human because of their 
competence in the lifestyle of measure; because of their 
capacity to experience the appropriate emotion at the right 
time, toward the right person and for the right reason. 
Politicians exercised the principle of the mean in their 
judgment, cultivating virtuous character for themselves. But 
they also struggled to maintain a political order where measure 
was the norm for all citizens--where virtuous conduct, the 
principle of the mean, was not simply an abstract ethical 
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doctrine, but a social norm. 
To preserve moral excellence in the polis, politicians used 
the principle of the mean as an axiom or criterion. In each new 
situation, measure was the criterion for determining which 
conditions constitute the good and the just life. Measure 
defined the existential condition of happiness, it loosely 
prescribed happiness as a condition of moderation, appropriate 
sentiments directed toward appropriate people. The practical 
intent of politics was to cultivate this existential condition 
for Greek citizenry. This was an ethical principle which helped 
(loosely) to define the "happy" man -- "the good life" or "well 
being." 
For Aristotle, the rational part of man's soul is more than just an intellect and intellectual excellence by itself 
does not make a good and happy man. Reason governs action 
as well as theorizing. Action is the response made to 
desire, and here, Aristotle insists, one can respond too 
much or too little. The correct response lies somewhere 
between the two extremes. This is the doctrine of the 
mean. It does not pretend to provide a moral decision 
procedure. It is a meta-ethical statement about the form 
of certain moral concepts: to every virtue there are two 
distinct vices (excess and deficiency). So what is needed 
in addition to intellectual excellence is moral excellence. 
The man who has the latter has habits that lead him always 
to find the virtuous mean between two vicious extremes. 
These habits are not unthinking responses or natural 
instincts for doing the right thing. They involve a 
rational assessment of each new situation and a choice made 
in the light of a conception of what it is that men should 
aim at, what they should regard as constituting happiness 
[21]. 
For the Greeks, then, measure defined happiness. Well-
being was the experience of a full range of human sentiments 
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(e.g., fear, courage, desire, anger, pity, pleasure, pain) --
while in happiness, none of these were experienced excessively 
or deficiently. To be happy was to experience these emotions 
appropriately -- at the right times, toward the right persons 
and for the right reason. The cultivation and preservation of 
this virtuous life, both for himself and for the polis, was the 
responsibility of politicians. 
To accomplish this, politicians used a different kind of 
understanding -- a different combination of knowing and acting. 
Praxis was a kind of understanding which assessed each new, 
varying situation, making choices which were guided by the 
principle of the mean. Decisions of governance were right if 
they struck a balance between extreme sentiments; if they were 
generated in an atmosphere of measure and if they cultivated an 
environment of measure for citizens. 
Importantly, the kind of thinking or understanding used by 
politicians in this activity was a very different form of 
consciousness. It differed significantly from the kind of 
knowing which was present among philosophers. The prudent 
judgment of politicians was a kind of understanding which was 
much more contingent, with none of apodictic intentionality 
found in episteme. The form of understanding enjoyed by 
politicians phronesis had a cognitive status which reflected the 
changing situations at the center of political activity. 
The practical intention of politics (the cultivation of 
virtuous character in a moral political order that rendered 
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its citizens capable of leading a good and just life) as 
well as the nature of its subject matter (the changing and 
contingent conditions of such a life) determined its 
cognitive status. Politics and practical philosophy 
generally, could not achieve the status of rigorous 
sCience, of episteme. Because it had to take account of 
the contingent and variable, it had to rest content with 
establishing rules of a "more or less" and "in most cases" 
character. The capacity thereby cultivated, and the 
keystone of virtuous character, was phronesis, a prudent 
understanding of variable situations with a view to what 
was to be done [22]. 
The difference between the kind of understanding found in 
politics and phronesis, and the kind of understanding found in 
contemplation episteme, is a critically important one to 
recover. The scientization of politics (and of civilization 
generally) has eroded this distinction. The prudent 
understanding of variable situations was a form of knowing and 
acting which scientistic consciousness has forgotten. In his 
Truth and Method, H.G. Gadamer has also noted the importance of 
recovering this aspect of Greek tradition. He described the 
distinction between theoretical understanding (episteme) and 
practical/political understanding (phronesis) as follows: 
The old Aristotelian distinction between practical and 
theoretical knowledge is ••• a distinction which cannot 
be reduced to that between the true and the probable. 
Practical knowledge, phronesis, is another kind of 
knowledge. Primarily, it means that it is directed towards 
the concrete situation. Thus, it must grasp the 
"circumstances" in their infinite variety ••• This kind of 
knowledge is outside the rational concept of knowledge, but 
this is not in fact, mere resignation .•• Rather there is a 
positive ethical element involved .•• The grasp and moral 
control of the concrete situation require the subsumption of 
what is given under the universal; i.e., the goal that one 
is pursuing so that the right thing may result. Hence, it 
assumes a direction of the will, i.e., moral being. That is 
why Aristotle considers phronesis as an intellectual virtue 
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••• Although the practice of this virtue means that one 
distinguishes what should be done from what should not, it 
is not simply practical shrewdness and general cleverness. 
The distinction between what should and should not be done 
includes the distinction between the proper and the improper 
and thus presumes a moral attitude, which it continues to 
develop ••. (phronesis), the sense of the right and the 
general good ••• is acquired through living in the community 
and is determined by its structures and its aims [23]. 
Mastery of phronesis was a competence acquired from living, 
from internalizing and externalizing the structures and aims of 
the community. Politicians were masters of phronesis and 
therefore wise men, not because they had perfected the technique 
of contemplation, but because they had mastered the art of public 
life. 
Theirs was a kind of mastery which objectified the principle 
of the mean. To live in the polis (as a citizen) meant first of 
all that one internalized the notion of measure. The principle 
of the mean was the ethical core of Greek ideology -- the nucleus 
of belief/assumption/conviction which anchored public experience. 
In their phronesis, politicians also externalized and objectified 
the principle of the mean. They were masters of the art of 
argumentation/persuasion -- a process which externalized the 
convictions of measure, a process which made the principle of the 
mean objectively real. 
Phronesis was therefore a kind of knowing which was acquired 
from public-political life. Competence only came from doing, 
from mastering the art of prudent judgment. To have this kind of 
understanding meant more than simply acquiring a subjective sense 
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of right/wrong. "To know," in the sense of phronesis, was 
something much different than a solipsistic experience. It 
meant that one objectified a moral attitude, that one argued with 
others in the posture of measure. This was a kind of 
understanding which both presumed and cultivated a moral 
attitude. It was a kind of knowing which sprang from living in 
the community, since that living involved the process of 
internalizing measure. But more importantly, phronesis was 
acquired from living because one only gained the knowledge by 
doing, by recreating or reproducing the principle of measure in 
objectively real political activity, by cultivating/developing a 
moral attitude. 
For [Aristotle], as for all ancient writers, moral goodness 
lay in the realization of virtues, but in each individual 
case, it was for phronesis to decide which concrete actions 
were virtuous. True moral merit lay not simply in 
acknowledging the right values or in incorporating these 
value-claims and virtues into character, but rather in the 
"astuteness" with which each virtue and virtues were 
applied. It was of no use, for example, for someone who was 
unable to decide when, where, with whom, how and why he 
should be magnanimous to have a "magnanimous" character; he 
possessed this "virtue" to no purpose, since he did not know 
how to act magnanimously, and if he did not practice 
magnanimity, he would finish by losing value and "virtue" 
alike [24]. 
Mastery of this kind of understanding required an astuteness 
which was absolutely unique to political life. This was an 
astuteness which only came from doing 
conduct. But to master this practice 
from practicing virtuous 
to be politically astute 
required a keen sense of contingency, a "sixth sense" that could 
recognize variable conditions, continually adjusting or tailoring 
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judgment in each new concrete situation. Phronesis was the 
capacity to decide, in each new, changing situation, which 
actions were virtuous. 
Although phronesis was characterized by an astute "sixth 
sense" of contingency, it was not the "practical shrewdness" or 
"general cleverness" of being "street smart." What made the 
politiCian's judgment virtuous was its positive moral element. 
Judging the contingent always included a "value-judgmentll -- a 
judgment which identified proper versus the improper or right 
versus wrong conduct in each new situation. 
The "positive moral element" contained in phronesis was a 
property which made this kind of judgment much different than the 
practical shrewdness which is known today as being "street 
smart." Politicians knew how to act in changing or contingent 
situations. But this acting always subsumed the concrete, 
contingent situation under a "positive-moral" category. It could 
identify virtuous conduct in each new situation because it had a 
more universal criterion of virtuous conduct: the principle of 
measure. Because Greek politicians had internalized this 
"positive moral element,1I they used it, in each new situation, to 
act and to govern in such a way that measure and virtuous conduct 
would be cultivated among citizens. 
It seems important to emphasize that this "positive moral 
element" (specifically the principle of measure) made Greek 
politics much different than political judgment in bourgeois 
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society [25J. Phronesis or classical politics was unlike modern 
politics, with its rotating roster of values and its 
decisionistic utilitarian ethic. Unlike bourgeois ethics, where 
consequence is the criterion or yardstick for judging virtue, in 
phronesis, communal society loosely established a much different 
communal ethic, one which reflected the principle of measure. 
The contingency of phronesis, its characteristic moral 
element, and its mode of acquisition in public life made it a 
form of knowing which simply could not be compared in any 
meaningful way with other forms of understanding. In particular, 
the kind of knowing which politicians mastered could not be 
compared meaningfully to the episteme of philosophers. 
For moral being, as Aristotle described it, is clearly not 
objective knowledge, i.e., the knower is not standing over 
against a situation that he merely observes, but he is 
directly affected by what he sees. It is something that he 
has to do. It is obvious that this is not the knowledge of 
science. Thus the distinction that Aristotle makes between 
the knowledge of phronesis and the theoretical knowledge of 
episteme is a simple one, especially when we remember that 
science, for the Greeks, is represented by the model of 
mathematics, a knowledge of what is unchangeable, a 
knowledge that depends on proof and that can, therefore, be 
learned by anybody. Compared to this kind of "theoretical" 
knowledge [phronesis] is a kind of moral knowledge. Its 
object is man and what he knows of himself. But he knows 
himself as an acting being, and this kind of knowledge that 
he has of himself does not seek to establish what exists. 
An active being rather, is concerned with what is not always 
the same as it is, he can discover the point at which he has 
to act. The purpose of his knowledge is to govern his 
action •.. [26]. 
Knowledge which could direct public action was something 
different in kind than the apodictic certainty of episteme. 
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Phronesis was directed toward the sphere of human action, seeking 
to recognize aspects of human civilization which are changing. 
This sphere of understanding touches the moral being of man, 
teaching humans how and when to act. 
The question is whether there can be any such thing as 
philosophical knowledge of the moral being of man, and what 
role knowledge plays in the moral being of man. Aristotle 
emphasizes that it is impossible to have in ethics the kind 
of extreme exactitude that the mathematician can achieve. 
Indeed, it would be an error to demand this kind of 
exactitude ••• Human civilization differs essentially from 
nature in that it is not simply a place in which capacities 
and powers work themselves out, but man becomes what he is 
through what he does and how he behaves. Thus Aristotle 
sees ethos as differing from physis in that it is a sphere in 
which laws of human nature do not operate, yet not a sphere 
of lawlessness, but of human institutions and human 
attitudes that can be changed and have the quality of rules 
only to a limited degree [27]. 
To recognize that phronesis is not the same kind of lawlike 
understanding found in mathematics, is to acknowledge that this 
form of understanding is both a knowing and an acting -- a way of 
being or a mode of existence which does not stand over against 
the world, but which makes it. A kind of knowing which studies 
the moral and historical existence of man does not remain sterile 
and untouched by what it learns. For it learns that the 
conditions of existence change and it wants to know how to act in 
this change. 
Phronesis is not content to know what exists. It is a kind 
of understanding which knows man, as he does exist and has 
existed. But it knows man because it wants to learn how to live; 
it judges men and changing circumstances because it wants to know 
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how to conduct life, how to make one's own life -- which is the 
construction of something new; something which does not yet 
exist. Phronesis is only half content with a knowledge of 
existing conditions, because it knows that these are only the 
foundations of something different. 
The moral reasoning of phronesis then learns that human 
institutions (social formations) are not "lawless," they have the 
quality of rules. But they are rule governed only to a limited 
extent: this is because humans create and recreate those rules 
and institutions. Phronesis knows that the conditions of human 
existence change because humans judge conditions and act to 
change them. The judgment of phronesis is the reasoning which 
governs this action. 
The state of affairs, which represents the nature of moral 
reflection, not only makes philosophical ethics a 
methodologically difficult problem, but also gives the 
problem of method a moral relevance. Aristotle emphasizes 
that it is impossible to have in ethics the kind of extreme 
exactitude that the mathematician can achive. Indeed, it 
would be an error to demand this kind of exactitutde. What 
needs to be done is simply to make an outline, and by means 
of this sketch, give some help to moral consciousness. But 
how such help can be possible is already a moral problem. 
For obviously, it is among the characteristics of the moral 
phenomenon that the person acting must himself know and 
decide and cannot let anything take this responsibility from 
him. Thus it is essential that philosophical ethics have 
the right approach so that it does not usurp the place of 
moral consciousness and yet does not seek either a purely 
theoretical or "historical" knowledge, but by outlining 
phenomena, helps moral consciousness to attain clarity 
concerning itself [28]. 
To know, in the sense of phronesis, then meant that one had 
a general outline or schemata defining virtuous conduct. 
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Generally, virtue was moderation, it was experiencing sentiments 
appropriately. But this was only the most general of all 
possible outlines. For in each actual situation of life, the 
task of phronesis was to decide which sentiments were 
appropriate, and what behavior right. This really meant that in 
each concrete situation, the task of moral judgment was to attain 
clarity concerning itself. The task was to fill out the outline, 
a task which required reflexivity. It required that moral 
consciousness become transparent -- that it become aware of 
itself working and scanning the situation. 
This is a level of reflexivity and a kind of knowing which 
was/is, indeed, "methodologically problematic." Phronesis could 
not be taught in the same didactic way that mathematical proof 
was taught. It was a kind of understanding which prudent humans 
could "help" others to acquire. But humans could only be helped 
to acquire phronesis if they already possessed a moral awareness. 
This asks alot of the person who is to receive this help ••• 
He must be mature enough not to ask of his instruction 
anything other than it can and may give. To put it 
positively, he must himself already have developed through 
education and practice an attitude in himself that he 
constantly concerned to preserve in the actual situations of 
his life and to prove it through right behavior [29]. 
All that could be done was to give moral consciousness some 
sort of outline and then help it attain clarity or reflexivity 
concerning itself. But how this kind of help could be provided 
was/is problematic, for this is a kind of knowing which can only 
come from questions. It presumes that men and women have 
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cultivated the attitude of continually asking "what is the 
virtuous thing to do?" and it presumes that they will not let 
anything take away the responsibility of asking this Question. 
Praxis and phronesis then, the life of politics, was a mode 
of human conduct which differed radically from the lifestyle of 
philosophers. It was a kind of thinking and acting which scanned 
variable situations, judging proper versus improper conduct in 
light of the principle of measure. It was a life of 
argumentation and persuasion, which nurtured virtuous conduct for 
citizens. And finally, it was a mode of conduct which was not 
content to gaze at what existed, but which wanted to know and to 
act. Phronesis then was a kind of knowing which was important 
as a means to an end. It showed politicians how to govern -- it 
directed their praxis. 
2.5 Production: Techne and Poeisis 
Aristotle several times distinguishes between three kinds 
of thinking or knowledge: "theoretical," "practical" and 
"productive." While theoretical knowledge is concerned with 
things which cannot be otherwise than in fact what they are, 
both practical and productive knowledge are concerned with 
things dependent on man's "doing" and "making" respectively. 
Practical knowledge is concerned with human actions which, 
both for their coming to be and with respect to their 
distinct character, depend upon deliberate choice; 
productive knowledge is concerned with artifacts which 
depend upon human "art" [30]. 
The recognition of this third kind of understanding, techne, is 
an elusive task in contemporary analysis. Because of some 
historical fusions which occurred during the Renaissance and 
during the industrial revolution, it has become more difficult to 
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identify clear and distinct differences between the kinds of 
knowing used by sCientists, politicians and craftsmen. But in 
Greek society, those differences are patently real. 
For the Greeks, the sphere of productive activity (poeisis) 
was a mode of human conduct totally distinct from the lifestyles 
of politics and theory. Production was exactly this; a 
lifestyle. It was the mode of conduct found among artisans and 
slaves. It was the common way of life found among the lower 
socioeconomic strata of Greek society, not considered significant 
enough to be called a "walk of life" by landed proprieters, 
politicians and philosophers. 
For the Greeks, this sphere of productive activity was a 
mode of human conduct requiring a different kind of thinking and 
acting. It was a form of activity which comes closest to 
contemporary ideas about labor. It referred to activity which 
produced enduring objects or artifacts and it required the 
acquisition of skills and the application of these skills to 
achieve certain tasks and to produce desired artifacts. 
This mode of human conduct, production or poeisis, required 
a different kind of understanding. This was a way of knowing 
which again contained none of the apodictic certainty of 
episteme, since it was concerned with things "doable" and not 
with unchangeable features of the cosmos. Additionally, it was a 
kind of knowing which did not coincide with phronesis, since it 
was not concerned with the sphere of ethical and political 
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conduct. The distinction between political understanding and 
productive understanding is especially important to note • 
• • • practical knowledge was not to be confused with 
productive knowledge. The spheres of praxis and poeisis, of 
moral-political action and the production of useful or 
beautiful artifacts, were no less distinct [than the spheres 
of praxis and theoriaJ. Whereas the one domain [praxisJ was 
reserved for practical prudence, the other belonged properly 
to workmanlike skill, or techne ••• [theoryJ could 
contribute nothing directly to the techne of the craftsman 
or artist, which was based on acquired skills and 
experiences ••• like phronesis, techne could neither be 
derived from nor justified by theory [31J. 
The clear separation of theoria/phronesis/techne seems much 
less obvious today. But for the Greeks, there was no connection 
between the episteme of philosophers and the production (techne) 
of artisans. Similarly, there was very little connection between 
the phronesis of politicians and the understanding found among 
either artisans or philosophers. These were three distinct modes 
of knowing. 
While the contrasts between these kinds of knowing were very 
real, there were, however, some very important parallels, 
especially between the kinds of understanding enjoyed by 
politicians and that found among artisans. Socrates and 
Aristotle both recognized important parallels between phronesis 
and techne, noting that both were characterized by some common 
properties. 
Both forms of understanding, for instance, were 
characterized by application; both were used to guide action~ In 
the case of the politicians; phronesis guided his deliberate 
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choice; in the case of the artisan, techne guided his 
craftsmanship or "making." 
••• There is no doubt a real analogy between the perfection 
of moral consciousness and that of the capacity to make 
something, i.e., of a techne ••• A person who knows how to 
make something knows something good and he knows it for 
himself, so that where there is the possibility of doing so, 
he is really able to make it. He takes the right material 
and chooses the right means for the execution. Thus, he 
must know how to apply in the concrete situation what has 
been learned in a general way. Is the same not true of 
moral consciousness? A person who has to make moral 
decisions has always already learned something. He has been 
so formed by education and custom that he knows in general 
what is right. The task of making a moral decision is that 
of doing the right thing in a particular situation, i.e., 
seeing what is right within the situation and laying hold of 
it. He too has to act, choosing the right means and his 
action must be governed just as carefully as that of a 
craftsman •.• Both are knowledge of a dynamic kind, i.e., 
their purpose is to determine and guide action. 
Consequently, they must include the application of knowledge 
to the particular task [32]. 
Techne then shared with phronesis this property of 
application. It was a kind of knowing which directed action, a 
"blueprint" or a master plan which guided human activity. Like 
the politician who acquired his "blueprint" from living in the 
community and internalizing its aims, the artisan also acquired a 
"blueprint" or a form of knowing which oriented his activity and 
directed decisions and action. This "blueprint" or techne of the 
artisan was acquired from accumulated experience. 
In the end this kind of knowledge is little more than 
accumulated experience based on past "making," either one1s 
own or that of others, which is sufficiently articulate to 
be useful to further "making" [33J. 
The similarities between phronesis and techne then included 
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the application of these forms of knowledge to guide human 
action. They stood against theory as ways of knowing which were 
concerned with things "doable" and "makeable," and unlike theory, 
their acquisition depended directly upon the accumulation of 
either technical or political experience. 
But Aristotle, and other Greek thinkers were also very 
concerned to articulate fundamental differences between phronesis 
and techne. This was a concern to preserve the distinction 
between the activity of politicians and the activity of artisans; 
preserving the distinction between practice and techne. 
We learn a techne and can also forget it. But we do not 
learn moral knowledge nor cah we forget it. We do not stand 
over against it as if it were something that we can acquire 
or not, in the way that we can choose to acquire or not an 
objective skill, a techne. Rather, we are always already in 
the situation of having to act and hence must already 
possess and be able to apply moral knowledge. That is why 
the concept of application is highly problematical. For we 
can only apply something that we already possess; but we do 
not possess moral knowledge in such a way that we already 
have it and then apply it to specific situations. The image 
that man has of what he ought to be, i.e., his ideas of 
right and wrong, of decency, courage, dignity, loyalty, etc • 
• • . are certainly to some degree guiding ideas towards which 
he looks: but there is still a basic difference from the 
guiding idea represented by the plan the craftsman has of an 
object he is going to make. What is right, for example, 
cannot be determined independently of the situation that 
requires a right action from me, whereas the eidos of what a 
craftsman desires to make is fully determined by the use for 
which it is intended [34J. 
Here Gadamer is identifying a very subtle difference between 
the application of phronesis and the application of techne. For 
the craftsman, the application of techne is more rigidly 
determined. The object he intends to create or the result he 
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intends to achieve is known in advance, and while particular 
details of techne may vary, still the intended object generates a 
relatively fixed blueprint for action or a design, which the 
craftsman carries out. 
Phronesis, on the other hand, is more contingent. In it, 
there is not a fixed image of the outcome. There is not 
"anterior certainty" concerning the good life and virtuous 
conduct. For the politician, what is right cannot be determined 
in advance of the concrete situation which requires right 
conduct. The application of phronesis was then much more 
contingent, depending more upon the specific details of each new 
situation. 
For many thinkers, the subtle, yet important differences 
between phronesis and techne have been overlooked. Centuries of 
western thought have eroded the important distinction between 
productive activity and ethicopolitical activity. Increasingly, 
production and its attendant form of understanding (techne) have 
been "minimized" or devalued as distinct categories of knowing 
and acting. 
Aristotle has divided knowledge into theoretical, eractical, 
and productive. Yet the third member of this divislon seems 
to have fallen into oblivion soon after Aristotle1s death, 
the main reason probably being that Aristotle had tended to 
identify productive knowledge with arts and thus and 
suggested that it was not a genuine type of knowledge in 
the strong sense of the term. In any case, most of the 
Greek Peripatetics already distinguished only between 
theoretical and practical knowledge, either treating 
productive knowledge as an insignificant subdivision of the 
latter or else simply forgetting about it. Accordingly, 
where the Arabs and early medieval thinkers wished to 
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classify quasi-sciences such as medicine, alchemy or 
navigation, they were in a somewhat embarrasing situation 
of either having to treat them as theoretical sciences 
somewhat comparable to mathematics and metaphysics, or else 
being forced to place them in practical philosophy beside 
politics and ethics. If the first alternative was chosen, 
such "sciences" could only be treated as parts or subparts 
of the knowledge of nature ••• If, on the other hand, one 
preferred to consider such quasi-sciences as practical, one 
had to treat them as subparts of ••• practical philosophy 
beside ethics and politics. It is easy to see that both 
classifications are quite unsatisfactory ••• [35J. 
To understand this historical memory lapse and the erosion 
of production/techne as a distinct category of human conduct, it 
is helpful to explore a fusion in Western traditions which 
occurred roughly between the twelfth and the fifteenth centuries 
A.D. This was a fusion of ways of knowing, episteme/ 
phronesis/techne during the Renaissance and the transition to 
bourgeois society. 
2.6 The Scientization of Politics 
ana Proauct;on: TransitTon ;n the 
Renaissance --
With the rise of modern science the classical constellation 
of theoretical, practical and productive knowledge was 
drastically altered. Theory came to mean the logically 
integrated systems of quantitatively expressed, lawlike 
statements characteristic of the most advanced sciences. 
a potential for predictive and technological application is 
intrinsic to theoretical knowledge of this sort ••• The 
close connection between pure and applied research which is 
familiar to us today arose gradually only in the 19th 
century. Since that time, the systematic, institutionalized 
connection between science and technology has undergone 
constant development, until today technological 
considerations playa dominant role in determining the 
direction of progress in many areas of pure science. At the 
same time, craftsmanship, techne, has become less and less 
important for the reproduction of the material conditions of 
existence. Thus, the classical conceptions of contemplative 
theory and theory-free techne have given way to the modern 
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conceptions of scientific theory and theoretically grounded 
technology [36J. 
The fusion of theory and production, a development which may 
be called the scientization of production, occurred roughly 
between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries A.D. in western 
civilization. While today it may be difficult to imagine a time 
when science and technology were isolated forms of human 
activity, their fusion has in fact been a relatively recent 
historical event. It may be recalled that, for the Greeks, 
episteme and theoria characterized the lifestyle of the 
philosopher. His was a "walk of life", or a way of knowing with 
no practical intent or no pragmatic applications on earth. 
But beginning at least in the twelfth century A.O., Western 
discourse began to acknowledge a fusion of theory and practice, or 
the emergence of "applied science." One part of this development 
involved a merger of strictly theoretical understanding (the 
knowledge of episteme) with the pragmatic "handling and making of 
things." The episteme of philosophers began to melt into or 
merge with the understanding of artisans. 
This fusion of theory and techne happened at a time when 
significant technological innovations were occurring ;n the 
Western world. Those technological developments were to have far 
reaching effects, changing social attitudes about theory and its 
relevance to practice. 
Only during the last decades have we begun to realize that 
the more than one thousand years between the end of 
antiquity and the beginning of the so called "modern times" 
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was also a period of significant technological innovation 
which produced far reaching social changes and led to the 
emergence of a radically new attitude of Western man both 
toward nature and toward his "world" ••• Around the year 
1000 A.D. Western man began systematically to use natural 
powers. It was around this time that there emerged the 
first fulling mills, trip hammers and water driven mills 
cutting marble, treating hemp and forging iron. One 
century later the first horizontal axle windmill was built. 
Once invented, these machines quickly spread allover 
Europe ••• This mechanization made possible production on a 
comparatively large scale and soon led to a significant 
refinement of techniques in general. Beginning with the 
thirteenth century, this technological development tended to 
result in a new interest in methods for solving practical 
problems better than the age old method of trial and error 
[37J. 
Mechanization or technological innovation began to solve 
complex practical problems, increasing the degree of technical 
control which humans held over nature. In Habermas" language, 
the feedback controlled learning process contained in 
instrumental action, gained ascendency as a method for solving 
survival problems. This was a quickening or a heightened 
application of techne to the natural environment. 
With its success, social attitudes began to change. 
Humans expressed new interests in solving practical (technical) 
problems through the application of theory. Francis Bacon 
articulated this interest in applied theory when he identified 
scientific method. 
It is this attitude toward knowledge which Francis Bacon 
articulated into a program for revolutionizing the whole of 
science. His greatness consists in having made explicit the 
self-understanding of an emerging industrial and capitalist 
society, of having translated into an articulate, philo-
sophical program the social aspirations and ideals 
which underneath the abstract thinking of philosophers and 
forerunners of science, had gradually developed in the minds 
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of common people since the end of the thirteenth century., 
Knowledge, instead of aiming at patterns which are as lofty 
as they are useless, ought to bear fruits in works; science 
ought to be "practical," that is, applicable to 
technological progress [38]. 
When Bacon isolated the steps of scientific method, he 
isolated the feedback controlled learning process which had 
always been contained in the artisan's instrumental reason, or in 
his techne. Bacon raised this method to a formal abstract 
level, calling it science. He was actually giving expression to 
the fusion of episteme and techne. This fusion converted 
episteme into a technocratic, instrumentally oriented cognitive 
product. It converted the intuitive contemplative "union" of 
episteme into logically integrated systems of lawlike 
statements. This development might reasonably be called the 
technocratization of theory, or the scientization of production. 
While this fusion has had far reaching effects, including 
the institutional merger of science and technology, the 
transition to bourgeois society also witnessed another important 
fusion. This was a blending which occurred between the notion of 
practice, in the sense of ethicopolitical activity and the 
notion of practice, in the sense of productive activity. 
Increasingly, there was very little distinction drawn between the 
practical understanding of politicians and the practical 
understanding of craftsmen • 
• • . In the twelfth century ••• the expression "practical" 
ceased to refer exclusively to the ethical/political realm 
•.• the expression "practical" came to refer both to the 
deontological realm of ethics and politics and to the 
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twilight zone in which strictly theoretical science met with 
the purposeful handling and making of things ••• This 
ambiguity did not disappear when in the thirteenth century 
the newly translated writings of Aristotle drew the 
philosopher's attention to the Greek distinction between a 
knowledge guiding ethico-political action and a quite 
different kind of knowledge guiding making. Thomas Aquinas 
in many instances uses the term "practicus" as referring 
both to the virtuous man and politician and to the 
artisan ••• There certainly is more to this development than 
only an innocuous shift in terminology ••• one no longer 
was aware of the basic difference between the knowledge 
involved in ethico-political activities and the knowledge 
characteristic of the artisan [39]. 
This fusion of phronesis and techne can be clearly identified in 
the shift from a classical doctrine of politics to a traditional 
(bourgeois) political doctrine. This was a development which may 
be termed the "scientization of politics." In this fusion, 
prudent judgment or phronesis changed from the cultivation of 
virtuous conduct in a communal society to the technocratic 
problem of regulating social relations. This was a fusion of 
ethicopolitical judgment and a technocratic orientation. 
This fusion of the deontological and technological 
permitted, and later increasingly invited, a treatment of 
the deontological in terms of categories applicable to an 
artisan -- to a man who has a well-weighed masterplan and 
then carries it out ••• As technology progressed and 
abstract theoretical considerations became increasingly 
relevant to all kinds of "making," the link which the 
middle ages had established between ethics and politics, on 
the one hand, and technology, on the other hand proved 
fateful ••• it did not take long until politics and ethics 
turned from a practical knowledge as Aristotle had conceived 
it, into the knowledge of a man who translates into practice 
abstract insights which have to work, since the politician 
knows the laws of societ~e an architect knows the laws 
of mechanics and statics [40]. 
This was a fusion of phronesis and techne which proved fatal 
for the classical doctrine of politics. The idea of praxis, as 
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the Greeks had used it, referred to a mode of ethicopo1itica1 
activity with none of the certainty or control which is desired 
in bourgeois politics. There was, in short, no technocratic 
orientation in the classical notion of phronesis. 
But in the transition to bourgeois society, this tech-
nocratic orientation became the sine qua non of politics. In 
the scientization of politics, political doctrine and praxis 
forgot the Greek tradition of cultivating and nurturing virtuous 
character. This had been the tradition of governance. In 
bourgeois society, politics instead turned its attention toward 
the instrumental (technocratic) task of regulating social 
relations. This was the beginning of the contemporary tradition 
of ruling (coercion). 
The old doctrine of politics referred exclusively to praxis 
in the narrow sense of the Greeks. This had nothing to do 
with techne, the skillful production of artifacts and expert 
mastery of objectified tasks. In the final instance, 
politics was always directed toward the formation and 
cultivation of character; it proceeded pedagogically and not 
technically. For Hobbes, on the other hand, the maxim 
promulgated by Bacon, of scientia propter aotentiam, is 
self-evident: mankind owes its greatest a vances to 
technology, and above all to political technique, for the 
current establishment of the state [41]. 
This was a crucial shift in Western civilization, a shift 
which has erased the memory of praxis and phronesis, in the 
classical sense, as existential modes. Contemporary thought 
must now struggle even to recognize that ethicopolitical activity 
could have a much different gestalt; that politics and 
ethicopolitical judgment has been characterized, in the past, by 
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an absence of this technocratic orientation, and that it could, 
~ principle again be characterized by an absence of an 
instrumental gestalt. 
But the tradition of scientifically oriented politics was 
solidified during the transition to bourgeois society. Now, the 
concept of politics is very real evidence of the fusion of 
episteme/phronesis/techne which occurred during the transition to 
capitalist society. Politics now includes an instrumental 
(technocratic) orientation, reflected in its concern to predict, 
manipulate and control social intercourse. And it displays a 
scientistic conciousness, (episteme), presuming that there could, 
in principle, be some foundation of onto1ogic constancy or lawlike 
regularity in ethicopo1itica1 conduct. These are aspects of the 
contemporary tradition of politics which have very little in 
common with the classical tradition of phronesis and praxis. 
Aristotle emphasizes that politics, and practical philosophy 
in general cannot be compared in its claim to knowledge with 
a rigorous sicence, with apodictic episteme. For its 
subject matter, the Just and the Excellent in its context 
of a variable and contingent praxis lacks ontological 
constancy, as well as logical necessity. The capacity of 
practical philosophy is )hronesis, a prudent understanding 
of the situation ••• [42 • 
Whereas now, 
••• the claim of scientifically grounded social philosophy 
aims at establishing once and for all the conditions for the 
correct order of the state and society as such. Its 
assertions are to be valid independently of place, time and 
circumstances and are to permit an enduring foundation for 
communal life, regardless of historical situation. 
[Additionally] the translation of knowledge into practice, 
the application, is a technical problem. With a knowledge 
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of the general conditions for a correct order of the state 
and of society, practical prudent action of human beings 
toward each other is no longer required, but what is 
required instead is the correctly calculated generation of 
rules, relationships and institutions. [Finally], human 
behavior is therefore to be now considered only as the 
material for science. The engineers of the correct order can 
disregard the categories of ethical social intercourse and 
confine themselves to the construction of conditions under 
which human beings, just like objects within nature, will 
necessarily behave in a calculable manner. This separation 
of politics from morality replaces instruction in leading a 
good and just life with making possible a life of well-being 
within a correctly instituted order ••• The order of 
virtuous conduct is changed into the regulation of social 
intercourse [43]. 
The scientization of politics was a development which was 
tied directly to an historical or cultural transition in Western 
civilization. This was the transition from communal society to 
bourgeois society. In this transition, humans passed from one 
tradition to another -- letting go of the classical tradition of 
ethics and moral/political conduct and taking up a new tradition, 
with a new institutional order and new definitions of virtuous 
conduct. The scientization of politics was evidence of this 
shift. It was evidence of an institutional transition, where 
social relations lost the characteristics of communal ethics (the 
principal of measure) and took up the tradition of bourgeois, 
utilitarian ethics (decisionism). 
In the transition from feudalism to capitalism, public life 
underwent drastic changes -- changes which were reflected in 
political philosophy -- in practical philosophy generally. In 
feudal society, public activity was still more or less 
consistent with one's social position, i.e., there was a 
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relatively fixed roster of values which made up a relatively 
stable communal ethic. But with the capitalist division of labor 
and the loosening of the social hierarchy, what had been a 
relatively stable communal ethic began to undergo a kind of 
fragmenting. New positions within the social structure, new 
occupations, brought with them new rights and obligations: and a 
new roster of values. 
So long as there existed an immediate communal ethic, where 
only a difference, but no contradiction obtained between 
concrete and abstract norms, men could find a secure guide 
by holding fast to the existing system of norms. If 
however, there is no firm communal ethic, then neither 
Socratic ethical rationalism nor its Aristotelian 
modificaiton is satisfactory. The problem is not only 
whether we will know the "good" (i.e., the system of 
virtues, which is also a generalization and idealization of 
the customary ethic) or even whether character, training, 
and long-standing habits permit us to follow that known 
good; the problem is that the good itself becomes ambiguous. 
What does it mean to be just? What does it mean to be 
steadfast. In themselves -- abstractly -- these categories 
meant less and less ••• [44]. 
If the classical doctrine of politics was gradually being 
eclipsed by a technocratic, scientistic notion of politics, this 
was because classical notions of virtuous conduct were becoming 
less and less meaningful in bourgeois society. The whole 
possibility of praxis and phronesis (or of political activity) 
had been anchored in a communal ethic, which defined virtue in 
terms of measure. There was little ambiguity in knowing and 
practicing the good or the just, since communal society had a 
relatively clear definition of virtue. For the Greeks, the good 
and the just, or virtuous conduct was synonomous with measure. 
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But modern morality witnessed the birth of a new ethico-
political tradition. This was a tradition with new and different 
kinds of ambiguities. 
Modern morality, reacting to man's situation in bourgeois 
society -- and hence beginning with the Renaissance --
opposes to the existing system of ethical custom not some 
concrete system of ethical norms -- but rather a set of 
abstract norms; or more correctly, it tries with the help of 
those abstract norms to orient itself within the existing 
system of ethical custom. Here is the origin of that 
contradiction between "morality" and "legality" which Kant 
so rightly recognized ••• When people come to act, they 
rarely can act on a basis of pure legality and never on a 
basis of pure morality. The former implies an absolute 
conformism and the extinction of the "private" conscience. 
On the other hand, it is impossible to act from a purely 
moral standpoint, because at every step one strikes 
contingencies, relations and situations in which absolute 
systems of value have foundered or provide us with no 
bearings whatsoever ••• [45]. 
The transition to bourgeois society saw the creation of a 
new set of abstract norms or standards to orient ethicopolitical 
conduct. These standards included both legalistic and moralistic 
postulates. Legalistic standards coerced human conduct from the 
standpoint of conformism, extinguishing private conscience. 
Moralistic standards coerced human conduct from the standpoint 
of subjectively internalized, absolute, value orientations, which 
in their concrete, practical application, frequently "foundered" 
[46]. 
The ambiguities of bourgeois ethics then required new 
definitions of phronesis or a new formula for prudent judgment 
and virtuous conduct. Those new definitions occurred with the 
creation of bourgeois, utilitarian ethics (decisionism). 
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••. if neither pure morality nor pure legality offer any 
opportunity for genuinely ethical action, can ethics itself 
be possible? Assuredly it can. But it will be much more 
boundup than before with individual choice, with an ability 
to take account of the situation, with the mutual 
interaction of character and situation and will judgment. 
The concept of ~hronesis took on a new meaning. Not only 
must general va ues be applied in a manner appropriate to 
the individual situation: in each concrete situation, the 
hierarchy of values must constantly be re-created, with some 
values being rejected and others reinterpreted, in the 
search for the "mean" value between the general and the 
subjective individual, between what is demanded and what is 
possible. That is the new ethic whose birth we can witness, 
an ethic of groping for a "mean" between morality and 
legality ••• [47]. 
Phronesis and praxis then underwent a fundamental 
transformation in the transition to capitalism. While there had 
been a significant degree of contingency in Aristotelian ethics, 
there had at least been a relatively stable communal ethic 
anchoring ethicopolitical activity. In the transition to 
bourgeois society, that "anchoring" form of practical reason gave 
way to a new tradition, where the judgment of virtue and the 
execution of virtuous conduct became an individual decision. In 
each new situation, the individual groped for the mean between 
legalistic and moralistic imperatives. 
In doing this, individuals could no longer rely upon a 
fixed, given set of values. There were always situations where 
moralistic postulates became contradictory or where moralistic 
and legalistic imperatives were in conflict. This required a 
"shuffling" of the value roster, recreating the "hierarchy" of 
values in each new situation, rejecting some values, 
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reinterpreting others. 
A new sort of ethics then became possible; one which was 
much more "bound up" with individual choice. This fundamental 
shift in the social definition of praxis was accompanied by a new 
criterion for determining the good and choosing virtue in each 
new situation. Bourgeois ethics was/is characterized by the 
criterion of consequence. Practical philosophy began to emphasize 
the consequence of action as the criterion for judging goodness or 
virtue. 
Machiavelli declares, as a matter of general validity, that 
it is impossible to act in keeping with abstract virtues at 
all times and places. What was new in this was the 
establishment of the fact that the infringement of virtues, 
could, in certain concrete connections and from certain 
points of view, be adequate, necessary, and what is more, 
good. There exists, moreover, a criterion by which its 
"goodness" can be measured, a standard by which that 
goodness can be read. That is none other than the 
consequence of an action [48]. 
The new ethics was one which groped for the mean between 
legality and morality, using the consequence of an action to make 
judgments concerning its virtue. The new ethics also made this 
"shuffling" of the value roster, the practical responsibility of 
each individual. 
An overall action may be proper even though it contains many 
partial actions which contradict accepted rosters of values, 
and an overall action may be wrong even though there is no 
single part of it which contradicts them. Machiavelli thus 
uncovered the internal contradiction between abstract 
morality and real social ethics (an ethics based not on any 
Ought, but on the unity of Ought and possibilities). And he 
pOinted out as well that bearing this contradiction, and 
eventually resolving it, is not a general abstract 
theoretical task, but an eminently ~ractical one, 
and a practical task of a sort whic every single human 
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being must solve again and again in each concrete situation, 
and for which, he must bear personal responsibility [49]. 
Machiavelli's ethics was the first great step which mankind 
has made since Aristotle's theory of the mean towards a 
thoeretica1 solution of the contradictory character and 
thrust of ethics. Just as, with the emergence of a non-
communal society, moral responsibility came to weigh more 
and more heavily on the individual's shoulders, so too 
Machiavelli proclaimed the need for the individua1 1s 
acceptance of responsibility for good and evil, humanity1s 
arrival at moral adulthood, and the ethics of willingness to 
take a risk. In a paradoxical way, Machiavelli's ••• 
propositions served to awaken men to the risky character of 
their actions and, among other things, to the fact that 
often they can only choose between the greater and lesser 
evil and that in these cases, neither God nor the law will 
decide for them what to choose [50]. 
The transition from communal society to bourgeois society 
brought with it a new form of practice and a new form of 
phronesis. Political action was no longer judged in terms of its 
competence in measure. Where Greek political action had been 
skillful if it embodied the principle of the mean -- now 
political action was judged solely in terms of its consequence. 
While the action in itself might be accepted as virtuous conduct, 
it could turn into poor judgment or bad action if its 
consequence was bad. 
Machiavelli captured the transition from communal ethics to 
bourgeois ethics when he presented Renaissance political 
ideology. From that time until now, the understanding of 
phronesis had been a kind of knowing which straddles the 
contradictions of bourgeois ethics. This is a kind of knowing 
which absorbs several contradictions. 
1. In the first instance, it absorbs the contradiction 
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between legalistic judgment and moralistic judgment. In any 
concrete situation, it weighs the alternatives presented from the 
perspective of legality which is the alternate of conformism. 
And it weighs the alternatives presented from the perspective of 
morality, from a sense of internalized, subjective postulates. 
The application of either an exclusively legalistic or an 
exclusively moralistic framework is no longer possible in 
phronesis. What phronesis requires is the juggling of 
internalized subjective postulates, the restructuring of the 
value roster in each concrete situation. 
2. At the same time, phronesis straddles the contradiction 
between abstract morality and real social Ethics. In any 
concrete situation, phronesis judges alternatives from the 
abstract Ought perspectives of law and morality: Abstractions 
which define the good and the just. And it also judges 
alternatives from the perspective of social ethics -- which is the 
unity of ought and real possibilities. "All the alternatives are 
evil; which is the lesser evil." 
3. To absorb these contradictions between -legalistic/moral 
istic abstraction and the real social ethics, phronesis uses a 
bourgeois standard. This is the criterion of consequence, a 
caliper which marks the mean between legalistic and moralistic 
perspectives, between abstraction and real social possibilities. 
In phronesis judgment sifts through a whole range of abstract 
norms, rejecting some, reinterpreting others. This shuffling is 
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always directed to real social possibilities; norms are 
rearranged in an effort to orient oneself to individual concrete 
situations. But the shuffling is not regulated by some communal 
ethic. It is guided by the judgment of consequence. This 
weighing of consequence is the hallmark of a bourgeois, 
individualistic ethic. In phronesis, the responsibility of "will 
judgment" -- is an individualistic burden. It is the 
responsibility of "astuteness." It requires an accurate account 
of the situation, an astute recognition of consequence. The 
presence of decisionistic/utilitarian ethics is to this day an 
important part of phronesis. 
4. Finally, phronesis requires that these contradictions be 
resolved in practice, again and again. The contingency of 
phronesis is masked by the label "utilitarianism," for the 
judgment of consequence is something which must be worked out in 
practice, again and again. 
2.7 Nurses as Contemporary Social Actors: 
RecognT:Zing ~ Genesis of Our 
Historlcal Selves 
Self-reflection brings to consciousness those determinants 
of a self-formative process of cultivation and spiritual 
formation [Bildun~] which ideologically determine a 
contemporary praxls of action and conception of the world. 
Analytic memory thus embraces the particulars, the specific 
course of self-formation of an individual subject (or of a 
collective held-together by group identity) ••• Self-
reflection leads to insight due to the fact that what has 
previously been unconscious is made conscious in a manner 
rich in practical consequences: analytic insights intervene 
in life ••• [51]. 
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This brief step of historical recovery has attempted 
something different than rational reconstruction. It has brought 
to consciousness some selected aspects of a self-formative 
process which "ideologically determine" contemporary praxis and 
conceptions of the world for nurses. Scientized production, 
technocratic theory and scientized politics are all aspects of a 
bourgeois tradition which nurses as social actors have inherited. 
This is bringing to consciousness the particulars or the specific 
course of self-formation for social actors in contemporary 
bourgeois society. 
But this process of recovery differs from rational 
reconstruct ion if it has II pract i ca 1 consequences. II Self-
reflection produces analytic insights and these, in turn, 
lIintervene in life." They change our previous ways of reasoning 
and speaking. They produce a new self, with new modes of praxis 
and new conceptions of the world. Recognizing the genesis of our 
historical selves then sets in motion other steps in radical 
reflection. These are the steps of critique, imagination and 
negotiation. 
Remaining chapters of the investigation will continue these 
steps in radical reflection. Here it seems important to identify 
some of those "practical consequences" or some changes in 
thinking and speaking which are suggested from this first 
hermeneutic step and its self-knowledge. 
One of the most powerful insights produced in this recovery 
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is a self-understanding about nursing1s technocratic inter-
pretations of reality and the human condition. As social 
actors, nurses have inherited contemporary bourgeois traditions. 
This means that nurses participate in a Weltanschuung which 
includes scientized politics ("political science"), decisionism 
or utilitarian ethics, scientized (as opposed to contemplative) 
theory and theoretically grounded technology. 
The "fusions" discussed in this chapter were very real 
historical events which have had dramatic effects upon the way 
nurses (as contemporary social actors) constitute reality and 
act-in-the-world. 
Scientific understanding for nurses is no longer a 
contemplative activity whose end is the intuitive union with an 
object. Episteme and techne are now intimately related or 
interlocked, thanks to centuries of institutional connections 
between science and technology. Science now is characterized 
predominantly by its instrumental (technocratic) cognitive 
orientation; scientific theory now finds its application in 
technology. 
Of equal importance, the fusion of phronesis and techne has 
eroded the Greek meaning of "practical" activity. Nurses as 
social actors do not particpate in a communal ethic. The 
principle of the mean now seems hopelessly old fashioned as a 
framework to anchor ethicopolitical activity. There is instead 
the more technocratic orientation of utilitarian ethics and 
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Machiavellian political doctrine to orient contemporary practical 
(political) activity. 
Finally, the kind of understanding found in production, 
techne, has increasingly been "minimized" or devalued. This 
occurs when, as science and technology interlock, social actors 
place more confidence in the understanding of scientific experts 
than in the understanding of skilled practitioners. In the self-
formative process of the human species, increasing mastery of 
natural processes has actually been the result of a combination 
of both these ways of knowing. 
In nursing, social actors can begin to look more critically 
at some of these "fusions." A critical perspective like the one 
expressed here, would begin to question or doubt the continued 
legitimacy of these fusions, at least in some of their consequen-
ces. 
In the social institution of nursing, for example, it might 
be argued that nursing practice is, could or should be, 
characterized by three distinct modes of knowing: episteme, 
techne, and phronesis. A scientific understanding is part of 
nursing practice when it provides theoretical knowledge con-
cerning natural processes (e.g., pathophysiology, biochemistry, 
etc.). These forms of scientific understanding provide nurses 
with formulas which guide action. In Habermas' pragmatist 
language, they are beliefs whose consequence is successful 
instrumental action. 
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But techne, the understanding of skilled craftsmen, is also 
an important part of understanding in nursing practice. This is 
the understanding which Aristotle rightly recognized as part of 
medicine, navigation, agriculture, etc. It is a skill which 
comes from accumulated experience, an understanding which is tied 
directly to the kind of labor found in nursing practice. 
In industrial society, nurses, of course, particpate in many 
forms of labor. Specialization and its attendant social 
stratification make nursing practice an eclectic array of 
activities which struggles to maintain itself as a single social 
institution. But the Aristotelian tripartite distinction (in a 
contemporary form) can still be used meaningfully to address the 
category of labor/techne in nursing. 
In her political philosophy, Hannah Arendt drew a 
distinction between labor, work and action. She saw these as 
different kinds of human activity, and gave an account of each 
which is helpful in understanding the dimensions of labor and 
techne in nursing practice. 
Arendt argued that labor corresponds to and is a response to 
the human condition of life • 
• • • labour •• aincludes all those activities whose basic 
purpose is to attend to life1s needs. At the most basic 
level, man must eat, drink, clothe himself, sleep, attend to 
basic functions, etc. He must also earn his living, that 
is, take part in the collective process of material 
production and secure the means by which to meet his basic 
wants. He must also preserve the species and undertake such 
activities as raising children ••• In short, labour covers a 
wide range of activities, which although different in other 
respects, share one essential feature in common, namely they 
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have no other purpose but to serve life by sustaining, 
preserving, perpetuating or helping it periodically 
recuperate its lost energies. They owe their origin to the 
fact that man is an embodied being who wishes to preserve 
himself [52]. 
These kinds of activities, tied directly to the life 
process, are a form of productive activity which Aristotle could 
have included in the category of poiesis. Although they do not 
produce an enduring object, they produce the space of man's life, 
they serve life, preserve it, or perpetuate it. 
The category of labor corresponds to the kinds of activities 
found among slaves in Greek society. Activity which is tied 
directly to the life process relies very much upon techne, 
although this techne may differ subtly from the understanding 
used by Aristotle's artisans. While craftsmen rely on 
understanding from accumulated experience to produce artifacts, 
laborers (e.g., domestic slaves) rely just as strongly upon a 
kind of understanding which comes from accumulated experience. 
The techne of labor (in Arendt1s sense) is accumulated from 
experience with the cyclical, repetitive nature of the work 
itself. 
Arendt argues that since labour is required by the needs of 
the body, which is a natural organism, it has all the 
phenomenal characteristics of nature. It is necessary and 
cannot be avoided. It is also cyclical and repetitive in 
the sense that it follows the circular movement of our 
bodily functions and recurs with unerring regularity ••• 
Its products are used by the life process the moment they 
are produced and must be continually produced afresh ••• 
although necessary labor is also "futile" in the sense that 
the expenditure of human energy involved in it is constantly 
used up and has nothing lasting to show ••• Since its 
movements are di ctated by the 1 i fe process, 1 abour requi res 
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little initiative or thought [53]. 
The kind of understanding required in this activity, techne 
is a common feature of most "service" activities. Those kinds of 
work which are tied most intimately to the human body and to the 
life process demonstrate these circular, repetitive rhythms, with 
a routine which repeats itself over and over again. Competence 
in these activities comes from experience, from techne, from 
surrendering to the rhythm of the work itself. 
This kind of understanding, techne, is an important part of 
women1s experience in domestic labor. British feminist Sheila 
Rowbotham described the cyclical, futile qualities of labor in a 
domestic context in the following way. 
Housework is not only excluded from the prevailing economic 
notion of value, the actual nature of the work makes it 
invisible in another sense ••• The days routine of tasks is 
not apparent because they result merely in the creation of a 
normal environment ••• Within the space of the house and the 
time of the day there are certain tasks to be done. The 
tasks are the boundaries of a woman's work in the home. Get 
up, breakfast, wash up, make beds, dress the children, take 
them to school, clean, polish, wipe, shopping, collect 
children, eat, wash up, put children to bed, talk to 
husband, go to bed, make love. The day is carefully 
delineated, the operations are repeated again and again. 
[54]. 
Here, it seems important to suggest that nursing labor, 
especially in hospital settings, is characterized by many of 
these same properties. It is activity which is tied directly to 
the life process. It is cyclical, repetitive, invisible or 
dissolving and it frequently seems futile, in the sense that it 
produces no enduring object and makes no lasting mark in the world 
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of appearances. It can and frequently does, proceed on the basis 
of very little initiative or thought, following instead the 
circular movement of human bodily processes. The rhythm and 
routine of day, evening and night hours in hospital settings are 
very real phenomenological evidence of these properties in 
nursing labor. 
These analyses suggest that in addition to scientific 
understanding, techne or the understanding of productive labor is 
also an important dimension of nursing1s social reality. A 
critical perspective would extend this analysis to include a 
reflective look at the experience of alienation in nursing 
practice [55]. This would identify the dialectics of 
subjective/objective experience in nursing practice, where techne 
is externalized and converted into a reified, alienated social 
reality. Where techne guides nursing decisions and action, it is 
a subjective blueprint which is acquired through accumulated 
experience. Where that subjectivity is externalized and reified, 
then techne turns into an alienated task orientation and 
labor/techne stands over against nurses as something alien and 
dominating; labor controlling humans. 
The understanding of techne and the understanding of science 
are then two kinds of knowing contained in the existential reali-
ty of nurses. A third kind of knowing is the ethicopolitical un-
derstanding used by nurses as social actors in bourgeois society. 
Phronesis, or ethicopolitical activity in nursing practice fol-
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lows those same contours of decisionistic behavior found in bour-
geois society writ large. Ethical judgment in nursing proceeds 
along lines of utilitarian theory and practice. Political 
judgment and political ativity follow those same contours of 
Machieavellian doctrine found in bourgeois society, writ large. 
This is a form of phronesis in other words which is characterized 
by an erosion of communal ethics and by its technocratic 
orientation. 
2.8 When Insi~hts Intervene in Life: 
- -rragmatlc Consequences-
The insights generated by these kinds of self-knowledge can 
have some very real, pragmatic consequences. One possible 
consequence, is the genesis of "revolutionary" consciousness, or 
a shift in thinking and speaking which rejects the validity of 
bourgeois society. Such a shift occurs when one recognizes that 
alienation in nursing labor will not be overcome, unless it is 
overcome in bourgeois society, writ large. This is recognizing 
that the struggle against alienation in nursing is a particular; 
it rests upon the struggle against alienation in society writ 
large. 
Another "shift" which can occur as a pragmatic consequence 
of these insights is the rejection of bourgeois ethics and 
politics, or phronesis, in its curent hegemonic form. This 
rejection can occur for example, when one begins to notice the 
contradictions and "foundering" of decisionism, when one 
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recognizes the absence of humanism in Machiavellian politics, 
when one discovers the emptiness and technocratic orientation in 
bourgeois definitions of virtue and well-being. The emptiness of 
contemporary definitions of well-being (or "health") stand in 
hollow contrast to the communal definition expressed in the 
principle of measure. 
These are inSights which can provoke an awareness that the 
contradictions of ethicopolitical judgment in nursing are only 
examples of the contradictions found in bourgeois society writ 
large. This is recognizing that the struggle against current 
hegemonic forms of phronesis in nursing is a particular; it 
rests upon the struggle against those same contradictions in 
bourgeois society, writ large. 
A positive characterization of these inSights can be 
summarized as follows: Self-reflection can have the pragmatic 
consequence of provoking utopian thinking and speaking. Utopian 
conceptions have long been a part of Western discourse and their 
emergence frequently occurs in conjunction with episodes of self-
reflection. In this instance, analytic inSights can provoke 
thinking and speaking which struggles for a communal ethic and 
the erosion of alienation in society, writ large. 
The struggle for a communal ethic and for the erosion of 
alienation is expressed in a democratic socialist conception of 
the world. A commitment to this interpretation of the human 
condition and a commitment to the struggle for this tradition can 
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be the pragmatic consequence of these pieces of self-reflection. 
Nurses who undergo this ideological shift, who experience these 
new, reflexive, critical interpretations, commit themselves to 
negotiation or to the pragmatics of persuasion, in a commitment 
to alter the reality of bourgeois society, and thereby, to alter 
the bourgeois reality of nursing. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CRITIQUE: RECOGNIZING THE DIALECTIC 
OF ENLIGHTENMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred 
tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his 
understanding without direction from another. Se1f-
incurred is tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of 
reason but in the lack of resolution and courage to use 
it without direction from another. Sopere aude'. "Have 
courage to use your own reason" -- that is the motto of the 
enlightenment. [1]. 
This chapter attempts to recover a dialectical tension 
between two forms of consciousness in Western intellectual 
traditions. This is the tension between a dogmatic constitution 
of reality and an enlightened, emancipatory one. Kant's 
exhortation expressed the critical spirit of Enlightenment 
ideology. This was the resolution to overcome dogma and myth in 
a critical, self-conscious, emancipatory use of reason. The 
dialectic of enlightenment, then contains both moments of con-
sciousness: the preref1ective moment of dogma, or hypostatized 
world views and the reflective moment of self-conscious, criti-
cal thinking. 
In this chapter, I have tried to look more closely at the 
notion of a dialectic in enlightenment. This is not an original 
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or self-discovered problematique. A similar kind of exploration 
occurred in an early work from the Frankfurt School, The 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, by Adorno and Horkeimer. 
The Dialectic of Enlightenment is not about the period in 
the history whlCh goes by the name of Enlightenment. The 
central figures of the Enlightenment are hardly touched 
upon at all. Instead the book is about enlightenment, 
without the definite article and with a small "e." It is 
about enlightenment in general. In philosophical parlance, 
enlightenment is the emancipation of man from the despotism 
of myth. Horkeimer and Adorno take exception to this 
traditional definition which led to the errors of 
rationalism and progressivism. Far from being 
straightforward, emancipatory enlightenment has had a 
dialectical career, carrying within itself the seeds of 
regression. Horkeimer and Adorno speak of the aporia of 
enlightenment, for it is at once emancipation from myth and 
the destruction of areas of freedom already won [2]. 
The intent of this chapter is to briefly critique the 
dialectical career of enlightenment, as it has occurred in 
Western intellectual traditions. This is a step of critique 
which roughly approximates ideologiekritik. It roughly 
identifies problems or limits in Western interpretations of 
reality. This step of critique argues that the history of 
Western thought has demonstrated an ongoing tension between 
dogma and critical spirit. This dialectic is an historical 
characteristic of Western intellectual traditions which seems 
important for a self-conscious nursing praxis to recognize. It 
seems important, in other words, to recognize that intellectual 
traditions inherited by contemporary nurses have contained this 
dialectical relationship between dogma and critical spirit. 
3.2 Empiricism and Enlightenment 
IdeOTOgy 
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Western enlightenment ideology, expressed during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, typically argued that 
order and predictability characterize the universe and that 
human reason, freed of superstition and metaphysical belief in 
divine will, could secure knowledge of this regularity by 
discovering nature's laws. 
To error, we owe the oppressive chains which despots and 
priests everywhere forge for the people. To error we owe 
the slavery in which people languish in almost all 
countries. To error we owe the religious terrors which 
freeze human beings in fear and make them slaughter each 
other for the sake of figments of the mind [4]. 
This example of enlightenment ideology echoed Kant's 
challenge, that humans could achieve emancipation by 
enlightenment; that humans could liberate themselves from 
despotic myth by exercising the will to be rational. The 
challenge to "use your own reason" was at once the invitation to 
release man from the fear and terror of myth and also the 
invitation to release humans from the domination of nature. 
Enlightenment ideology challenged humans to direct their own 
consciousness to the natural environment, to uncover the "laws" 
of nature and free themselves from natural constraint. 
The work of an early empiricist, Francis Bacon, expressed 
this ideology using reason to dominate nature. This was an 
early indication of a Western interest in using science to free 
humans from the constraint of the natural environment. 
157 
[ForJ Bacon, scientific knowledge [wasJ potential power 
the instrument or tool which can be used to master nature. 
Science is the key to the control of nature and (as Bacon 
well recognized) of human beings. By obeying nature one 
can, on Bacon's account, command her "for you have but to 
follow and as it were hound nature in her wanderings, and 
you will be able, when you like, to lead and drive her 
afterwards to the same place again" [4J. 
Presented this way, reason offers itself as an instrument 
to liberate humans from the domination of nature. By knowing 
nature's regularities and limits, humans simultaneously learn 
which aspects of nature they are free to manipulate and which 
aspects are beyond human control. Reason under Enlightenment 
ideology then came to have an emancipatory connotation. It was 
presented as a form of knowledge which frees humans from 
situations of bondage and domination. 
But, paradoxially, reason as constituted during the 
Enlightenment also came to have a repressive connotation. With 
nature conceived as pure, neutral matter, reason came to stand 
for a form of understanding which allows humans to control, 
manipulate or dominate nature. Reason then became a repressive 
force, a form of power to be used for domination and control. 
Human knowledge and power coincide, for ignorance of the 
cause deprives one of the effect. Nature to be commanded 
must be obeyed; and that which in contemplation is as the 
cause in operation is as the rule [5J. 
Knowledge, in other words, was power. It was control and 
dominance of the natural environment; it was coercion of nature. 
It is no coincidence that the sexist language used by Bacon 
to describe nature was language which matches the history of 
• 
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science as it developed in Western sexist civilization. At 
least since empiricist philosophers like Bacon, Western 
discourse has demonstrated the desire to coerce and dominate 
nature -- an ideology espoused by males who were incapable of 
even noticing that they characterize nature according to gender. 
For you have but to follow and as it were hound nature in 
her wanderings, and you will be able, when you like, to 
lead and drive her afterwards to the same place again [6]. 
Bacon1s comments are evidence of a rather peculiar tendency 
in Western patriarchal discourse to characterize the natural 
environment in a paradoxical way: as neutered object (an 
absolute, fully determinate objectivity) and as feminine subject 
(possessing "feminine" tendences; e.g., "wanderings" even 
purposes, which are capable of being decoded and, more 
importantly, controlled). 
The dialectic of Enlightenment in early empiricist 
discourse then contained the two moments: 1) patriarchal coercion 
directed at nature and 2) a humanistic liberating focus, which 
struggled for emancipation and an uplifting of the human 
condition. Empiricist discourse then contained the two moments 
of prereflective, repressive consciousness and reflective 
emancipatory, critical consciousness. 
This dialectic expressed itself over and over again, as 
empiricists struggled to discover the right method for 
coercive/emancipatory consciousness. Francis Bacon, for 
example, argued that science could achieve predictive capacity 
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if it adopted the pattern of inductive inference. This was 
arguing that induction based upon controlled experiments, could 
provide the instrument or the power to coerce nature. 
The method usually followed by philosophers should be 
inverted. Instead of coming down from axioms to particular 
conclusions, as in syllogistic deduction, the scientist 
should go instead from particular experiments and 
observations up to axioms -- induction, in other words, 
should replace deduction ••• Then and only then, may we 
hope well of the sCiences, when in a just scale of ascent, 
and by successive steps not interrupted or broken, we rise 
from particulars to lesser axioms and then to middle 
axioms, one above the other, and last of all to the most 
genera 1. • • [7]. 
Bacon's confidence in inductive inference came at a time in 
history when Western civilization had experienced a marked 
increase in accumulated levels of productive efficiency. During 
the Middle Ages, material changes in the development of 
technology gave man increased control over the natural 
environment. This was roughly a time in history when man had 
learned to use techne to solve large scale, survival problems. 
Bacon succeeded in explicating the steps of this learning 
process, and in elevating those steps to a formal, abstract 
level which he called science. The confidence he expressed in 
scientific method was part of a more general social attitude 
found in Western civilization during the Englightenment. This 
was a progressive spirit which believed in the power of 
instrumental reason to improve the human condition. 
In his confidence, Bacon expressed a fundamental 
assumption common in Enlightenment ideology. This was the idea 
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that reason could be practical or that reason could be used to 
solve practical (survival) problems and thereby improve the 
human condition. This kind of Enlightenment ideology was 
emancipatory; it challenged humans to discard the despotism of 
myth (in this case, religious dogma) and have the courage to 
use their own reason. Bacon's early empiricism argued that 
reason, so applied, could improve the human condition. 
In his critical, enlightened spirit, Bacon rejected 
deductive inference as the only legitimate mode of reality 
construction. His skepticism launched the empiricist tradition. 
This was a program which argued for the integration of sense 
experience (observations) through the use of inductive 
inference, a form of inquiry which produced synthetic knowledge, 
or knowledge of empirical events. Induction through 
experimental method could provide humans with knowledge (or 
power) to control the natural environment. Reason could be 
practical. 
In later years, David Hume extended empiricism's critical 
spirit, becoming a critic of empiricism itself. Hume shared the 
empiricist commitment to sense experience and inductive 
inference in scientific inquiry. But he retained a self-
consciousness about empiricism which became critical of the 
empiricist project. That critical spirit enabled Hume to 
identify weaknesses or limits in empiricist methods. 
It was Hume who drew the famous distinction between 
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analytic and synthetic knowledge, discovering that deductive 
inference explicates analytic truths, and that inductive 
inference amplifies synthetic truth. Hume's critical thought 
then went on to discover that the principle of causal connection 
contained in empiricist dogma could not be justified, either by 
reference to logical necessity (analytic truth) or by reference 
to experience (synthetic truth) [8]. Hume's critique of the law 
of causal connection delivered a devastating blow to 
Enlightenment ideology. It threatened a key enlightenment 
assumption: that reason could be practical or that there could 
be connection between theory and practice. 
So powerful was the effect of Hume's criticism that it 
provoked a critical "awakening" in other European intellectuals. 
Kantian critical philosophy, for instance, was an especially 
important European response to Hume. In his critical spirit, 
Kant kept alive the dialectic of Enlightenment. His was a 
nearly self-conscious examination of reason, a critical, 
reflexive moment in European intellectual history which 
struggled to discover a connection between theory and practice. 
3.3 Kantian Critical Philosophy 
In his philosophy, Kant shared with other European 
intellectuals, a commitment to the project of Enlightenment. 
He became critical of scholastic dogma, believing that human 
rationality could be used to improve man's existential reality. 
He committed himself, in other words, to the problematique of 
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theory and practice; to the project of understanding how 
rationality could be practical or how self-conscious man could 
use reason to improve his own existential condition. 
But Kant was terrifically disturbed by Hume's critique; so 
disturbed that he spent his entire career struggling to overcome 
Hume's skepticism, struggling to discover how reason could be 
practical. His was a commitment to explain how far rationality 
could be extended to solve all kinds of practical (existential) 
problems. 
Kant's work contained the same themes found previously in 
the dialectic of enlightenment. His was a critical spirit which 
argued for the emancipation of man from myth and which 
simultaneously carried within itself the seeds of regression, 
mythology and hypostatized world views. 
Late in the eighteenth century, Kant made a last major 
effort to salvage the natural sciences, mathematics and 
metaphysics from the consequences of Hume's skepticism. Kant 
admitted that Hume's discoveries had wakened him from a 
"dogmatic slumber," for when Hume demolished justification for 
belief in causal connection, he also demolished claims made by 
metaphysicians (i.e., substance is permanent, the world has, as 
to time and space, a beginning limit). 
In the prevailing scholasticism of his time, metaphysical 
propositions such as these were presented as a priori, necessary 
truths. But Kant extended the implications of Hume's critique 
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to metaphysics and demonstrated that all propositions made in 
metaphysics are like the law of causal connection: they can be 
derived neither from logical necessity nor from experience. 
Kant1s distrust of speculative metaphysics was the problematique 
of his major work, The Critique of Pure Reason [9]. 
Kant's constructions have been characterized as radical or 
revolutionary in that he submitted dogmatic claims to critical 
analysis instead of accepting them in a prereflective manner. 
His critique of speculative metaphysics was a radical 
renunciation of dogmatism in metaphysics: a renunciation which 
argued that metaphysics was speculation or a dogmatic acceptance 
of metaphysicians claims to have a priori knowledge without an a 
priori examination of the scope and limits of knowledge. The 
philosophy which he proposed to replace speculative metaphysics 
would have been First Philosophy or Critical Philosophy, which 
provides a "scientific" foundation because it has ascertained 
the limits of theoretical knowledge. 
To appreciate this project, it is helpful to consider how 
Kant began. He was a follower of Cartesian rationalism, a 
position which asserted that: 
All knowledge was or could become scientific in the 
rationalistic sense -- that is complete, systematic, 
apriori [sic], apodictic and dogmatic. All things in the 
world, whether experienced or not were, for this philosophy, 
in principle rationally comprehensible [10]. 
This sort of anchoring never left Kant's work, although the 
dogmatism underwent somewhat of an erosion. The questions he 
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pursued, IIHow do we know?" "How much do we know?" were examples 
of epistemology: consciousness first becoming conscious of 
itself. These were questions in which dogmatic rationalism 
acknolwedged the possibility of its own limits; questions which 
acknowledged the possibility of contingency in human knowing. 
But the answers from Kant always emerged within a rationalistic 
framework, a structure which eventually organized all of his 
conclusions into a systematic, a priori and apodictic 
formulation. 
In his dissertation, Kant argued that space and time were 
"sensitive concepts," or forms of sensibility which apply to the 
world of sense experience or phenomena. They were not 
properties of things in reality, but categories which organize 
experience or the appearance of things. Later, cause and 
substance were similarly presented as intellectual concepts 
which do not apply to noumenal reality, but to the phenomenal 
world. 
Kant was led to this position concerning the subjective 
organization of appearances by the discovery of four fundamental 
antinomies. These were contradictory metaphysical propositions, 
each of which can be proved to be true of reality, if we take 
intellectual concepts to be characterizing reality, ~ itself. 




a) The world has, as to time and space, a beginning limit 
b) The world is, as to time and space, infinite 
II 
a) Everything in the world consists of elements that are 
simple 
b) But there is nothing simple, but everything is 
composite 
III 
a) There are in the world causes through freedom 
b) There is no freedom, but all is nature 
IV 
a) In the series of world-causes there is some necessary 
being 
b) There is nothing necessary in the world, but in this 
series all is contingent [11]. 
With the discovery of the antinomies, Kant argued that 
concepts such as time, space (I), substance (II) and cause (III 
and IV) could not, justifiably, be held to apply to reality, in 
itself: 
If we, as is commonly done, represent ourselves the 
appearances of the sensible world as things in themselves, 
if we assume the principles of their combination as 
principles universally valid of things in themselves and 
not merely of experience ••• there arises an unexpected 
way: because the thesis, as well as the antithesis, can be 
shown by equally clear, evident and irresistible proofs •• 
[12]. 
Kant's critical philosophy resolved the problem of 
antimonies by rejecting the realist premise: that knowledge is 
an organization of principles which characterize things in 
themselves. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argued that 
synthetical knowledge -- knowledge of factual matters -- does 
not describe things as they are ~ themselves, but rather things 
as they appear to us. This was his derivation of the 
transcendental aesthetic, a phrase which literally means that 
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appearance is the basis of experience. 
Kant argued that transcendental aesthetic was valid because 
it explains not only the antinomies but also the existence of a 
priori synthetic truths. He discovered that, beyond Hume's 
categories of a priori analytic truths and a posteriori 
synthetic truths, another category, which he called ~ priori 
synthetic judgments were found in mathematics, natural science 
and metaphysics. He argued that mathematical judgments are true 
both a priori (in that they follow necessarily) and 
synthetically (in that they provide new information by going 
beyond given concepts). 
First of all, we must observe that all strictly 
mathematical judgments are a priori, and not empirical, be-
cause they carry with them necessity, which cannot be ob-
tained from experience ••• But on close examination ••• [we 
discover] the essential and distinguishing feature of pure 
mathematical knowledge among all other apriori knowledge is 
that it cannot proceed from concepts. As therefore in its 
propositions it must proceed beyond the concept to that 
which its corresponding intuition (sense experience) con-
tains, these propositions neither can, nor ought to, arise 
analytically, by dissection of the concept, but are all 
synthetical [13]. 
Similar arguments were made concerning a priori synthetic 
judgments in metaphysics (e.g., judgments about substance). 
Kant believed that he had discovered a system of a priori 
(universal and necessary) truths about space and nature. This 
collection of propositions about space and nature, true both 
necessarily and synthetically, held the promise of refuting 
Hume's skepticism concerning predictive knowledge of natural 
events. 
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With the discovery of a priori synthetic judgments, and 
with the discovery of his antimonies, Kant argued that 
empiricist epistemology contained major weaknesses; that 
empiricist confidence in sense experience as it "mirrors" nature 
was ungrounded. In his rationalist construction, a priori 
synthetic judgments were possible only if one gave up the 
assumption that such propositions represent things in 
themselves. Mathematics, especially geometry, could be a priori 
synthetic knowledge, because it did not describe things as they 
are in themselves, but only things as they appear to us. 
It is only the form of sensuous intuition (sensuous 
experiences) by-whlch we can intuit things apriori [sic]; but 
by which we can know objects only as they appear to~ (to our 
senses), not as they are in themselves, and thlS assumption 
is absolutely necessary if synthetical propositions apriori 
[sic] be granted as' possible, or if, in the case they actually 
occur, their possibility is to be comprehended ••• [14]. 
In similar arguments, with a more specific reference to 
propositions concerning space and time, Kant went on to argue 
that his "sensitive concepts" were themselves part of the 
transcendental aesthetic: 
Intuitions of mathematics; space and time, if we omit from 
empirical intuitions (sense experience) of bodies and their 
alterations (motion) everything empirical that is, 
belonging to sensation, space and time remain; which are 
therefore pure intuitions that be apriori [sic] at,the basis 
of the empirical •.. They are mere forms of our sensibility, 
which must precede empirical intuition [15]. 
With these discoveries, Kant established a foundation for 
his philosophical system. Everything else stood on the premise 
that propositions characterize the appearance of reality, and 
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not reality in itself. This was a formal elaboration of a 
position which accepts a subject/object distinction. Such a 
distinction meant that human knowledge of objective (external) 
reality can never achieve certainty concerning that external 
reality, as something in itself. Human knowledge is rather the 
subjective organization of objects -- as they appear. 
Kant recognized that his position concerning the 
transcendental aesthetic might easily be construed as idealism 
and he was quite concerned to refute this interpretation: 
Idealism consists in the assertion that there are none but 
thinking beings, all other things which we think are 
perceived in intuition, being nothing but representations 
in the thinking beings, to which no object external to 
them in fact, corresponds. I, on the contrary, say that 
things, as objects of our senses, eXisting outside us, are 
given, but we know nothing of what they may be in 
themselves, knowing only their appearances, that is, the 
representations they cause in us by affecting our senses. 
the existence of a thing is not thereby destroyed, as in 
genuine idealism, but it is only shown that we cannot 
possibly know it by the senses as it is in itself [16]. 
Kant1s refutation of objective idealism was a remarkable 
example of eighteenth century epistemology; eighteenth century 
thought becoming conscious of itself. If all that could be 
known of external reality were its appearances, then humans 
needed a theory of knowledge which understands how appearances 
come to be known. What the natural sciences, mathematics and 
metaphysics required was a scientific explanation for how such 
appearances are "caused" in us when external objects affect our 
senses. 
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Kant presented his critical epistemology as a solution which 
could salvage the sciences from Humets skeptical conclusions. 
While he accepted the discovery that there could be no 
predictive knowledge concerning things in themselves, Kant 
retained just enough dogmatism to argue that humans could know, 
with a priori certainty, how such external objects make their 
appearance. This was another way of saying that it is possible 
for humans to have predictive knowledge concerning the way in 
which things will always appear. By getting clear on how the 
medium or tool of knowledge works, humans could regain 
confidence in their ability to predict, at least the appearance, 
of natural events. 
Specifying the nature and limits of human knowledge was the 
task of critical philosophy. By identifying the conditions of 
possible knowledge (that is, by knowing the conditions under 
which objects "cause" their appearances), Kant could predict 
which aspects of reality were objects of possible understanding 
and which aspects of reality were beyond the limits of knowledge 
(in other words, unknowable). Those aspects of reality which 
were, in principle, unknowable were best left to "rational 
faith." Western reason, especially (science), could 
extend its knowledge of external reality by focusing on the 
appearance of objects of possible understanding. Science could 
continue to generate predictive laws -- (laws of appearances), 
if it understood the a priori nature of theoretical reason and 
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the apodictic manner in which such principles are constituted. 
Kant1s Critique of Pure Reason specified the conditions 
under which a priori synthetical judgments are made. These 
conditions he labeled broadly the transcendental analytic, a 
phrase which meant that at the basis of appearances is thinking. 
Kant developed the transcendental analytic then as the ground 
for his transcendental aesthetic. He believed that appearances 
ultimately were derived from transcendental, a priori conditions 
which govern thinking. 
The analytic conditions which Kant discovered included the 
analytic of concepts and the analytic of principles. Roughly, 
he argued that concepts and principles are used universally to 
organize experience. He proposed that thinking proceeds by the 
organization of representations into judgments. But Kant would 
not reduce such judgments to the private association of ideas. 
His was not a psycho logistic argument concerning the way in 
which individual psychic faculties work. 
Rather, Kant argued that all judgments reflect four 
universal modes of organizing representations. These were 
logical (not psychological) forms of union; a priori, necessary 
modes of judgment for any consciousness, whatsoever. His 
logical table of judgments then was presented as a discovery 
containing an exhaustive account of all functions performed in 
any act of judgment (e.g., as to quantity, as to quality, as to 
relations, as to modality). 
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Kant next derived pure concepts or categories of 
understanding which run parallel to judgments. His concepts 
reflected the logical functions of judgment; for example, the 
intellectual concept of cause reflects the logical function of 
making judgments concerning relations. The categories or 
concepts are then applied to the world of experience or to 
empirical phenomena in space and time. This application of the 
concepts gives rise to universal, a priori principles or laws. 
These are a priori synthetical judgments (e.g., principle of 
causation) which the understanding legislates for nature; a 
priori rules which apply to all our experiences. The result is 
an organization of sensuous experience by the understanding. 
This organization is nature, which is phenomena under law [17]. 
Kant used these findings as premises which provide a 
scientific grounding for propositions generated in mathematics, 
the natural sciences and metaphysics. His transcendental 
concepts/categories allow humans to determine, in an a priori 
manner, the limits of theoretical understanding. Kant argued 
that when the categories are applied beyond sensuous experience, 
they yield knowledge of a speculative nature (e.g., nature of 




In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant established a 
distinction between theoretical reason and practical reason, 
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using sense experience to make this distinction. Theoretical 
reason, when applied to sense experience, provided knowledge of 
nature. But reason applied beyond the realm of sense experience 
provided another kind of knowledge: practical understanding. 
Kant rejected the metaphysics which resulted from practical 
reason's attempt to explain sense experience. But he held that 
practical reason was an important source of grounding for action 
in the world -- especially for moral action. Practical reason 
makes judgments concerning moral conduct -- judgments which are 
not based on any empirical grounding. 
Kant's separation of theoretical reason from practical 
reason allowed him to bifurcate any knowing subject into two 
kinds of ego. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant had 
presented the ego as a unity of mental activity or of judgments 
concerning sense experience. This was an ego who knows 
empirical/natural events, ego in the epistemological sense. In 
the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant had presented the ego as 
a subject who knows moral judgments in its conduct, who engages 
in practical activity which is governed by moral judgments. 
This was ego in the practical sense. 
To preserve a form of reason which would allow humans to be 
moral and free, Kant separated theoretical knowing from 
practical knowing and derived a priori grounds for both. The 
Critique of Practical Reason was apparently modeled on the 
Critique of Pure Reason [18] as it presented Kant's a priori 
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ground for any possible (moral) judgment. This was the famous 
categorical imperative, another a priori synthetic principle to 
organize the activity of humans in practical affairs. 
For Kant, the moral interests pursued in the context of 
everyday life were grounded in the principle: "act only on that 
maxim which you can at the same time will to become a universal 
law." Practical reason, anchored in this principle, could, 
according to Kant, organize practical activity in such a way 
that freedom and morality were preserved. 
Like his other a priori synthetic judgments, this 
imperati~e was held to organize moral experiences in such a 
way that moral obligation and the sense of duty occur with a priori 
necessity. The ground could not be derived from empirical 
experience; empirically conditioned or "natural" human feelings 
and inclinations do not motivate moral conduct or guarantee a 
sense of moral obligation. But as with Kant's other a priori 
synthetic truths, the principle organizes experience in such a 
way that a sense of moral obligation, specifically duty, is 
transcendental. 
The moral judgments which humans experience then were not 
threatened by the sphere of theoretical understanding. Humans 
could continue to "have their cake and eat it too;" discover 
causally determined appearances, but enjoy/pursue human freedom, 
free will and moral responsibility. 
This was the grand paradox of the [Enlightenment frame of 
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reference:]law governed the universe, determining the 
smallest motion of the least grain of sand, but men need 
not necessarily believe this to be true and even if they 
do, they are free to ignore its consequences [19]. 
To preserve those pure practical interests (freedom, 
morality) Kant broke off a piece of rationality and presented it 
as different in kind from the reason humans exercise in 
theoretical understanding. The distinction between theoretical 
and practical reason helped Kant to carryon the Enlightenment 
project. His pure theoretical reason explained how men could 
improve the material conditions of existence through one form of 
rationality; and Kant's practical reason explained how man could 
improve the human condition through another form of ethicopoli-
tical rationality. 
Kant's critical philosophy argued against Hume, that reason 
in all its forms, was practical or that rationality could not 
help but apply to the human condition. In the Critique of Pure 
Reason, he argued that theoretical reason, when applied 
appropriately to sense experience, organizes that experience to 
provide man with an understanding of appearances -- or natural 
events as they appear. This use of theoretical reason was 
practical, in the sense that it gave man knowledge of 
appearances which could then be used to predict and control 
natural events. Kant's formulations about theoretical reason 
then fit with the Enlightenment project: to use reason to free 
man from the constraint of the natural environment. 
Similarly, in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant argued 
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that a different kind of reason organizes man's ethicopolitical 
or moral experience. Practical reason, when applied 
appropriately to man's existential activity, gives humans a 
different kind of judgment or understanding. This is a 
practical understanding which can guide man's ethicopolitical 
activity. These formulations again fit with the Enlightenment 
project: to recognize and use man's own practical reason to 
improve the human condition. 
Kant's critical spirit then pushed the Enlightenment project 
to a new level of reflexivity. He argued for a new self-
consciousness; for the emancipation of humans from myth. He 
dissolved both rationalist and empiricist mythology in his 
discovery of two kinds of rationality which could be practical. 
His work then contained an emancipatory moment; an interest 
which struggled to overcome myth and dogma. 
But paradoxically, Kant's work also contained the 
dialectical moment of regression or retrenchment into new forms 
of myth. While his critical philosophy pushed against 
hypostatized world views and struggled for emancipation through 
self-consciousness, it simultaneously created new forms of myth 
and lost areas of freedom already won. 
The dialectical, hypostatized or regressive moment of 
critical philosophy was uncovered in Hegel's critique of Kant. 
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3.4 Hegelian Critique 
Hegel IS work was launched by the same critical spirit found 
in Kantian critical philosophy. Hegel also took up the 
Enlightenment project of exposing myth and uncovering dogma, a 
project which was driven by an interest in emancipation. Hegel, 
however, focused his critical gaze on Kant's work and uncovered 
mythology there concerning the knowing process and the knowing 
subject. 
Kant's philosophy was based upon a specific notion of 
knowledge which saw knowledge as an organon, a medium or a tool. 
Those who conceive the enterprise of the critique of 
knowledge as an examination of the means of knowledge start 
with a model of knowledge that emphasizes either the 
activity of the knowing subject or the receptivity of the 
cognitive process. Knowledge appears mediated either by an 
instrument, with whose help we form objects or as a medium 
through which the light of the world enters the subject. 
Both versions accord in viewing knowledge as tran-
scendentally determined by the means of possible 
knowledge [20J. 
Kant had used such an organon model of knowledge in his 
critique. When he identified the transcendental conditions of 
possible knowledge, he focused his examination upon knowledge as 
a tool and as a medium. He examined the thinking activity 
(judgment) of any possible knowing subject and presented 
knowledge as a tool which is used by the knowing subject. 
Similarly, in his examination of the receptivity of 
transcendental cognitive processes (transcendental analytic), 
Kant presented knowledge as a medium through which external 
objects are known. 
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However, the critique of knowledge, in its use of the 
organon model, began with presuppositions concerning the knowing 
subject who uses the tool/medium. The critique also included 
presuppositions concerning the category of activity/receptivity 
which would count as a legitimate instance of the tool/medium. 
These were hidden presuppositions concerning an ahistorica1 
epistemic subject and an ahistorica1 knowing process. 
Ahistorica1 Knowing Process 
Hegel [21] identified the first presupposition in Kant's 
critique as an ahistorical and normative conception of the 
knowing process (tool/medium). Kant began his criticism with an 
acceptance of mathematics and contemporary physics as 
prototypical knowledge. In this Kant revealed his dogmatism. 
He accepted the principles of mathematics and physics as a 
priori (necessary) and then used these principles to draw 
conclusions about the necessary organization of all theoretical 
reason. 
For Kant, the logical categories of judgment and the 
correlative physical principles which existed in the eighteenth 
century were a priori and therefore unchanging. In order for 
the appearance of the thing-in-itse1f not to change, the 
conditions under which it made its appearance (i.e., the knowing 
process) had to be permanent (i.e., unchanging). 
Hegel's arguments, on the contrary, presented the knowing 
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process (judgments, categories, principles) as temporal, or 
something which undergoes historical transformation. Kant had 
rejected the relativism which is entailed by this suggestion. 
He rejected relativism in conditions of possible knowledge 
whether they were derived from psychologistic grounds (a form of 
justification which was also unacceptable to Hegel) or from 
radical subjective idealism (the claim which Hegel made). 
Instead, Kant derived his transcendental conditions from logical 
grounds, particularly from the law of contradiction and the law 
of the excluded middle. This was a derivation which justified 
his concepts as necessary and cast them as permanent categories 
of all possible experience. 
This was a dogmatism, an uncritical acceptance of claims 
made by mathematicians and physicists (or philosophers studying 
their work). According to -Hegel, this dogmatism occurred 
because Kant had ignored the self-formative process of 
consciousness. For Hegel, the claims made by logicians, 
mathematicians and physicists were the result of historical 
transformations in thought. On his account, all thought, 
including scientific consciousness, is involved in a self-
formative process which proceeds, historically, from an initial 
state of sense-certainty to a final state of self-conciousness, 
eventually characterized as absolute knowledge. 
In the transition from sense-certainty (this, here, now) to 
perception of the physical object, concepts are employed (e.g., 
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red, ball). In the succeeding stage, understanding occurs, a 
stage in which objects of consciousness are not observable 
physical things, but laws and forces. In the transition from 
perception to understanding, concepts are also employed; in fact 
they become the object of consciousness (e.g., mass, velocity). 
These objects of consciousness, themselves unobservable, are the 
explanatory constructs of physical theory. 
It is at this stage of understanding that consciousness 
recognizes its objects (theoretical constructs) to be both the 
object and the product of understanding. Consciousness, in 
having these constructs (e.g., laws) as its object actually has 
itself for an object. Consciousness then has become conscious 
of itself; it has become self-conscious [22]. 
It is by means of this final stage, that reflexive 
scientific thought ;s able to transform itself, historically. 
Science which is truly self-conscious recognizes that its 
concepts are products of an historically changing form of 
consciousness. It recognizes its concepts as finite constructs 
which have been applied to an infinitely large and complex 
reality [23]. 
In an uncritical and dogmatic way, Kant's critique of the 
knowing process had ignored these self-formative conditions of 
genesis and transformation in scientific consciousness. With 
his ahistorical, a priori conclusions concerning the knowing 
process, Kant's system would have frozen scientific understanding 
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in those eighteenth century categories of judgment. His system 
could not predict that Euclidean geometry would be challenged by 
non-Euclidean systems. And it would have difficulty with the 
contradictions which emerged in principles of quantum mechanics 
[25]. 
In his metacritique, Hegel exposed myth and dogma in Kant's 
normative conception of the knowing process. According to 
Hegel, Kant had failed to see that logical, mathematical or 
scientific judgments are examples of a knowing process which 
gradually changes, exposing the limited, finite nature of its 
understanding. This was an ahistorical conception of science 
itself. Additionally, Kant failed to see that scientific 
consciousness, was itself only one form of knowledge undergoing 
these historical transformations. He failed to recognize that 
scientific consciousness was only one finite part of an 
infinite, absolute consciousness. 
Ahistorical Knowing Subject 
The assumption of an ahistorical knowing process was not 
the only dogma contained in Kant's critical philosophy. His work 
also demonstrated the presupposition of an ahistorical, fixed or 
determinate knowing subject. The universality of Kant's 
categories lay in his claim that they are found, a priori, in 
every thinking subject. This claim reveals an assumption in the 
critique of knowledge concerning the identity of an ego, a 
presupposition which again ignores the self-formative nature of 
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consciousness. 
For Hegel, the categories or concepts used in consciousness 
are not fully formed, determinate principles, innate or 
"inevitably constructed" in every human subject. Forms of 
consciousness, states of perception and understanding, develop 
historically as humans work over their environment. Forms of 
consciousness develop in and are inextricably intertwined with 
actual social processes in history [26]. 
In the process of interaction, the ego is formed. Hegel's 
discussion of the Master/Slave relation in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit [27] traces the origin of the I (ego) in the Not-I (non-
ego). This was more like an existential (as opposed to 
epistemological) account of the self-formative process of 
consciousness. 
In his examination of consciousness in the epistemological 
sense t Hegel had argued that consciousness does not automatical-
ly possess an awareness of itself. The knowing process instead 
moves through an historical experience, where it gains con-
sciousness itself. In a similar way, Hegel maintained that the 
knowing subject (ego) does not automatically possess a full 
awareness of itself. The identity of the ego is not given a 
priori; it is created, again in the self-formative process of 
consciousness. The subject exists first in a state of naive, 
unreflexive consciousness. This is a specific natural 
experience which is characterized by the naive intuition of an 
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object as a thing-in-itself. The object, as something standing 
over against, or opposing the subject, is the "not-I" or the 
non-ego. It is defined, at least in part, by its being 
something different than the subject. This opposition and 
exclusion of the subject helps to define the object. 
However gradually, in the transition from perception to 
understanding to self-consciousness, the ego comes to the 
reflexive awareness that the object, far from being a thing-in-
itself, exists for it, the knowing subject. The transition from 
the natural attitude (which knows an object in itself) to the 
phenomenological attitude (which knows an object as it exists 
for us) is a reflexive experience in which the subject becomes 
aware of itself through the object. The non-Ego or "not-I" has 
then helped to define the Ego or the "I". This is an event 
which enables consciousness to have a specific experience of 
itself via its object [28J. 
An especially important element in this reflexive 
experience is the moment of radical doubt contained in it. Just 
as the notion of a fully determinate object (as thing-in-itself) 
is dissolved into a contingent awareness that the object exists 
as perceived-by-me, so too, the notion of a fully determinate 
ego is dissolved in the awarenes of a contingent ego, which 
achieves its identity only via non-egos. Ego is thus 
provisional; deriving its identity not from itself, but through 
its ongoing opposition to objects and other subjects [29J. 
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The ego which has achieved this level of self-awareness has 
become truly transparent to itself. It recognizes that it is 
formed in the act of reflection and negation. Paradoxically, 
the ego is also contained as an element in this act of 
reflection and negation. This experience constitutes a circle 
in which radical doubt is never erased. The self-conscious 
subject is forever caught in the practico-epistemological circle 
of chasing after itself and forming itself, all the while, 
negating previous levels of consciousness. 
Kant had not considered this self-formative process of the 
subject. He had begun his critique with the assumption of an 
ego already in possession of its identity, already characterized 
by the Cartesian certainty "I am." A truly critical examination 
would have reconstructed the genesis of an~ knowing subject, 
beginning from the initial state of natural consciousness and 
working up to a provisional view which acknowledges the 
contingency of any knowing subject. 
Again, the proposition of such contingency was a form of 
relativism which Kant could not accept. But the rejection of an 
historically changing ego had important consequences for Kant's 
very own work. Because Kant considered the knowing subject to 
be ahistorically fixed and determinate, he began his critique 
with an ahistorical blindspot concerning his very own plan. The 
critical project, to examine the medium of knowledge, was a 
reflexive form of consciousness. It was recognizing 
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metaphysical claims as the conceptual products of dogmatic 
consciousness. In examining these claims, eighteenth century 
metaphysical thought actually had itself for an object. Kant 
refuted speculative metaphysics, and in a pattern which bears 
an amazing resemblance to Hegel's stoical consciousness, he 
proposed transcendental conditions, a pure universality of 
thought or epistemological autonomy as a solution to naive, 
unreflexive metaphysics. This was epistemology almost, but not 
quite conscious of itself. 
Hegel's critique then accurately exposed a moment of 
myth or dogma in Kant's critical project. Kant's semireflexive 
examination had occurred with a consciousness which was not yet 
transparent to itself [30J. Kant had not come to see critical 
philosophy itself as a form of consciousness which had emerged 
at a particular point in history in opposition to dogmatism. He 
had not recognized his own critical spirit as a provisional 
attitude which was emerging in opposition to and negation of, 
something else (dogmatism). Because Kant neglected the self-
reflexive piece of analysis which would have reconstructed the 
evolution of critical spirit, Kant blindly ignored the 
contingent nature of his project and issued dogmatic, permanent 
standards of critique, permanent criteria for determining the 
limits of knowledge. 
Had Kant's philosophy been radically critical, it would 
have recognized the state of self-consciousness, reflexivity, or 
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critique as a perpetually circular or elusive project. In this 
project, the standards of critique are continually dissolved and 
reformulated at every successive stage of criticism. This form of 
critical consciousness would not have been stoical (as was 
Kant's); it would not have been hypocritically skeptical (as was 
Hume's); it would have been a perpetually unhappy (elusive, 
circular) consciousness. This is something like Otto Neurath's 
famous characterization of epistemology. 
There is no way of taking conclusively established pure 
protocol sentences as the starting point of the sciences. 
No tabula rasa exists. We are like sailors who must 
rebuild therr-ship on the open sea, never able to dismantle 
it in dry-dock and to reconstruct it there out of the best 
materials [31]. 
In his critique, then, Hegel had exposed myth where 
Kant had claimed to be dissolving it. Hegel exposed an absence 
of reflexivity in Kant's/work which kept critical philosophy 
from fulfilling its emancipatory interest. Because Kant had not 
achieved self-consciousness concerning his own critical project, 
his work remained anchored within preconceived standards of 
critique. It exposed only so much myth and then it relapsed 
into new dogma. 
On Hegel's critique, critical philosophy lost its critical 
moment when it perpetuated 1) the dogma of appearance versus 
reality, 2) the dogma of theoretical versus practical reason and 
3) the dogma of an ahistorical knowing process and an ahistorical 
knowing subject. These were points of myth in critical 
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philosophy which kept it from achieving the interest of 
Enlightenment. They were aspects of a natural consciousness 
which kept critical philosophy from achieving a radicalized 
critique of knowing. 
German Idealism and the Philosophy 
of Identity --
Hegel IS struggle to radicalize Enlightenment discourse was 
grounded in German idealismls peculiar notion of identity. The 
philosophy of identity involves the notion that nature and 
external objects are ultimately externalizations of an absolute 
subjectivity_ Hegel·s objective idealism (absolute idealism) 
was grounded in this monistic premise that all that exists is a 
form of one absolute spirit (absolute mind) [32]. The 
philosophy of identity which characterized Hegel's work proposed 
the identity of thought and being, of subject and object and 
maintained that history, as a series of transformations in the 
universal spirit, progressively overcomes these oppositions 
[33]. 
The philosophy of identity, which joined knowing and 
acting, thought and being, subject and object into one absolute 
spiritual reality, allowed Hegel to reject Kantls distinction 
between "thing-in-itself" and appearances. The whole of Hegel IS 
work was characterized by a fundamental argument which rejected 
Kant's distinction between things and appearances. By accepting 
the distinction, humans surrendered the hope of having absolute 
knowledge and could only be satisfied with knowledge of 
appearances, which really was "no knowledge at all." 
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By giving up this opposition between appearance and 
reality, humans could retain the potential of deriving absolute 
knowledge (knowledge of the absolute). The philosophy of 
identity held the premise of revealing to humans how their 
knowing and acting were part of the same universal progression 
toward (spiritual) freedom. Hegel IS objective was to reveal 
that previous forms of consciousness dissolving in history, 
previous modes of knowing and acting, previous oppositions 
between nature and subject were only apparent oppositions, 
putatively opposed categories which were actually connected 
parts of a larger infinite whole. Kant's critique of reason had 
failed in its critical objective precisely because it had failed 
to recognize the connection between finite historically limited 
forms of being/knowing and this absolute whole. 
Hegel argued that the whole of history was a sequence in 
which ascending forms of consciousness appear, with the 
dissolution of previous finite or limited forms. He maintained 
that this historical progression was driven by an internal 
principle of autonomy; that the human spirit seeks self-
sufficiency or freedom. This basic "drive" or principle of 
autonomy explained the linear development of the ascending forms 
of consciousness. 
In agreement with the philosophy of identity, it was not 
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just forms of consciousness in the epistemic sense, which were 
driven by this principle of autonomy. Hegel maintained that 
knowing and being were part of the same infinite reality. 
Knowing and being were two sides of the same existence which was 
driven by the principle of self-sufficiency or freedom. 
Therefore being or practical activity in the world demonstrated 
the same pattern of progressively becoming more and more 
contradictory or limited, and then being dissolved into new 
forms of practical activity which are more autonomous. 
Additionally, Hegel argued for the identity of object and 
subject -- or nature and subject -- by proposing that nature was 
the externalization of universal subjectivity. The 
contradictions in opposing forms of consciousness were matched 
by contradictions in the essential being of the world. Ultimate 
reality, which for Hegel was universal spirit, was itself beset 
with contradictions. 
These were the idealist premises that grounded Hegel IS 
examination of the history of ideas. On Hegel IS account, the 
history of human thought reveals a series of transformations 
which have occurred when finite human concepts are applied to 
this infinite, absolute and contradictory reality. The finite 
categories of human understanding (e.g., Kantls judgments) when 
applied to infinity, yield "nests of contradictions" [34]. 
"Conceptual" knowing (i.e., rational understanding in the form 
of theoretical reason) therefore seemed relatively useless. It 
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could never provide humans with the kind of behavioral certainty 
hoped for under Enlightenment ideology. 
Other German idealists (romanticists) used similar 
arguments to reject the use of conceptual/analytic modes of 
understanding. Jacobi [35]~ for example, argued that since 
historically, all conceptual modes of knowing have proven to be 
finite and ineffective, conceptual knowing (analysis) should be 
rejected. Intuitionism then emerged as the argument that the 
absolute or infinity cannot be known analytically/conceptually. 
It can only be grasped intuitively -- or "felt." 
Hegel rejected these forms of intuitionism. He argued that 
finite concepts are necessary in the study of finite limited 
objects; they allow humans to make clear distinctions, to 
eliminate ambiguity and vagueness from understanding. This is 
the function which concepts perform in creating sense from non-
sense [36]~ the role ~hich concepts assume in the categorization 
of contingent ambiguous sense experience into a conditionally struc-
tured conceptual representation. Concepts provide intelligibility 
in the practical realm of representation and action. Without this 
fundamental level of clarificatjon, human reality/existence could 
not proceed beyond a chaotic level of ambiguity. 
So concepts, when applied to finite/limited aspects of 
reality~ are essential for human understanding. But on Hegel's 
account, this application of concepts to an unlimited reality or 
to infinite objects (i.e., existence) leads to "nests of 
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contradictions." While finite concepts function usefully to 
distinguish or categorize finite aspects of reality, gradually 
as they are applied to greater/extended aspects of reality, 
their opposition leads to contradictions, contradictions which 
eventually necessitate the dissolution of previous categories of 
understanding. 
Hegel was then faced with the contradictory discovery that 
finite concepts are both indispensable and unfit for absolute 
knowledge. Faced with this dilemma, he developed a mode of 
conceptual analysis, the dialectic, which he used in his Science 
of Logic [37]. 
This method consists in examlnlng the understanding's pairs 
of putatively opposed categories and showing that these 
categories, ordinarily thought to be mutually exclusive, 
really involve each other ••• Putatively opposed categories 
are shown to be actually one sided abstractions from a 
concrete whole of which each is only a partial aspect ••. 
The dialectic preserves pairs of putatively opposed 
categories as the necessary elements of more concrete 
categories. But as necessary elements of a more concrete 
category, their mutually exclusive character is removed or 
negated. These categories are both preserved and negated 
they are aufgehoben [38]. 
In its application as a form of conceptual analysis, the 
dialectic has been characterized as follows: 
What distinguishes the dialectical method in its 
recognition of the insufficiencies and imperfections of 
"finished" systems of thought. The dialectical method is a 
critical method, for it reveals incompleteness where 
completeness is claimed ••• Through continuous criticism 
and reconstruction, the partiality of perspective can be 
progressively overcome. For Hegel, every "point of view" 
has a place in the unfolding of the universal, absolute 
Idea -- the final transcendence of all subject-object 
differentiation. The closer our knowledge comes to this 
limit, the closer it is to truth [39]. 
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As a method of conceptual analysis, the dialectic under 
Hegel clearly reflects the philosophy of identity. The 
dissolution of partial perspectives into more comprehensive, 
encompassing ones is based on the presupposition that 
perspectives which seem to be mutually exclusive, actually are 
parts of a larger identity. This was the identity of the 
absolute, a state of universal subjectivity in which even the 
putative distinctions between subject and object would be 
dissolved. 
An important property of the dialectic, one which also 
derives from the principle of identity, was its dynamic or the 
process by which it proceeds. This has been labeled "determinate 
negation" -- a process which has been characterized as follows: 
The centrality of the governing principle of dialectical 
thought [was] Hegel's concept of determinate negation ••• 
The process whereby consciousness attempts to come to 
terms with the world around it involves continuous 
negation; that is, continuous criticism and reconstruction 
of the knowledge of subject and object and of their 
relation to one another. The development of consciousness 
through determinate negation consists precisely in the 
experience of surmounting old forms of consciousness and in 
incorporating these moments into a new reflective attitude 
[40J. 
The dialectic under Hegel was a form of conceptual knowing 
with a structure which matched the structure of reality. If it 
was successful in explicating contradictions in the history of 
ideas (e.g., Kant's critical philosophy) this was because 
history itself contained contradictions. If it was successful 
in identifying false distinctions between knowing and thinking, 
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this was because such distinctions were historically real, 
pseudodistinctions dissolving in history_ In other words, the 
dialectic was a form of knowing which was successful because its 
structure "fit" the structure of absolute mind, or reality 
itself. 
On idealist premises, Hegel was arguing for the identity of 
theoretical and practical forms of consciousness. These forms 
of consciousness had been falsely separated by Kant; the 
interest pursued by humans in practical activity using 
practical reason was, for Hegel, the same as the interests 
pursued by humans in theoretical activity using theoretical 
reason. Both forms of consciousness were aspects of the same 
historically evolving human spirit driven by the interest in 
autonomy, or the drive for self-sufficiency. 
Hegel argued (on idealist premises) that the separation of 
the knowing subject from an acting subject was a false 
separation. In his "practico-epistemological" forms of 
consciousness, categories of apprehending the world and norms of 
action were connected. The reversal of previous levels of 
consciousness meant that previous fixations and identifications 
were overcome. 
A form of life that has become an abstraction cannot be 
negated-Without leaving a trace or overthrown without 
practical consequences. The revolutionized situation 
contains the one that has been surpassed because the 
insight of the new consists precisely in the experience of 
revolutionary release from the old consciousness ••• This 
figure of a determinate negation applies not to an immanent 
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logical connection but to the mechanism of the progress of 
a mode of reflection in which theoretical and practical 
reason are one [41]. 
When such a level of reflective awareness occurs, whether 
in history or in the life of an individual, it is not only false 
views about the world that are dissolved; habitual attitudes and 
modes of action also change. When a critical consciousness 
challenges dogmatic assertions about the nature of reality, 
reflexive humans also question and change the dogmatic patterns 
of activity which have accompanied those views. 
In history, for example, the enlightenment interest in 
emancipation and free will emerged concomittantly with a 
critical theoretical understanding. The rejection of a 
speculative metaphysics brought about a new kind of theoretical 
reason -- science. But as humans rejected dogma about 
predestination, they experienced more than a change in 
theoretical reason. Practical reason also changed. Manis 
attitudes about himself and the human condition changed. This 
revolutionary release from old forms of consciousness had some 
very real practical consequences. Existential modes changed, 
man changed his pattern of being-in-the-world and entered and 
the era of bourgeois social reality. 
On idealist premises then, Hegel was arguing against the 
separation of theoretical and practical reason. He acknowledged 
that during the eighteenth century, these two forms of reason 
were in fact historically separate. But against Kant, he saw 
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the separation as a transitory state, and argued that the 
opposition between theoretical and practical reason would be 
overcome, because of the progression of absolute mind. This was 
the argument that the development of universal spirit would push 
human rationality and human being-in-the-world to levels of 
greater and greater autonomy. 
Hegel's critique was itself a remarkable example of 
enlightenment ideology. His critical gaze uncovered the myth or 
hypostatized moments of Kant's work. He exposed the ahistorical 
blindspot in critical philosophy, pushing against the 
hypostatized horizon of an ahistorical knowing process and an 
ahistorical knowing subject. 
But Hegel's work was itself characterized by a dialectical 
moment of myth and dogma. While he carried on the emancipatory 
project of an enlightened humanity, conscious and self-conscious 
of its own reason and freedom, Hegel prolonged the myth of 
humanity constrained by something greater, constrained or 
dominated by universal spirit. This was a piece of myth in 
Hegel's work which escaped his critical gaze. 
The dialectic of enlightenment then recurred in Hegel IS 
work, as it had in Kant's. In his critique, Hegel came very 
near to achieving the aim of enlightenment. He abandoned 
presuppositions and thereby exposed myth. But Hegel was not 
able to abandon all presuppositions, and those which he retained 
turned into the hypostatized moments of mythology contained in 
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his critique. 
Hegel shows that the critique of knowledge, if it 
unconditionally follows its own intent, must abandon. 
presuppositions; instead, it must let the standard of 
critique emerge from the experience of reflection. Because 
he does not proceed logically, but relativizes the critique 
of knowledge as such according to the presuppositions of 
the philosophy of identity, Hegel arrives at the concept of 
speculative scientific knowledge. In relation to this 
norm, sciences that proceed methodically, whether of nature 
or mind, can only prove themselves to be limitations of 
absolute knowledge and discredit themselves. Thus the 
paradoxical result of an ambi~uous radicalization of the 
critique of knowledge ••• [42 • ---
When Hegel accepted the challenge of Kantian critical 
philosophy, he adopted the cognitive posture of unconditional 
doubt to expose myth and dogma. But in his critical journey, 
Hegel confronted the spector of relativity in knowing without 
giving up his major presupposition, which was the fundamental 
assumption that there can be something like absolute knowledge. 
He had exposed the circularity in knowing by identifying 
the historical dissolution of standards for knowing. The 
conditions for possible knowledge were always passing away into 
new conditions. But the discovery of this circularity about 
knowledge did not lead Hegel to a radical position concerning 
the critique of reason. The absolute contingency of reason, the 
possibility that historically changing conditions never move 
reason closer to truth, the possibility that there is no 
absolute truth; these were outcomes never entertained by Hegel. 
The Hegelian critique of reason could only present a unilinear 
progression in understanding, a progression which would 
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(inevitably) lead to absolute knowledge. 
The alternative to this myth is a genuinely radicalized 
critique of knowledge. This is a critical gaze which is 
entirely circular; which is self-consciously aware of the 
relativized conditions of possible knowing; which is perpetually 
"unhappy." The circularity of relativized conditions of 
possible understanding has been characterized as the hermeneutic 
circle. It has been described in the following way_ 
In Hegel's philosophy, consciousness of each historical era 
is a stage in the progress of reason coming to know itself 
and gradually discovering itself as the only "essense" of 
. being [reality] •.. This realization has been reflected in 
philosophical hermeneutics as the notion of "hermeneutic 
circle." Understanding means going in .circles: rather 
than a unilinear progress toward better and less vulnerable 
knowledge. It consists in an endless recapitulation and 
reassessment of collective memories -- ever more 
voluminous, but always selective. It is difficult to see 
how any of the successive recapitulations can claim to be 
final and conclusive, still more difficult would be to 
substantiate this claim [43]. 
The possibility of an unconditionally relativized 
understanding was a prospect too radical for Hegel. Having 
raised the spector of relativity in knowing, he dogmatically 
suppressed it with his confidence in the progression of thought 
toward the state of absolute truth. Even his dialectic and its 
dynamic of determinate negation were conceptual strategies which 
avoided the possibility of unconcluded contradictions or 
unresolved circularity. 
The dogmatic ingredients of German idealism, its universal 
subjectivity and the philosophy of identity, were elements in 
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Hegel's work which kept it from fulfilling Enlightenment 
intentions. These were pieces of mythology which kept the 
Hegelian critique from demonstrating how reason could be 
practical or how man in his own reflexivity could go on 
improving the human condition. 
Hegel·s critique instead lost its emancipatory moment and 
dissolved into a form of mysticism, arguing that human 
rationality should "surrender II to the life of the spirit. 
Hegelian metaphysics, in effect, rejected the prospect of reason 
which could be practical. Hegel could not argue that the human 
condition would improve because of human rationality, because 
humans have the courage to use their own reason. He argued, 
instead, that human spiritual reality would improve, and this, 
only if man learned how to surrender to the life of absolute 
mind. 
The moments of myth in German idealism, its universal 
subjectivity and the philosophy of identity, were elements of 
Hegel·s work which Marx (and later the Frankfurt School) 
rejected. While he accepted the historical purview of Hegel·s 
critique, Marx rejected its philosophy of history. Hegel·s 
critique of an ahistorical transcendental framework had 
made important discoveries; findings concerning historical 
transformations in the knowing process and in the knowing 
subject and findings concerning the connection between 
theoreiical and practical reason. 
198 
But for Marx (and in the later neomarxist critique), Hegel 
had made the right discovery for the wrong reasons. If 
historical transformations occur in the knowing process, in the 
knowing subject, and in the connection between knowing and acting, 
this was a reflection of historical transformations in the 
material conditions of existence. Conditions of possible 
knowledge change, not because of changes in universal spirit, 
but because actual man, an embodied being, changes the 
conditions of his existence. 
3.5 Marx and the Theory of Knowledge 
- as-SOcraT Theory I44J 
The greatness of Hegel IS phenomenology ••• is that Hegel 
grasps the self-generation of man as a process ••• that he 
grasps the essence of labor and comprehends objective man, 
who is true man because of his reality, as the result of 
his own labor [45]. 
Marx stood in a structural (chronological) position which 
allowed him to inherit the critical moments of Hegel IS work. He 
saw in Hegel the historical recognition which had been absent 
from so much Enlightenment discourse. In his treatment of 
consciousness, Hegel had recognized the self-formative process 
of the species man. He had linked changing forms of 
consciousness and changing conditions of possible knowledge to 
the history of man, to the self-formative process of a species 
which produces the conditions of its own existence. 
But because of his entrenchment in German idealism, Hegel 
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grounded those historical changes in consciousness to a 
universal spirit. His idealism prevented him from discovering 
an anthropological grounding for the critique of knowledge. 
Marx, on the other hand, could not help but see this 
anthropological grounding. He saw conditions of possible 
knowledge change because of changes in the natural history of 
man, because of changes in man's existential activity; because of 
changes in the existential category of labor. Marx's theory of 
history, then contained an emancipatory moment which struggled 
to fulfill the intent of Enlightenment. He saw reason as 
eminently practical. His historical materialism struggled for a 
critique of knowledge which would demonstrate how rational man, 
real living men, could improve the human condition. This was 
the emancipatory moment of materialist ideology; an interest in 
understanding how actual man could improve the conditions of his 
own existence. 
In his critique of Hegel, Marx rejected idealist premises, 
but he maintained an historicist perspective about conditions of 
possible knowledge. 
The crucial assumption of the [historicist program] is that 
understanding is the work of history ••• that understanding 
cannot become universal until historical development paves 
the way to the rule of reason ••• The historicist solutions 
differ [from rationalist] in their refusal to believe that 
correct understanding is possible in all conditions, given 
the accessibility of effective methods. Knowledge, as 
ignorance, is historically determined. History must 
"mature" to objective understanding. The range of 
improvement which may be accomplished by better methods in 
the self-consciousness of an age is and will remain limited 
until history "transcends itself" and creates conditions in 
which understanding can be freed from historical 
limitations and rise to the level of objectivity 
[universality] [46]. 
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Under Marx's historicist program, reason reflects the 
historical conditions in which it is used; reason is a part of 
the social/natural reality it wishes to know. As such, reason 
can only reflect limitations (or perhaps utopian universality) 
found in actual historical conditions. Marx's historicism 
rejected the assumption that the externality of the world could 
be overcome by "intellectual maturity" by reason somehow freed 
from its historical context. Under Marx, the externality of the 
natural world, its objectivity, did not reflect immaturity in 
intellect; it reflected an "immaturity" in actual natural 
conditions of existence. Humans had not yet developed the 
practical capacity for overcoming nature's domination. Before 
the externality of the world could be overcome by reason, it had 
to be overcome in practice. 
[TheJ world is and will remain real and objective; at 
present, however, it is objective as something external to 
human being, something which does not belong to its being 
nand which overpowers it." Hence the feeling of a chasm 
between subject and object, which is but a necessarily 
perverted reflection of the fact that man has no control 
over his world, that the world is to him an alien, 
merciless, inhuman force. Before this, strangeness 'of the 
world may be transcended intellectually, it has to be 
overcome in practice [47J. 
In his rejection of German idealism, Marx preserved the 
prospect of natural man improving his own existential reality. 
Reason could be practical and man could use it to overcome an 
alien, inhuman world. But before consciousness could become 
201 
universal (or absolutely free) man had to secure his own freedom 
in practice, he had to overcome the constraint of the natural 
environment. 
Along with this emancipatory moment in Marx's work, 
however, the project of historical materialism contained its own 
moment of dogma. Marx uncovered the myth in Hegel's idealism, 
but failed to recognize the dogma in his own materialist 
premises. This was an absence of reflexivity in Marx's work 
which resulted in an hypostatized theory of social evolution. 
As Habermas identified, Marx viewed the history of the 
human species as grounded primarily in the category of labor. 
He viewed historical changes in forms of consciousness as 
arising primarily from changes in productive activity. If the 
conditions of possible knowledge change, this is because of 
changes in human productive efficiency or changes in the 
instrumental category of labor. 
With his more or less dogmatic emphasis on the mode of 
instrumental activity, Marx minimized the experience of 
reflection, as Hegel had conceived it, and he minimized the 
existential mode of communicative activity, as Habermas 
conceived it. Changes in forms of consciousness followed 
"natural law," they occurred with lawful regularity, only as 
humans increased their productive efficiency. If history 
contained any improvement in the human condition, this was a 
movement which was regulated by natural law, a lawlike 
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progression in man's productive efficiency. 
Marx considers the movement of society as a process of 
natural history, governed by laws that are not only 
independent of the will, consciousness and intention of 
men, but instead and conversely determine their will, 
consciousness and intentions [48]. 
It was this moment of dogma in Marx's work which eventually 
turned into a positivistic bias concerning the science of man. 
Marx reified the category of instrumental activity and argued 
that social evolution followed the same sort of lawlike 
progression found in the natural realm. Because the species 
operated primarily in the instrumental mode of labor, and 
because the development of man's productive efficiency was tied 
so closely to the laws of the natural environment, social 
evolution would follow a lawlike course of development. Social 
theory or a science of man was possible, but it would be a 
positivistic kind of science. 
If Marx had not thrown together interaction and work under 
the label of social practice (praxis), and had he instead 
related the materialist concept of synthesis likewise to 
the accomplishments of instrumental action, and the nexuses 
of communicative action, then the idea of a science of man 
would not have been obscured by identification with the na-
tural sciences .•. It would have made clear that ultimately 
a radical critique of knowledge can be carried out only in 
the form of a reconstruction of the history of the species, 
and that conversely social theory .•• is possible only as 
the self-reflection of the knowing subject [49]. 
Marx's singular error was a reificiation of the category of 
labor. He could not relate historical changes in consciousness 
to the synthesis of man as a reflective being, a communicative 
being, and an instrumentally oriented being. He saw epistemology, 
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not as an act of self-reflection, but rather as an act of science, 
and, he saw social theory, not as an experience of self-
reflection by the knowing subject, but rather as a scientistic 
project, which could scientifically explain man's social 
evolution. 
The dogma in Marx's work kept him from fulfilling the 
Enlightenment project of emancipation. While he exposed the 
mythology of German idealism, he created a new moment of 
mythology in his scientifically oriented materialism. For Marx, 
an adequate understanding of man could occur only within the 
experience of scientific consciousness. It could not move 
within the coordinates of phenomenological experience (which is 
perpetually circular). The science of man, for Marx, would not 
have been a form of hermeneutic understanding. 
Marx did not develop this idea of the science of man. By 
equating critique with natural science, he disavowed it. 
Materialist scientism only reconfirms what absolute 
idealism had already accomplished: the elimination of 
epistemology in favor of unchained universal IIscientific 
knowledge" -- but this time of scientific materialism 
instead of absolute knowledge [50]. 
The new moment of myth in Marxts work was a dogmatic stance 
which reified scientific materialism. If man·s social evolution 
was governed by the same sort of natural laws found in nature, 
then reason should uncover these laws. Scientific materialism 
proposed to do just this; to uncover those natural laws which 
govern man's social history. This was the myth of a positivistic 
science of man; producing better and better knowledge, 
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approaching absolute knowledge, as it discovered laws of the 
"second nature" [51J. 
The dialectic of Enlightenment then repeated itself in 
Marx's critical/dogmatic work. What began as a critical 
challenge against the mythology of German idealism collapsed 
into the mythology of scientific materialism. Reason could be 
practical for Marx, because it could struggle for more than 
spiritual freedom. This was an emancipatory, enlightened moment 
in Marx's work. His critique of Hegel was a critical struggle 
against the complacency and resignation of German idealism. Far 
from being satisfied with spiritual emancipation, Marx's 
critical spirit struggled for the elimination of human suffering 
and the furthering of concrete happiness. He argued that this 
practical emancipation could occur in the progression of history 
beyond class society. 
But Marx's work lost its emancipatory moment when it 
became scientistic consciousness. Reason, for the later Marx, 
could only be practical as it became scientific, as it 
surrendered to laws of the "second nature;" as it provided a 
positivistic account of the laws of history. This was reason 
constrained by something external to man's reason; rationality 
constrained just as tightly as medieval scholasticism; reason 
predestined now by nmaterial" forces which "driven history. 
Marx's historicism occurred at a time in history when most 
European intellectual discourse was obsessed with the idea of 
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right method for reason. While Marx argued that reason could 
only mature with the maturation of history, other intellectuals 
struggled to purify reason, to suppress its historical 
contingency, to discover an ahistorical form of "right" 
rationality. This was a struggle to find the best methods for 
reason, to make rationality "right" -- so that humans could go 
on improving their existential conditions. 
3.6 Positivism and the Critique of 
- PosmvTSiil -
The term ~ositivism now functions more as a polemical 
epithet t an as a designation for a distinct philosophical 
movement. Even leaving aside the positive philosophy of 
Saint-Simon and Comte, the evolutionary positivism of 
Spencer and Haeckel, and the phenomenalism of Mach and 
Avenarius and concentrating on the "logical positivism" of 
the Vienna circle and its descendants, it is difficult to 
specify a common "positivist" perspective. The subsequent 
development of the more or less unified program of the 
original members of the circle has led to its disin-
tegration as a distinct philosophical movement. This 
is not to say that logical positivlsm has disappeared 
without a trace; on the contrary, it has been absorbed into 
such influential traditions as empiricism, pragmatism and 
linguistic analysis. The net result is that the legacy of 
logical positivism -- a legacy of convictions and 
attitudes, problems and techniques, concepts and theories 
-- pervades contemporary thought [52]. 
The legacy of positivism remains as one of, if not the most 
pervasive influence upon contemporary thought. The philosophy 
of positivism surfaced in an especially intense way under Saint-
Simon and Comte in nineteenth century France. They gave 
expression to the idea of a "positive" knowledge of man. This 
would have been an understanding of the human condition which 
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progressed beyond metaphysical and theological explanations. 
Positivism expressed the hope that there could be a systematic 
study of the human world; a positive science of man which could 
produce knowledge comparable to that found among the established 
natural sciences. 
As with Marx, this confidence in "positive" knowledge was 
another example of Enlightenment ideology. It contained the 
emancipatory hope that "positive" knowledge of the human world 
could be used to understand and improve the human condition. 
But it also contained a regressive moment; a moment which 
hypostatized the human world under its hypostatized scientistic 
consciousness. 
While positivism, as a distinct philosophical movement may 
have "disintegrated" during the last half of the twentieth 
century, remnants of positive philosophy still influence 
contemporary thought. From a contemporary standpoint, 
philosophy which adheres to some version of the following five 
tenets still retains a positivist interpretation of reality. 
All (synthetic) knowledge is founded in sensory experience. 
Meaning is grounded in observation. Concepts and 
generalizations only represent the particulars from which 
they have been abstracted. Conceptual entitites don't exist 
in themselves -- they are names; positivism is (normally) 
associated with nominalism. Sciences are unified according 
to the methodology of the natural sciences. The ideal 
pursued is knowledge "in the form of a mathematically 
formulated universal science deducible from the smallest 
possible number of axioms, a system which assures the 
calculation of the probable occurrence of all events." 
Values are not facts and hence values cannot be given as 
such in sense experience, value judgments cannot be 
accorded the status of knowledge claims [53]. 
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Many of these tenets were developed by members of the 
Vienna circle, an elite group of intellectuals (mostly 
mathematicians and physicists) who established the tradition of 
logical positivism, also called logical empiricism. The 
tradition undertook, as its major effort, the forging of an 
intellectual synthesis containing aspects of rationalism and 
empiricism. 
With empiricism, positivism accepted the distinction 
between a priori analytic truths and a posteriori synthetic 
truths. It likewise accepted the assumption that synthetic 
knowledge, or knowledge of empirical events, is grounded in 
sensory experience. But against some aspects of early 
empiricism, positivism did not reduce the empirical ground of 
science to a passive reception of sense contents. 
It argued instead that sense experience is tied very 
closely to observation -- and that observation is always "theory 
laden." Positivism argued that "observation statements" (or 
"protocol statements") were the empirical ground of science. 
In science, it is observation rather than perception which 
plays the decisive part. But observation ;s a process in 
which we play an intensely active part. An observation is 
a perception but one which is planned or prepared. We do 
not "have" an observation (as we may "have" a sense 
experience) but we "make" an observation ••• An observation 
is always preceded by a particular interest, a question, or 
a problem -- in short, by something theoretical [54J. 
In Karl Popper, logical positivism achieved an important 
critique of traditional empiricist assumptions. It was Popper's 
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principle of falsifiability which replaced empiricist notions 
about verification. Under rigorous science, observation 
statements were subjected to repeated attempts at falsification, 
not verification. Popper argued that in the history of sCience, 
there have been repeated attempts at falsification. After 
repeated, unsuccessful attempts to falsify, there is a 
conventional assignment of truth to certain basic statements. 
These conventions were held by Popper to be well founded. In 
the course of the history of sCience, certain basic observation 
statements have resisted repeated empirical attempts at 
falsification. They have become more or less foundational. 
These were revisions of empiricism1s assumptions which 
produced a new kind of empiricism under "positive philosophy." 
Logical empiricism argued that basic observation statements are 
gradually linked through "hypothetico-deductive" method. They 
are linked by the logical and empirical operations of observers. 
Hypothetico-deductive operations, performed by independent 
observers, gradually confirm the lawful, regular occurrence of 
social and nonsocial events. 
With these fundamental epistemological tenets, positivism 
has frequently committed itself to the unity of scientific 
method or unified science. 
Despite differences the specific concepts and techniques 
proper to diverse domains of inquiry, the methodological 
procedures of natural science are applicable to the 
sciences of man; the logic of inquiry is the same in both 
cases. More particularly, the goals of inquiry, 
explanations and prediction -- are identitical, as is the 
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form in which they are realized: the subsumption of 
individual cases under hypothetically proposed general 
laws. Scientific investigation, whether of social or 
nonsocial phenomena aims at the discovery of lawlike 
generalizations that can function as premises in deductive 
explanations and predictions. An event is explained by 
showing that it occurred in accordance with certain laws of 
nature as a result of certain particular circumstances. If 
the laws and circumstances are known, an event can be 
predicted by employing the same deductive form of argument 
[55]. 
The commitment to unified science under logical positivism 
brought with it the methodological requirement that individual 
cases of social phenomena (social action) be brought under 
general laws. This requirement contains the presupposition that 
a causal explanation of social action is possible (causality 
here being understood in the post-Humean sense of exceptionless 
repetition and irreversibility). Causal explanation of the 
social world then uncovers an empirically verifiable pattern of 
regularity resembling the uniformities which characterize 
natural processes. Under the tenets of logical positivism, this 
form of explanation was prototypical and exhaustive: No other 
form of understanding was required. Explanation concerning the 
social only required that a particular social event or 
phenomenon be shown to have occurred in accordance with a 
general law as a result of particular antecedent conditions. 
But increasingly in the twentieth century, reflexive social 
scientists have questioned this logical positivist assumption 
about unified science. Even Max Weber (who, thanks to Talcott 
Parsons, has been characterized as predominantly positivistic) 
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demonstrated an important methodological ambivalence concerning 
explanation of social phenomena. 
Weber acknowledged that causal adequacy was a necessary, 
but not a sufficient, condition for explanation of the social. 
Social action, as distinct from natural processes, is 
intentional action. It is social just because acting 
individuals attach a subjective meaning to it. Because social 
phenomena are intentional (imbued with meaning), they are 
accessible to a different form of understanding -- motivational 
understanding, Verstehen, a form of knowing which presents an 
interpretation of actions in terms of their subjective meanings. 
What Weber calls "explanatory understanding" consists in 
placing a particular act in an understandable sequence of 
motivation which corresponds to an empirically verifiable 
regularity of behavior. Its correctness is a function of 
both "adequacy at the level of meaning" and causal 
adequacy ••• It was [Weber's] view that "if adequacy in 
respect of meaning is lacking, then no matter how high the 
degree of uniformity and how precisely its probability can 
be numerically determined, it is still an incomprehensible 
statistical probability. Statistical uniformities ••• 
constitute sociological generalizations only when they can 
be regarded as manifestations of the understandable 
subjective meaning of a course of social action" [57]. 
The arguments for a different form of explanation under 
social science, derive mainly from the claim (made above by 
Weber) that the object domain of the social sciences is 
different, in kind, from the domain of material objects 
encountered in the natural sciences. This is the argument that 
social phenomena constitute a symbolically structured object 
domain; that the sphere of the social is a linguistically based 
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matrix, which, because of its communicative, symbolic nature, 
includes meaning as a basic category. It is because humans 
interact via symbols (language) that meaning may not be 
eliminated as an element in understanding of the social. 
In contrast, under the logical positivist "verifiability 
theory of meaning," a social event had no significance or 
meaning beyond the empirical operations performed in its 
verification. The explanation of social phenomena only required 
that a particular phenomenon be shown to have occurred in 
accordance with a general law, as as result of particular 
antecedent circumstances. The meaning which social actors 
attach to this phenomenon then became a "useful fiction" or an 
epiphenomenon. 
The most extreme examples of a logical positivist program 
in the social sciences came under the project of behaviorism 
(e.g., psychology, social psychology, learning theory) where 
there was a fundamental denial of the necessity to understand 
meaning. Here the attempt was to transform any statement about 
intentions into statements about behavior. Under behaviorism, 
human action was reduced to behavior and was studied in much the 
same way as animal behavior. 
But as later criticisms of behaviorism acknowledged, the 
reduction of social action to behavior ignored the crucial role 
which is played by language in human behavior. Reflexive social 
science argued that, at the level of culture, language plays the 
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unique function of transforming species-specific drives into 
"meaning mediated" action. It is this critical function played 
by language which differentiates human action from animal 
behavior. 
At the level of animal behavior, the element of 
intentionality is not yet disconnected from behavioral 
modes and transformed in symbolic systems. Action is 
first made possible when intentional contents have been 
rendered independent in language. A more or less stringent 
system of drives ••• is released from univocal correlations 
with the environment only at the cultural level. 
[At the level of culture, the system of drives is] 
itself subjected to new definitions through a linguistic 
system with variable significations ••• The symbolic 
significations rendered independent in linguistic systems 
have acquired power to react back on the interpretation of 
needs themselves ••• the motive for action shifts from the 
level of the drive system to that of linguistic 
communication [58]. 
Under these premises, explanation of the social must 
somehow account for the way in which behavior is mediated by a 
system of symbols. It must include an account of the way in 
which symbols transform animal drives into human signification, 
meaning or motivation. This is the argument that because of 
language, the sphere of objects studied under social science 
(humans) is different in kind than the domain of objects studied 
in the natural sciences. "A general theory of action cannot 
simply abstract from the symbolic dimension of social life; it 
must somehow integrate it into its basic categories, assumptions 
and procedures [59]. 
These kinds of criticisms then rejected a key assumption in 
the positivist program of unified science. They rejected the 
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positivist notion that explanation of social phenomena could be 
modeled on the kind of explanation found in the natural 
sciences. This was arguing that the logic of inquiry is 
different in the sciences of man. Because of a fundamental 
(ontological) difference in their object domains, the science of 
man and the science of nature could not help but differ in their 
modes of explanation. 
The argument against a unified science has been part of a 
later twentieth century critique of positivism. In this 
critique, the program of unified science has come under 
increasing criticism by reflexive social scientists. Critical 
social scientists have argued against the program of unified 
science on the additional ground that the natural and social 
sciences share fundamental differences in their respective modes 
of access to data. 
As discussed above, it has been argued that the social 
sciences involve themselves in attempts to gain access to a 
symbolically structured object domain. The critique of 
positivism has rejected the program of unified science because 
it fails to account for the symbolic nature of social reality. 
This criticism has argued that access to a symbolically 
structured object domain requires procedures which are different 
from those used in the natural sciences. This criticism calls 
for procedures which are similar, at least in some respects, to 
those used in the humanities. 
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While the natural sciences and the humanities are able to 
live side by side, in mutual indifference if not in mutual 
admiration, the social sciences must resolve the tension 
between the two approaches and bring them under one roof. 
Here the research practice itself forces us to reflect on 
the relationship between analytic and hermeneutic 
procedures [60]. 
This is a position which preserves the methodological tension 
first expressed by Weber. An adequate understanding of social 
reality searches for empirical regularities, but preserves the 
category of meaning as an irreducible element in social reality. 
Under this criticism, hermeneutic procedures, those approaches 
common to the humanities, are valued and retained as a form of 
access to social data. Hermeneutic methodology is retained 
because it provides an interpretation of the meaning found in 
social events. In this function, hermeneutic approaches provide 
a different form of understanding than that found in causal 
explanations. 
In search of such hermeneutic procedures, early 
neopositivist critique tried to gain access to the category of 
meaning via Motivverstandnis. This was the attempt to 
understand meaning via empathy or sympathetic imagination. Here 
the effort was to understand human action by applying personal 
experience to observed behavior. In this form of social 
inquiry, scientists imputed to social agents certain 
psychological states (motives, beliefs, values, emotions) which 
might account for an observed sequence of behavior [61]. 
This operation of understanding the meaning behind social 
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action involves an introspective process whereby the 
scientist/observer internalizes the stimulus, internalizes the 
response and then applies a behavioral maxim to account for the 
action. The empathic mode of understanding, however, has been 
rejected on the grounds of its subjectivism and its failure to 
address intersubjectivity or the symbolic, communicative matrix 
of social interaction. 
As social scientists have long noted, behavior in society 
depends on the agent1s "definition of the situation": 
social actors themselves have an interpretation of their 
behavior, ideas about what they are doing and why they are 
doing it. But this definition of the situation, through 
which agent1s behavioral reactions are mediated is not 
simply a matter of subjective motivation of "an intervening 
process located inside the human organism" The meanings to 
which social action is oriented are primarily inter-
subjective meanings constitutive of the social matrix 
in which individuals find themselves and act: inherited 
values and world views, institutionalized roles and social 
norms and so forth [62]. 
The elusive focus on subjective motivation or an 
interpretive process which is interior or "inside" the human 
organism ignores the collective, behavioral expectations or the 
cultural tradition within which individuals interpret their 
action. Agents define their situation according to an inherited 
framework of institutionalized expectations, values or world 
views. The meaning which social actors give to their action is 
thus not an independently, or individualistically created 
psychological state. Rather, the Significance which individuals 
find or give to their behavior presupposes an inherited cultural 
tradition, a framework which fixes the possible world views 
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available to social actors. 
This cultural tradition is symbolically structured. It is 
within the matrix of language, an intersubjective, communicative 
structure that individuals acquire expectations concerning 
institutionalized (norm governed) behavior. It is within this 
symbolically structured cultural tradition that social actors 
appropriate various interpretations for their action. 
Empathic motivverstandnis presupposes a Sinnverstandnis of 
the cultural and institutional setting, which gives the 
behavior to be explained its significance. And the latter 
cannot be reduced to a "construction of psychological 
models. 1I It involves a Symbolverstehen that is similar in 
important respects to the hermeneutic appropriation of 
traditional meanings. Thus the experiential bases of 
social inquiry, the mode of access to social reality, is 
neither the controlled observation and experimentation of 
the natural sciences nor an empathic identification based 
on introspection and imagination. It is rather a kind of 
linguistically based "communicative experience ll ••• [63]. 
On this account of understanding, empathy or sympathic 
imagination presupposes another "meta" level of understanding. 
This Symbolverstehen is something like a shared, linguistically 
based communicative experience. A social scientist wishing to 
penetrate the meaning of social life must first master the 
available stock of interpretations. This mastery occurs where 
social scientists and social actors share a common 'linguisti-
cally based experience. 
In the intersubjective sphere of the social, where actors 
share a common cultural tradition, they also share a common 
language. It is via symbols that culture presents a matrix of 
possible interpretations and world views. In these assumptions 
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concerning social reality, it is necessary to acknowledge that 
language (in at least a very loosely structured way) fixes the 
range of available interpretations or meanings. Additionally, 
there is something about the structure of ordinary language 
which establishes criteria for appropriating various meanings. 
This is the (late Wittgensteinian) point that language 
establishes a stock of available action descriptions and that 
language also contains criteria (rules) for determining the 
correct use of those descriptions. The ability of social actors 
to approrpriate meaning in social action is then a function of 
mastering language games or becoming communicatively competent. 
Because social actors take their meaning from an available 
stock of interpretations, social inquiry must, as a pre-
requisite, master this available complex of interpretations, 
world views, values and expectations. Further it must, as a 
prerequisite, master the criteria for choosing appropriate 
behavioral interpretations. Before science can even impute a 
motive, meaning or psychological state to the experience of 
social actors, it first must achieve a shared communicative 
experience, mastering the cultural, linguistically based 
tradition within which social actors are met. Social scientists 
must first possess an interpretive understanding of social 
reality as prerequisite to identifying correctly demarcated 
social phenomena and their appropriate meaning. 
The issues raised in this critique of positivism include 
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the following methodological implications: 
Seen in this light, the problems that the understanding of 
meaning raises for the program of unified science are much 
more wide-ranging and fundamental than neo-positivists have 
supposed. In fact, Habermas considers this to be the 
Achilles heel of the positivist theory of science. "It is 
the gate through which methodology must pass if posi-
tivistically paralyzed reflection is to be brought to 
life once again." ••• If we are to capture the char-
acteristically symbolic dimension of social action and 
dO so without abstracting from the specific cultural and 
institutional settings in which it is located, there seems 
to be no way of avoiding a ··Sinnverstehenden" access to the 
data. Since the "meanings" that have to be grasped have at 
the same time the status of "facts," of something 
empirically entered, the experiential basis of social 
inquiry must somehow combine both understanding and 
observation [64]. 
The combination of understanding and observation, means 
that one must have first penetrated the symbolic dimension of 
social activity, mastering interpretive schema before one can 
make culturally meaningful, appropriate observations. 
Understanding then moves in a circle, interpreting particular 
aspects of social reality in terms of an ever expanding mastery 
of cultural tradition. 
The recognition of hermeneutic understanding in social 
science has been an important step in the critique of 
positivism. Criticisms such as those have challenged the 
legitimacy of unified science, arguing that there are importnat 
differences between the science of man and the science of 
nature. Late twentieth century critique has argued for the 
separation of social and natural sciences because of fundamental 
differences in their modes of explanation and access to data. 
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One last point of criticism has identified another 
important source of myth in the positivist program. 
Increasingly, critical social science has challenged 
positivism's tenet which claims value neutrality for 
positivistic modes of inquiry. As mentioned earlier, in the 
positivist commitment to unified science, there has been an 
implicit presupposition that scientific inquiry provides value-
free facts. 
Scientific investigation, whether of social or nonsocial 
phenomena, aims at the discovery of lawlike regularities. An 
event is explained by showing that it occurred in accordance 
with lawlike empirical uniformities as a result of certain 
particular circumstances. Explanation then aims at uncovering 
laws which enable social actors to predict and control social 
and nonsocial processes. 
Scientific investigation, whether of social or non-social 
phenomena, aims at the discovery of lawlike generalizations 
that can function as premises in deductive explanations and 
predictions ••• If the appropriate general laws are known 
and the relevant initial conditions are manipulable, we can 
produce a desired state of affairs, natural or social. 
But the question of which state of affairs are to be 
produced cannot be scientifically resolved. It is 
ultimately a matter of decision, for no "ought" can be 
derived form an "is," no "value" from a "fact." Scientific 
inquiry is itself "value-free;" it strives only for 
objective (intersubjectively testable) value-neutral 
results [65]. 
The claim to provide value-neutral results is grounded in 
the positivist assumption that scientific forms of explanation 
are value-neutral forms of consciousness. As mentioned earlier, 
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explanation under positivism was a form of consciousness which 
aims only at empirical regularities. Since the object of this 
form of consciousness, natural laws, are essentially value 
neutral, scientific consciousness may claim for itself the 
property of ethically neutral intentionality. 
Under contemporary criticism, however, this claim of value 
neutrality has been rejected. In its criticism, for example, 
the Frankfurt School uncovered a hidden value oreintation in the 
positivist program -- a value orientation which hypostatizes the 
status quo as it constitutes social reality from the standpoint 
of prediction and control. 
The Frankfurt theoreticians rejected the place accorded to 
prediction by positivist philosophers. Within the 
positivist framework, all data can be classified with a 
view to predicting future facts and can be formulated as 
laws or law-like generalizations ••• A scientific theory is 
tested by checking the validity of its law-like hypotheses. 
Since the law-like structure of explanation is held to be 
identical with the logical structure of a prediction, tests 
are made by comparing the events expected with those 
observed. However, this manner of testing hypotheses is an 
insufficient test for theory. As Adorno put it "the cheap 
satisfaction that things actually come about in the manner 
which the theory of society has suspected" ought not to 
"delude the theoretician that he has penetrated society." 
In fact, the theoretician has, in all likelihood, conflated 
social and natural processes and hypostatized a particular 
stage of development of society. Predictability does not 
lead to truth. Rather, it highlights the extent to which 
social relations are relations of unfreedom [66J. 
These points of criticism uncover the hidden value 
orientation in scientific assumptions which model social 
explanation upon forms of explanation found in the natural 
sciences. Positivistic explanation of the social is a gaze 
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which hypostatizes the status quo of social reality. When 
social explanation is reduced to prediction, then science of the 
social is grounded in the expectation that social events or 
phenomena will not deviate from current structural patterns of 
organization. This is a value orientation which conflates 
social and natural phenomena, collapsing social processes into 
the same form of organization found among natural phenomena. It 
is a presupposition which reduces the possibility for social 
inquiry to address and uncover developmental potentialities in 
the sphere of the social. 
With its commitment to unified science, positivism held 
that the pattern of objectification was the same in both social 
and natural scientific inquiry. Contemporary criticism, like 
that found in critical sociology, has rejected this assumption 
as an objectification mistake. In his critique, for example, 
Bauman has criticized positivistic approaches in the cultural 
sciences as making this kind of objectification mistake. He has 
characterized such approaches collectively as lithe science of 
unfreedom." 
••• [in] the triumphant ascent of positive science of the 
social, science views IIsociety" as nature in its own right, 
as orderly and regular as the "first nature" appears to the 
natural scientist, and legislating for human action as much 
as the "first nature" ••• [in positivistic science] it has 
been accepted without question that their social world 
confronted men the way nature does -- as something they 
could live with, and sometimes even turn to their advan-
tage, but only if they unconditionally surrendered to 
its command ••• From the start, the "second nature ll has 
been introduced to intellectual discourse, not as an 
222 
historical phenomenon ••• but as an aprioric assumption. 
As a "second nature" ••• society is what imposes itself 
from without upon the individual; what imposes itself with 
irresistible force; ••• the authority which demands to be 
respected ••• it dominates not only our sensitivity, but 
the whole of our nature, even our rational nature ••• 
[positive] science [of the social], as we know it, can be 
defined as knowledge of the ["second nature"]; knowledge of 
unfreedom [67]. 
The hidden value orientation in positivistic social inquiry 
is a core of convictions and assumptions which objectifies 
social reality as a fully determinate, fixed objectivity. 
Following the logic of inquiry found among natural sciences, 
this kind of social inquiry constitutes the sphere of the social 
as an object domain governed by fully determinate laws, with a 
fixed or determinate structural organization. Social reality so 
constituted takes on the characteristics of a "second nature;" 
something which constrains human action in much the same way as 
do laws of the "first nature" or the natural order. This form 
of objectification (explanation) constitutes the social order as 
unfreedom, as an object domain which imposes itself with an 
irresistible force -- dominating both sensitivity and 
rationality. 
The commitment to this particular form of objectification 
in social science also commits social science to the same kind 
of value orientation found in the natural sciences. This is a 
value orientation which is means-end oriented, which wants to 
constitute social reality from the standpoint of prediction and 
control. This kind of means-end value orientation is the hidden 
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value orientation found in bourgeois technological rationality. 
[The positivistic] concepts of ••• legitimate knowledge 
restricts science's findings to a technical function •.• 
Science can judge the efficiency of means for given ends, 
but it cannot contribute to the formation of an objective 
basis for values ••• this form of [reason] is not, as 
positivists maintain, value-free. For it embodies a formal 
(means-end) rationality and centers its interests on 
efficiency and economy of means to given ends •.• The 
effect on social theory of this hidden value commitment is 
a conceptualization of problems and alternative solutions 
which encourages the development of technological 
rationality and mentality. Only those problems which are 
amenable to scientific-technological solutions are 
rationally decidable. Ultimate goals are supposedly not 
accessible to rational decision and therefore are beyond 
the control of science and rational dialogue [68]. 
In the pursuit of its (value laden) technical interest, 
positivistic reason constitutes reality and legislates 
rationality within a monolithic technological dimension. In its 
refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of other forms of 
understanding, positivism elevates one value orientation, the 
interest in technical control, to a position of such hegemony, 
that other human interests/values are eclipsed; they are beyond 
the grasp of rational discourse. If human problems cannot be 
presented in terms of scientific-technological solutions, then 
they are inaccessible to rational discourse. The disastrous 
consequence of such a position is that those aspects of the 
human condition which are beyond technological solutions become 
increasingly intractable. Since they cannot be resolved through 
rational discourse which moves within the dimension of 
technological rationality, they are abandoned to individual, 
subjective experience. Issues of "value" and morality, for 
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example, are resolved in a subjective experience of decisionism. 
These are extremely important criticisms of positivistic 
consciousness as a form of reality construction which has had a 
pervasive influence in bourgeois society. In its tenets, 
positivism expressed the self-consciousness or confidence of 
technological rationality in bourgeois society. But this was 
confidence in a form of reason which has been paradoxically 
useful and harmful in the existential reality of bourgeois 
society. 
The belief in the fact/value, theory/practice dichotomies 
has, within these terms of reference paradoxical results. 
In the name of value-freedom, a certain value-orientation 
is championed to the exclusion of all others [technical 
interest]. In the name of the separation of theory and 
practice, a particular form of practice is sanctioned 
[instrumental action]. Seemingly passive, contemplative 
reason masks an underlying level of committed reason. Not 
being open to rational investigation and solution, 
practical questions become the province of the private 
individual and in the end can be justified only by 
reference to a decision or a commitment of belief or faith. 
By confining rational decision procedures to those utilized 
by the natural sciences, positivists reduce ethics to 
decisionism and close off ultimate principles and values 
from the possibility of rational justification [69]. 
These points of contemporary criticism disclose the 
paradoxical consequence of positivistic consciousness. 
Positivism argued for a clear distinction between facts and 
values. In the case of natural sciences, it was argued that 
facts describing empirical regularities in the natural order, 
give no information concerning the value of natural objects. 
Natural science only discovers how to manipulate the natural 
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environment. The question of what form of technical control ;s 
best or which technically achievable ends should be pursued is a 
matter which science cannot address. Atomic physics derives 
information concerning the manipulation of natural matter; the 
question of whether or not humans should manipulate matter in 
ways which produce atomic bombs, is a question which is not 
accessible to matters of fact, these kinds of practical 
questions become increasingly intractable. They cannot be 
resolved through rational investigation and solution; they may 
be resolved only through recourse to decisionistic ethics. 
From the standpoint of contemporary criticism, early 
twentieth century confidence in positivism seems to have been 
somewhat misplaced. Contemporary critique then has uncovered 
another instance of the dialectic of Enlightenment in the 
philosophy of "positive science." What emerged during the early 
twentieth century under a critical spirit of emancipation or 
Enlightenment, lost its critical moment and generated new forms 
of dogma or myth. This is recognizing the dialectic of 
Enlightenment in positivism. 
As with other Western intellectual traditions, positivism 
emerged as an expression of the hope which is contained in 
Enlightenment ideology. It was another example of the 
exhortation first expressed by Kant, "Have the courage to use 
your own reason!1I In its critical reworking or synthesis of 
empiricist and rationalist assumptions, positivism began as an 
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intellectual struggle for "right method" in science. In this 
struggle, positivism reasserted an Enlightenment commitment to 
rationality as the source of hope for humanity. This was the 
hope and the confidence that the human condition could be 
improved through "right reason." 
In this critical, emancipatory moment, positivism 
appropriated many of the insights which had been laid down in 
other intellectual traditions. It inherited Bacon's confidence 
in reason as an instrument and as power. It inherited Hume's 
insights concerning causality and his critical questions 
concerning the possibility of reason being practical. It 
inherited a Kantian bias about appearance and reality and like 
Kant, it modeled positive knowledge on the understanding of the 
natural sciences. 
But there was very little evidence in positivism to 
indicate that its participants had heard the critique of Hegel 
or of Marx. There was very little evidence of a self-
consciousness among positivists; little to suggest that the 
movement had a reflexive self-understanding; an awareness of it-
self as an historical event, as a form of consciousness which had 
emerged along with technocractic rationality in bourgeois 
society. 
In its lack of self-understanding, positivism could not 
recognize the functional and epistemic problems which 
accompanied the program for unified science. It could not 
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recognize the epistemic problem which arises when positivism 
objectifies social phenomena in the same way as natural 
phenomena. It could not see the functional problems which occur 
when science hypostatizes the social world, objectifying it as a 
"second nature." It could not see its own hidden technocratic 
value-orientation as an instance of technocratic rationality 
ascending in the West. 
Because of this absence of reflexivity, positivism produced 
new hegemonic sources of myth and dogma. It reified 
technocratic consciousness. It lost freedoms which it could 
have expressed. It became regressive and repressive. It lost 
sight of other kinds of rational discourse. It placed all of 
its confidence in the prospect of technocratic reason being 
practical. But it failed to see that this confidence was 
misplaced; that it reified the social world and preserved the 
status quo. It overlooked the role of practical reason or 
hermeneutic understanding as a mode of rational discourse which 
is also practical [70]. It eclipsed the awareness of another 
kind of reason, practical reason, which man can also have the 
courage to use, for the improvement of the human condition. 
While positivism elevated technocratic consciousness to a 
position of hegemony, there were other intellectual traditions 
which emerged in protest against positivistic consciousness. 
One of the most ambitious and radical critiques of positivism 
came in the work of Edmund Husserl, who struggled to create a 
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new foundation for understanding in phenomenology. 
3.7 Phenomenology 
In The Crisis of Eurotean Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenolog~,~usser ••• sought to criticize the currents 
of thought t at support the "mathematization of nature" and 
idealization of reality into a "mathematical manifold." He 
objected to [positivism's] typically unselfconscious 
presentation of quantified, ideational forms of nature as 
the only real and true forms ••• he unfolded sciences' 
prescientific foundations in the life-world [Lebenswelt] --
the world of human praxis, intentional activity and 
everyday knowledge and beliefs ••• Husserl's analysis 
highlights ••• the illusionary nature of modern science's 
claim to neutrality; the concern with exactness, 
calculability and foresight predisposes science to seek 
knowledge of a particular type and form namely knowledge 
for prediction and, therefore, technical control [71]. 
Phenomenology emerged under Husserl as a radical criticism 
against naive assumptions contained in positivism. Husserl 
struggled to go beyond the dogmatic natural attitude which had 
become a part of consciousness under positivism. He argued that, 
far from giving the one, true account of reality, positivism only 
gave a "one-sided" or one-dimensional account of that reality, 
this being through and through, a technocratic account. 
Husserl began his struggle against the ascent of positivism 
by returning to what he believed to be the root of 
understanding. His work was a radical return to consciousness. 
He argued tirelessly that scientific knowledge rested upon the 
foundation of consciousness and that science had neglected to 
recognize its own foundation in the structure of consciousness. 
If science, or any other form of knowing, was to provide an 
adequate account of the spatio-temporal world, it must first 
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account for the way in which consciousness provides access to 
this spatio-temporal world. 
Husserl argued that judgments about reality could not be 
cleansed of the influence of consciousness. He argued 
relentlessly that positivist confidence in the natural attitude; 
could be justified only if science understood the transcendental 
structure of consciousness. The whole of his career was a 
struggle for method which could get behind the natural attitude, 
a method which could expose the structure of consciousness 
itself. 
Phenomenological reduction is different from all previous 
attempts to extricate the kernel of certain knowledge from 
the husk of appearances ••• Husserl's doubt is sharply 
focused: It is aimed at eliminating all ideas related to 
the existence of objects our consciousness tells us about: 
to be exact -- the existence of objects apart from and 
independently of their presence in our consciousness ••• 
Husserl wishes to emancipate us from ••• our compulsive 
efforts to go beyond consciousness, into the world existing 
over there. What we need, therefore, is nothing less than 
transcendental epoche [suspension]: let us suspend the 
essential thesis of the natural attitude, let us put in 
brackets absolutely everything which such attitude exhorts 
us to assume. The act of epoche, so Husserl tells us, 
differs essentially from supposedly similar operations 
accomplished by philosophers in the past. It does not mean 
denying the world in the style of the sophist, nor 
questioning its existence in the style of the skeptics. 
Eroche means simply a methodological limitation which 
a lows us to make only such judgments as do not depend for 
their validity on a spatio-temporal world [72]~ 
In his radical critique, in his bracketing of the natural 
attitude, Husserl suspended positivist assumptions about reason 
and reality. He wanted to confirm positivist confidence in an 
external independent reality governed by natural law. In his 
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epoche, Husserl wanted to uncover the way in which consciousness 
presents us with a spatio-temporal world; the way in which 
consciousness is the transcendental medium of access to spatio-
temporal reality. 
In its critical moment, phenomenology emerged as a radical 
challenge against myth and dogma in positive philosophy. It was 
a radical call to suspend naive assumptions about a noumenal 
reality. Conversely, it was also a relentless attempt to restore 
confidence in those assumptions, a radical attempt to confirm 
them. In this critical spirit, phenomenology expressed the 
emancipatory moment of Enlightenment ideology. It was a critical 
I'awakeni ng, II an exhortati on to recogni ze transcendental 
subjectivity as the basis of consciousness, reason and experience 
itself. Phenomenology then expressed the enlightenment interest 
in using reason to solve human problems. "Have the courage to 
recognize consciousness as the source of human access to 
real ity! II 
At least part of phenomenology's project then was in 
agreement with the interest of Enlightenment. If the structure 
of consciousness could be understood, then man could have renewed 
confidence in the use of reason to solve human problems. This 
was wanting an exhaustive account of consciousness so that humans 
could proceed confidently, using it to improve the human 
condition. 
But Husserlls radical challenge contained its own repressive 
seed. 
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What is intended [in the epoche] is the elimination of 
historical, cultural and social factors as operators of 
understanding. Husserl was deeply impressed by ••• the 
idea that whatever is genuinely true must be so eternally 
and exterritorially. Anchoring truth, tying it down to a 
specific time, place, rigours of concrete practice -- all 
this may only result in distortions. Whatever is handed in 
by history is transient and incomplete; Whatever is offered 
by culture is almost by definition prejudiced and pre-
selected ••• If one wishes to grasp truth in its eternal 
purity and radically cleanse it of all and any corruption, 
one has to get rid of history, culture and society [73]. 
The confusing struggle for transcendental subjectivity was 
a project which occupied Husserl for his entire career. He kept 
insisting that there were essential meanings which could be 
grasped by a phenomenologically reduced consciousness and that 
only through the reduction, by removing the passions of the life 
world, could those essential meanings be comprehended. This was 
a struggle to ground reason in transcendental subjectivity. It 
was an attmept to remove biases or "flaws" in consciousness 
which occur because reason is embedded in man's existential 
activity. It was an attempt to get beyond this temporal 
existential reality to an ahistorical, transcendentally necessary 
structure of consciousness. 
In this moment, phenomenology contained its own dialectical 
point of dogma and myth. It repeated the regressive moment of 
Kantian philosophy, arguing for an ahistorical knowing process 
and an ahistorical knowing subject. Husserl could not recognize 
consciousness as a temporal entity, which, while it is the 
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medium of access to reality, is nevertheless grounded in the 
natural history of the human species. He could not see 
consciousness as embedded in the existential activity of man. 
With his commitment to transcendental subjectivity, Husserl 
could not make good the challenge of Enlightenment. If reason 
was constrained by a transcendentally necessary structure, then 
how could reason be practical? How could man use it freely to 
solve existential problems? The call "have the courage to use 
your own reason!" was a deception, for however courageous man may 
be, he will still be saddled with an instrument he cannot change, 
a weapon he cannot forge -- hypostatized consciousness. 
The attempt to tie consciousness down to an ahistorical, 
logically necessary structure was a tragic moment of repressive 
ideology in Husserl's work. Toward the end of his career, 
Husserl seemed to recognize this failure. He moved much closer 
to a recognition of the existential grounding of consciousness 
when he acknowledged the irreducible layer of the Lebenswelt. 
This was a recognition that reason can be practical because it 
is grounded in the intersubjective layer of real human activity. 
It is true that Husserl spent the last part of his life 
haunted by the realization that his solution to the problem 
of understanding was evidently ethereal. He tried hard to 
build a bridge from the phenomenologically reduced, back to 
the "life" world, over the gap between the two which he 
himself had dug ••• Drafts published post-humously revealed 
how painfully was Husserl aware of this fatal flaw in his 
system and how feverishly he tried to rectify it. As 
Schutz remembers: "When I asked him once why he had 
refrained from publishing the second volume of Ideen, he 
answered that at that time he had not found a solution to 
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the problem to the constitution of intersubjectivity [74]. 
Husserl repeated the dialectic of Enlightenment when he 
committed himself to the myth of transcendental subjectivity. 
He wanted reason to be grounded in something beyond the 
contingency of man's existential activity. But this grounding 
kept phenomenology from fulfilling the interest of Enligh-
tenment. With its transcendental prejudice~ phenomenology 
could not account for the intersubjectivity of reason, or for 
its collective use by humans to improve the human condition. 
Phenomenology then regenerated the myth of rationality which is 
predestined; reason which is constrained by something other than 
collective rational man. 
3.8 Conclusion: Nursing's Inheritance of 
the Dialectic of Enlightenment --
These sections of the investigation have involved the steps 
of recovery and critique. They have reconstructed Western 
intellectual traditions, including British Empiricism, Kantian 
Critical Philosophy, Hegelian metaphysics, Marxian critique, 
Positivism, and the Critique of Positivism and Husserlian 
phenomenology. This recovery has been undertaken in an attempt 
to recognize the historical genesis of intellectual traditions, 
in an attempt to reconstruct intellectual traditions which 
nursing has inherited. This is recovering the genesis of an 
historical knowing process. It is recognizing ourselves as 
historical knowing subjects, contemporary intellectuals who have 
234 
inherited the influence of these traditions. 
But this step has also included a moment of critique. It 
has identified a dialectic in Western intellectual traditions, 
called the Dialectic of Enlightenment. This chapter has argued 
that there has been an historically real tension in Western 
intellectual traditions which moves between the moments of 
emancipation or critical spirit and repression or dogma. 
Enlightenment ideology emerges as a critical, reflexive 
awareness that humans have the freedom to use their own reason. 
It surfaces as an emancipatory call, as an exhortation to "throw 
off the chains" of myth and dogma. This is reflexive humans 
challenging each other in Kant's critical spirit: "Have the 
courage to use your own reason!" It is self-conscious humanity, 
pressing for the use of human reason, struggling to improve the 
human condition. 
But in the history of Western intellectual discourse, this 
spirit of Enlightenment seems also to have contained within 
itself the seed of repression or regression back to hypostatized 
interpretations of reality; back to myth and dogma. This moment 
of myth has generally included the notion that reason is 
constrained in an ahistorical knowing process; that there are 
ahistorical conditions of possible knowledge; and that human 
rationality, if it would be "right" or correct, should conform 
to these transcendental conditions. This is viewing reason as 
constrained by something other than historically rational man. 
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Nursing occupies a structural position in bourgeois society 
where it may now inherit the influence of this dialectic. The 
inheritance of positivism, for example, has exerted an especial-
ly strong influence in the contemporary reality of nurse practi-
tioners, researchers, educators and administrators. As in bour-
geois society writ large, contemporary versions of positivism 
exert a pervasive influence on the social construction of 
reality in nursing. 
In practice, in research, in education and in administra-
tion, nursing relies almost exclusively upon the mode of positi-
vistic consciousness to constitute reality. When nursing re-
search, for example, appropriates the methodologies of hard 
science to compete for biomedical research monies, it illus-
trates the ascendency of technocratic consciousness in the West. 
This is an expression of the success of the natural 
sciences in providing technologically useful information. It is 
recognizing that technocratic consciousness allows nurses to 
constitute reality from the perspective of prediction and con-
trol. This "mathematization of nature" helps nurses to compete 
as technicians alongside other professionals in bourgeois 
society. 
But this kind of technocratic consciousness has had the 
paradoxical result of improving the human condition 
(biomedically) while it erodes other vitally important forms of 
rationality. Positivistic consciousness among nurses repeats all 
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of the paradoxical consequences found in positivistic society 
writ large. It perpetuates the myth of a fact/value distinction 
so that nurses do not see themselves as elevating a hegemonic 
technocratic value orientation. It hypostatizes the social 
world, so that nurses do not see themselves as reifying social 
reality -- turning it into a "second nature," participating in 
the "science of unfreedom." It loses the opportunity to 
constitute the existential reality of humans from the perspective 
of potentiality, emancipation or "becoming. 1I 
The critique of positivism and the critique of Enlightenment 
ideology, does not commit this investigation to a position of 
absolute skepticism. The insight that there may have been a 
dialectic in enlightenment does not obviate a commitment in 
nursing to the pursuit of Enlightenment ideology. As members of 
bourgeois society, nurses will hopefully continue to participate 
in this ideology. 
But the recognition of a dialectic in Enlightenment can help 
nurses to become more reflexive or self-conscious about our use 
of reason. This investigation has suggested in fact that the 
strongest moments of critical spirit and emancipatory struggle 
have occurred at points when humans have been intensely self-
conscious. Reflexivity seems to have been the prerequisite for 
emancipatory, critical movement. 
The conclusion which is suggested by this analysis seems to 
be that nursing can come closest to fulfilling the emancipatory 
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interest in Enlightenment if it develops and preserves a 
critical, self-consciousness concerning reason. Especially at 
this point in history, nursing needs to become more self-
conscious about the historical nature of reason, about the 
changes which have occurred and those which will occur in human 
rationality. 
Perhaps most importantly, nursing needs to be more self-
conscious about the existential grounding of human reason. It 
needs to see contemporary modes of reality construction as 
historically changing frames of reference; as Uquasitranscenden-
tal" frames of reference which orient human being-in-the-world. 
It needs to recognize reason, in all of its forms, as anthropo-
logically rooted, as tied to the existential reality of histori-
cal man. It needs to become more conscious of the way in which 
modern bourgeois existence anchors human reason. 
Nursing needs to recognize how our own aspirations for 
enlightenment are tied up with the existential reality of nursing 
labor. It needs to become conscious of how bourgeois existence 
has influenced the development of Enlightenment ideology in 
nursing; how the existential activity of nurses had led us to 
positions of scientism, professionalism and feminism. 
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CHAPTER 4 
TOWARD A CRITICAL NURSING PROCESS: 
NURSING PRAXIS 
Praxis in the narrow sense of the Greek ••• had nothing to 
do with techne, the skillful production of artifacts and 
the expert mastery of objectified tasks. In the final 
instance [praxis] was always directed toward the formation 
and culturation of [virtuous] character, it proceeded 
pedagogically and not technically [lJ. 
4.1 Introduction 
In preceding sections, the investigation has passed through 
the initial steps of radical reflection. In the step of 
recovery, the investigation moved through layers of tradition, 
recovering the memory of existential and intellectual traditions 
which have preceded ours. This recovery was an experience which 
can help nurses to recognize our own self-formative process. 
It can help us to see how we came to be the subjects we are, 
with these existential modes and these interpretations of 
reality. 
In the step of critique, reflection passed through a 
critical questioning of presuppositions and assumptions contained 
in bourgeois interpretations of reality. This was a passage 
which discovered problems in the course of enlightenment. It 
was an exploration of western bourgeois ideology which 
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identified epistemic and functional problems in that ideology. 
It uncovered problems which can occur when intellectual 
traditions are unreflexive. 
In this chapter, the investigation will pass through two 
final steps in the experience of radical reflection. These are 
the steps of imagination and negotiation. Beginning sections of 
this chapter will review the work of Berger and Luckman who 
extended the sociology of knowledge tradition in their analysis 
of the social construction of reality. The work of Berger and 
Luckman demonstrates a very strong resemblence to the 
philosophical frame of reference expressed by Habermas. It 
avoids an hypostatized or ahistorical view of reality 
construction. It suspends these presuppositions and engages in 
"free variation of imagination;" it attempts to uncover struc-
tural properties in the process of reality construction which 
are "essential." It identifies structural qualities in the 
self-formative process of man which guide the constitution of 
reality. 
The work of Berger and Luckman, like the work of Habermas, 
can help nurses to engage in the step of imagination. It does 
this first by identifying structures in the process of reality 
construction which are anthropologically grounded, structures 
which are relatively invariant or necessary for species 
survival. This recognition can help nurses to see, secondly, 
that the social construction of reality is also a process of 
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becoming. It is a self-formative process whereby man creates 
the conditions of his own existence. It is a process which is 
continually changing, and becoming something different. 
Recognizing this existential grounding can help nurses to 
imagine other existential modes, different ways of being-in-the-
world and different interpretations of reality. 
4.2 The Existential Determination of 
--,nought and the Social Construction 
ofReality ill 
The existential determination of consciousness is an 
important ingredient in the sociology of knowledge tradition. 
Proponents of the tradition begin with existential conditions 
and examine the way in which knowledge, reason, consciousness or 
understanding flow from historically real, material being-in-
the-world. This is a perspective which argues that historically 
changing interpretations of reality are anchored in the real 
life activity of humans. 
The sociology of knowledge tradition asserts that humans, 
in their real social activity, construct the parameters of 
existence, producing both the material and ideological 
conditions of existence at the cultural level. 
All non-human animals, as species and as individuals, live 
in closed worlds whose structures are predetermined by the 
biological equipment of the several animal species. By 
contrast, man's relationship to his environment is 
characterized by world-openness. Not only [have humans] 
succeeded in establishing [themselves] over the greater 
part of the earth's surface, [their] relationship to the 
surrounding environment is everywhere imperfectly 
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structured by [theirJ own biological constitution. The 
fact that [humans] continue to live a nomadic existence in 
one place and turn to agriculture in another cannot be 
explained in terms of biological processes. This does not 
mean of course that there are no biologically determined 
limitations to [humanJ relations with the environment. 
[Humans doJ have drives, of course. But these drives are 
highly unspecialized and undirected. This means that the 
human organism is capable of applying its constitutionally 
given equipment to a very wide and constantly variable and 
varying range of activities ••• [3J. 
Moreover, 
Despite the obvious physiological limits to the range of 
possible and different ways of becoming [humanJ, the human 
organism manifests an immense plasticity in its response to 
the environment ••• It is an ethnological commonplace that 
the ways of becoming and being human are as numerous as [the 
cultures of humanityJ. Humanness is a socio-cultural 
variable. In other words, there is no human nature in the 
sense of a biologically fixed substratum determining the 
variability of socio-cultural formations. There is only 
human nature in the sense of anthropological constants (for 
example, world-openness and plasticity of instinctual 
structure) that delimit and permit man's socio-cultural 
formations. But the specific shape into which this 
humanness is molded is determined by those socio-cultural 
formations and is relative to their numerous variations. 
While it is possible to say that man has a nature, it is 
more significant to say that man constructs his own nature, 
or more simply that man produces himself [4J. 
In these analyses, Berger and Luckman argue that in their 
real social activity, humans produce and reproduce the 
conditions of their existence. "Man produces himself" and "the 
self-formative process of the human species" are different ways 
of saying that in their real, material activity, humans produce 
the mode of existence and the conditions which are taken up as 
adequate for humanness. Additionally, in their real activity, 
humans reproduce this mode of existence in a social formation 
which is passed on to successive generations. 
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The self-formative process of the human species is then a 
social enterprise. Humans together produce the material and 
ideological environment which constitute specific social 
formations. The social nature of this enterprise makes it a 
process which cannot be reduced to mechanistic/deterministic 
dynamics. Rather, the social construction of reality is an 
exceedingly dialectical process--one which originates in 
conditions of existence and simultaneously transforms those 
conditions. 
Berger and Luckman characterized this dialectic, the social 
construction of reality, as a process which contains the three 
moments of externalization, objectivation and internalization. 
Man is capable of producing a world that he then 
experiences as something other than a human product ••• it 
is important'to emphasize that the relationship between 
man, the producer, and the social world, his product, is 
and remains a dialectical one. That is man (in his 
collectivities) and his world interact with each other. 
The product acts back on the producer. Externalization 
[human being externalized in activity] and objectivation 
[the process by which externalized products of human 
activity attain the character of objectivity] are moments 
in a continuing dialectical process. The third moment in 
this process ••• is internalization [by which the 
objectivated social world is retrojected into consciousness 
in the course of socialization] [5]. 
The dialectics of externalization, objectivation and 
internalization constitute the process by which humans create 
social formations, or the conditions of existence. While 
specific properties of the dialectic may vary in history, it is 
important to recognize that the structure is invariant. The 
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dynamic organization of all three moments is governed by a 
structure or Gestalt which is unique to the human species. This 
is the structure of dialectics, an internal relation which has 
organized the sweep of history -- one which has enabled man to 
produce himself. 
Externalization 
In the moment of externalization, subjectivity or the 
subjective experience of human being is first externalized in 
real (objective) human activity. 
Externalization as such is an anthropological necessity. 
Human being is impossible in a closed sphere of quiescent 
interiority. Human being must ongoingly externalize 
itself in activity. This anthropological necessity is 
grounded in man's biological equipment. The inherent 
instability of the human organism makes it imperative that 
man himself provide a stable environment for his conduct. 
Man must specialize and direct his drives [6]. 
The externalization of self occurs in embodied activity. 
This is another way of saying that humans externalize their 
being in real human action. It is also saying that truly 
human being requires this externalization; that being is not 
human unless it is externalized in real, embodied activity. In 
this externalization (in real labor), humans produce the self. 
The significance of this thesis has not been recognized in 
most contemporary nursing discourse. It is an assertion which 
can help us understand both our patients and ourselves. If the 
externalization of self occurs in real embodied activity, which 
is human labor, then the production of self clearly occurs 
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throughout life. The genesis of self, in other words, is not 
confined to early childhood development. If humans produce the 
self by externalizing subjectivity in labor, then it becomes 
critically important to understand the nature of labor under 
capitalism. It becomes important to understand labor as a 
condition which fixes the parameters of life and health (well 
being) under capitalism. 
To appreciate the significance of this assertion, it might 
help to look briefly at one concrete example of externalization 
via labor. If one accepts the proposition that nurses, for 
example, produce the self through embodied activity, then it 
becomes important to understand the dynamics of externalization 
in nursing labor. It becomes important, in other words, to 
examine the structure of externalization in the real embodied 
activity of nurses [7]. 
The externalization of self via nursing labor is an 
activity which contains many of the same properties found in 
women's labor in general. For example, this externalization 
occurs in embodied activity which does not produce a concrete, 
durable object. At the end of a shift, or following years of 
labor, there is no lasting evidence of the self. This means 
that in nursing, as in most women's labor, the self is an 
ambiguous invisible phenomenon. 
The invisible nature of nursing labor, and its structural 
properties make it a form of externalization which can be 
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compared meaningfully with women's domestic labor. In the 
following example, similarities in patterns of externalization 
are easily recognized. It is only necessary to replace the 
image of a female homemaker with the image of female hospital 
staff nurses, working in a patriarchal environment between 
morning and evening medical rounds. 
The actual nature of housework ••• makes it invisible. Men 
do not generally see it being done. The woman in the home 
works in isolation while the man is away. When he returns, 
he notices absences, things which have not been done. The 
day's routine of tasks is not apparent because they result 
merely in the creation of a normal environment for him. 
Only the woman and perhaps the children look at the room 
and remember its transformations through the day ••• The 
maintenance and surpassing of the work routine is a 
constant effort. The housewife tries to save time, she 
tries to accumulate space and time in order to push out the 
boundaries so she can have a little "time to herself." The 
attempt disentegrates continuously. A complex of forces 
prevent her from ever getting ahead of herself. One big 
spurt and the floor gleams, one achievement ••• The 
achievement itself disappears almost as it is accomplished. 
Children with dirty shoes they forgot to wipe come home 
from school -- one dirty floor [8J. 
The invisible quality of externalization and its constant 
disintegration are experienced in the process of hospital 
nursing labor from admission through discharge of patients. The 
reality of service settings is that they are characterized by a 
routine filled with tasks, i.e., nurses externalize themselves 
via activity which remains task oriented (at least in part). 
Shifts are filled with the routine of receiving report, making 
patient rounds, assessing patient status, providing physical 
assistance and emotional support, listening to patients, 
interpreting physicians' recommendations to patients 
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(brokerage), administering medications, transcribing orders, 
charting progress and finally, giving report to an oncoming 
shift. 
These are tasks which are only visible (recognized) when 
they are not done. They maintain a "normal environment," in the 
sense that they produce recovery for patients and maintain an 
orderly environment in the hospital. But they are only 
recognized when they are absent, e.g., when because of blatantly 
negligent nursing care, patients do not recover, or when, in the 
event of an oversight or inattention to a myriad of details, the 
routine of the next shift dissolves into chaos. 
Even when nursing labor externalizes itself in the form of 
a visible concrete object (e.g., nursing care plans or nursing 
progress notes) that externalization disintegrates as soon as 
patients are discharged. The feeling of never being able to get 
ahead of oneself is experienced by every hospital staff nurse 
who discharges a patient only to be faced with a new admission 
even before the bed is stripped and cleaned. 
While the particular characteristics of externalization in 
nursing labor would fill a volume of empirical analysis here, it 
is only important to recognize that this externalization of self 
occurs in real embodied activity. This is an irreducible part 
of human existence, a part of human being which converts the 
interiority (subjectivity) of being into something external, 
i.e., activity. Labor is that process of externalization. 
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But according to the frame of reference under discussion, 
humans do more than just externalize their subjective 
experience. They also objectivate it. Even in the moment when 
the self is being externalized, it is converted into a product 
and an object. Embodied activity is at once the subjective 
experience of my self and the objective experience which 
produces something objectively real. In this moment of 
existence, human being passes from the state of subjective 
interiority to something external and objective, something 
"out there" which stands over against the "me, inside here." 
Objectivation 
The process by which the externalized products of human 
activity attain the character of objectivity is 
objectivation ••• objectivations serve as more or less 
enduring indices of the subjective processes of their 
producers, allowing their availability to extend beyond the 
face-to-face situation in which they can be directly 
apprehended ••• The reality of everyday life is not only 
filled with objectivations; it is only possible because of 
them [9]. 
Objectivation is the moment of human existence which 
converts the products of human activity into objective or 
object-like phenomena. This is a "continuation" of 
externalization so to speak. It converts externalized human 
being into something objective, something "object-like." In the 
course of real, embodied activity, human products are created. 
The transition from externalized being (embodied activity) to an 
objectively real human product includes the moment of 
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objectivation. 
The category of IIproduct" -- means more than material 
objects (tables, chairs, artifacts). "Human products" is a 
category which also includes such quasitangible objects as 
social institutions; e.g., the modern state, church, family, 
marriage, class, etc. These are "objectively real" products of 
human activity in the sense that they have an objective status 
they are relatively enduring products of human activity_ 
In the moment of objectivation then, humans are producing 
both the objective and subjective conditions of existence, or 
the material and ideological conditions of human being. 
In objectivation, social actors produce material products 
and material conditions. For example, humans produce material 
resources which guarantee survival. Humans produce a mode of 
subsistence, such as sedentary or migratory agriculture, which 
provides control over the natural environment. But also in 
objectivation, social actors produce ideological products and 
ideological conditions of existence. For example, humans 
produce and reproduce institutionalized social relations, such 
as the class structure of modern capitalism. Social actors 
produce and reproduce world views, beliefs and assumptions, or 
ideological conditions which frame human access to reality. 
These are ideological conditions which provide mutual 
understanding or intersubjectivity. As with the case of 
material conditions, these ideological conditions are 
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existential requirements; they are products of human activity 
which are necessary for life at the cultural level. 
Until now, it may have been possible to speak of 
externalization, objectivation and internalization as an 
individual (personal) process; but this is not entirely 
accurate. As Berger and Luckman indicated, the dialectics of 
reality construction is a social enterprise or an 
intersubjective process. The production of self and the 
creation of human products never occurs in isolation. It occurs 
among others whose labor is also externalization and 
objectivation. Human products, both material and ideological, 
are then products of collective objectivation. Quasitangible 
products, such as the institutionalized social relations found 
in class society, are important examples of this collective 
objectivation. They are ideological conditions produced in a 
social enterprise. 
To illustrate the moment of objectivation, it may help to 
look briefly at one extreme example of its presence. A special 
case of objectivation occurs when ideological or quasi tangible 
products of human activity take on an object-like status which 
seems nonhuman. This extreme example of objectivation occurs 
frequently with humanly produced institutions. It has been 
labeled reificiation. 
Reification is the apprehension of human phenomena as if 
they were things, that is, in non-human, or possibly supra-
human terms. Another way of saying this is that 
reification is the apprehension of the products of human 
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activity as if they were something else than human products 
-- such as-facts of nature, results of cosmic laws or 
manifestations of divine will. Reificiation implies that 
man is capable of forgetting his own authorship of the 
human world, and further -- that the dialectic between man, 
the producer and his products is lost to consciousness ••• 
It is important to keep in mind that the objectivity of 
the institutional world, however massive it may appear to 
the individual, is a humanly produced, constructed 
objectivity. The institutional world is objectivated human 
activity, and so is every single institution. Despite the 
objectivity that marks [institutions] in human experience, 
they do not thereby acquire an ontological status apart 
from the human activity which produced them ••• As soon as 
an objective social world is established, the possibility 
of reification is never far away. The objectivity of the 
social world means that it confronts man as something 
outside himself. The decisive question is whether he still 
retains the awareness that however objectivated, the social 
world was made by men -- and therefore can be remade by 
them. In other words, reification can be described as an 
extreme step in the process of objectivation, whereby the 
objectivat~d world loses its comprehensibility as a human 
enterprise and becomes fixed as a non-human, non-
humanizable inert facticity [10]. 
The significance of this assertion, again, seems 
unrecognized in contemporary nursing discourse. Twentieth 
century nursing labor has inherited the humanly produced 
conditions of class society. This is an existential condition 
which nurses cannot ignore. Institutionalized social relations 
(i.e., class and class conflict) will continue to fix the 
parameters of practice, determining what nurses can and cannot 
do. Presently, nurses sell their labor as a commodity. The 
value of that labor depends in part upon the procurement of 
credentials, which in turn are a commodity, purchased with 
capital in the course of secondary education. To reiterate, 
capital and labor are social phenomena which fix the parameters 
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of nursing practice. 
Class society and its organization around capital and labor 
are perhaps the greatest massivity encountered in reflexive 
nursing discourse. Those concerned with national policy watch 
the spiral of health care costs as though it were a nonhuman 
phemomenon with a will of its own. This is the reification of 
internal contradictions in capitalism. It is the concretizing 
of a wage spiral, reflecting laborers' demands to keep up with 
an inflationary cost of middle class living. And it is the 
concretizing of an interest spiral; demands made by those who 
own capital (private ownership of property) to receive a return 
on investments. Taken together, this massivity of labor and 
capital becomes reified as institutionalized social relations. 
They are experienced by nurses and most other Americans as a 
nonhuman, nonhumanizable, inert facti city. The social world 
then loses its comprehensibility as a genuinely human product. 
If nursing discourse is to make any meaningful contribution to 
the health care needs of society, it needs to confront this 
specific example of objectivation/reification; the "second 
nature" of class society. 
The effects of objectivation are so powerful (especially 
in the case of reification) and its presence so unavoidable, 
that it seems important to recognize how and why it occurs. 
According to Berger and Luckman, one important reason for the 
presence of objectivation is the human use of symbols. The 
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transition from embodied activity to humanly created products 
occurs primarily through the use of symbols. 
Language provides the fundamental superimposition of logic 
on the objectivated social world. The edifice of [social 
reality] is built upon language and uses language as its 
principal instrumentality ••• The common objectivations of 
everyday life are maintained primarily by linguistic 
signification ••• that is, by the human production of 
signs. A sign may be distinguished from other 
objectivations by its explicit intention to serve as an 
index of subjective meanings ••• Language, which may be 
defined here as a system of vocal signs, is the most 
important sign system of human society. Language provides 
me with a ready made possibility for the ongoing 
objectification of my unfolding experience. Language is 
pliantly expansive, so as to allow me to objectify a great 
variety of experiences coming my way in the course of my 
life. Language also typifies experience, allowing me to 
subsume them under broad categories in terms of which they 
have meaning not only to myself, but also to my fellow men • 
• • [This is] the capacity of language to crysta1ize and 
stabilize for me my own subjectivity ••• It can therefore 
be said that language makes "more real II my subjectivity, 
not only to my [fellow humans], but also to myself [11]. 
The importance of symbols and language in the se1f-
formative process of man seems to have been overlooked in most 
contemporary nursing discourse [12]. The b1indspot may have 
occurred because of the heavy biopsychosocial eclecticism in 
contemporary health science and because of a relative absence of 
cultural awareness in nursing discourse. But for whatever 
reason, the absence of a cultural frame of reference in nursing's 
understanding of man, has meant that the role of language as it 
molds existential parameters has not been recognized. The 
cultural frame of reference is one which specifically recognizes 
the use of symbols as an irreducible part of existence at the 
cultural level. 
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The analysis of Berger and Luckman provides such a cultural 
frame of reference. They begin from the cultural phenomenon of 
linguistic signification. This is the use of symbols, 
particularly language, to indicate subjective experience. In the 
process of signification, a sign expresses or indicates the 
subjective experience of its user. Words and numbers, for 
example, indicate or "stand for" thoughts, emotions, sensations, 
judgments, etc. Linguistic signification then is the 
externalization of something more interior; it is the 
externalization/expression of subjective experience. Human 
expressivity is unique in its level of such "indexicality." No 
other species has the ability to indicate or externalize with 
the degree of complexity found in human signification [13]. 
Externalization, however, is not the only process which 
occurs in signification. Human expressivity not only 
externalizes subjectivity, it also objectifies it. A symbol 
serves as an object-like sign -- an index which stands for 
subjectivity. Signs are then another quasitangible product. 
They are products created by humans to signify subject 
experience. A word, for example, is a quasitangible object 
which, when spoken, objectivates a patient's experience with 
pain. The word transforms his subjective experience into a 
relatively enduring product. The word as product lasts beyond 
our face-to-face encounter. It becomes part of his memory and 
mine. 
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Symbols then, and particularly language, are objectivating 
in their very function. They are quasitangible objects which 
are produced to stand for or indicate something less object-
like. They convert subjective reality into objective reality. 
This objectivating function of symbols is a primary reason for 
the presence of objectivation in manls self-formative process. 
But language is a source of objectivation for other reasons 
besides its function. Symbols are objectivating partly because 
they come "ready-made. II They are inherited objectivities which 
pliantly coerce experience into ready-made categories. This is 
another way of saying that language molds a virtually infinite 
array of human experience into a relatively plastic mold of 
categories which are shared by members of a linguistic 
community. 
The "ready-made" nature of language is something which can 
be used to explain both particular variation in cross-cultural 
objectivation as well as universal regularity. The fact that 
members of different linguistic communities inherit different 
collections of symbols is a condition which may be used to 
explain variations in the social construction of reality. This 
interpretation, however, when it is overextended, leads to a 
kind of linguistic relativism which is so particularistic that 
it has little explanatory power. By the same token, the 
overemphasis upon a universal structure of syntax, or upon the 
logical form which is concealed beneath the surface of everyday 
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discourse, lends itself to a form of determinism which again has 
limited explanatory power [14]. 
A more moderate explanation would propose that the 
particular collection of symbols inherited by a linguistic 
community and the structural properties found in that collection 
are important reasons for the objectivation found in human 
existence. In their function as indices and in their status as 
an inherited commodity, symbols transform subjective experience 
into object-like products. They objectivate an infinite array 
of subjective experience into a more or less cohesive cultural 
tradition, a tradition which is then inherited by successive 
generations. 
Although this brief analysis of language has been much too 
superficial, its main intent has been just to recognize the use 
of symbols as a primary ingredient in the self-formative process 
of man. Language in particular is an important part of this 
process. Language is a humanly created product which is then 
taken up and used in the production of other products. Language 
influences the production of both the material and the 
ideological conditions of existence. It is the medium which 
carries agreement (consensus) or disagreement (conflict) 
concerning production of those conditions. It is the source of 
intersubjectivity in society. 
The inheritance of a collection of symbols and the 
continued use of those s~nbols is the reason that humans achieve 
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mutual understanding. Intersubjectivity springs from the 
communicative processes of ordinary language use. The use of 
ordinary language is the source of agreement or mutual 
understanding achieved between parents and children, employers 
and laborers, between males and females and between the self I 
am now and the self I was years ago. Without this hermeneutic 
understanding, which is achieved in ordinary language, humans 
could not continue to produce themselves -- they could not 
continue to produce the ideological and material conditions of 
existence. 
The significance of language in this process might be 
demonstrated by looking briefly at one concrete example. The 
current discussion has been examining the moment of 
objectivation -- the process whereby the externalized products 
of human activity attain the character of objectivity. The 
argument has been that objectivation occurs because of human 
labor and symbol use, because humans, through their labor and 
symbol use, create object-like products, or an objectively real 
social reality. 
In this moment of objectivation, the influence of language 
might be best illustrated by the example of sexist occupational 
vocabulary. In our labor, nurses achieve objectivation when we 
produce an objectively real social reality along with patients 
and other health care professionals. In hospital settings, for 
example, this is the social construction of an institutional 
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reality. The social construction of this objectivity still 
includes blatently sexist, patriarchal or coercive language. 
For example, a die-hard part of hospital nursing labor is still 
the transcription of physician's "orders." 
This sexist language objectivates my experience in labor. It 
coerces my subjective experience into the inherited tradition of 
male domination and gender specific discrimination. It is 
language which fixes the coordinates of my experience, coercing 
it, so to speak, into dominated boxes. I may passively and 
uncritically accept those coordinates; I may accept them 
begrudgingly; or I may protest these coordinates by protesting 
the use of sexist vocabulary and the presence of sexist role 
behavior. Such language is objectivating also because it 
designates or fixes an objectively real meaning in my 
experience; it means that I am still part of a master/slave 
relationship, no matter how subtle. In sum, the objectivation 
of self in this category of labor and via this language deposits 
a sexist objectivity in the common experience of nurses. 
Internalization 
Until now, the discussion has focused on two moments of the 
social construction of reality; externalization and 
objectivation. These moments, however, account for only part of 
the self-formative process of man. The third moment of this 
process is the retrojection of existential conditions into the 
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consciousness of humans. This is the moment of internalization, 
the process by which the socially constructed world is 
internalized in individual consciousness. 
The individual member of society simultaneously 
externalizes his own being into the social world and 
internalizes it as an objective reality ••• In the life of 
every individual, there is a temporal sequence, in the 
course of which he is inducted into participation in the 
societal dialectic. The beginning point of this process is 
internalization: the immediate apprehension or 
interpretation of an objective event as expressing meaning, 
that is, as a manifestation of another's subjective 
processes which thereby become subjectively meaningful to 
myself ••• Internalization is the basis first, for an 
understanding of one's fellowmen and, second, for the 
apprehension of the world as a meaningful and social 
reality. This apprehension does not result from 
autonomous creations of meaning by isolated individuals, 
but begins with the individual "taking over" the world in 
which others already live ••• On1y when he has achieved 
this degree of internalization is an individual a member of 
society. The ontogenetic process by which this is brought 
about is socialization, which may thus be defined as the 
comprehensive and consistent induction of an individual 
into the objective world of a society or a sector of it. 
Primary socialization is the first socialization an 
individual undergoes in childhood, through which he becomes 
a member of society. Secondary socialization is any 
subsequent process that inducts an already socialized 
individual into new sectors of the objective world of his 
society [15J. 
In primary and secondary socialization, the parameters of 
the lived world are internalized. The objectivity of the 
social world is internalized when humans take over a tradition, 
when they learn or master the specific interpretations of 
reality which enable them to participate in the social world. 
This internalization involves the absorption of different 
definitions of reality, the absorption and mastery of roles and 
role behavior and the development of identity. 
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In both primary and secondary socialization, the experience 
of internalization involves both the preservation and 
modification of social reality. The objective reality of 
externalized being, the objectivity of roles and institutions, 
the objectivity of social formations is reproduced in the 
consciousness of individuals. Institutionalized modes of 
existence are internalized as fixed objectivities; in other 
words, they are preserved, during socialization experiences when 
those definitions of existence are accepted without any 
significant change. But socially constructed definitions may 
also be rejected as a situation which produces "deviance." 
Individuals and collectivities deviate from institutionalized 
norms when they "take over" the world with a modified 
"interpretation of reality. 
To take just one example, the internalization of the 
objective social world includes the absorption of gender 
specific interpretations. An important example is the universal 
presence of gender specific interpretations concerning labor 
[16]. Primary and secondary socialization includes the 
internalization of hegemonic definitions which specify some 
forms of labor as open to women, other forms being relatively 
closed to women. Nursing, like domestic labor, has 
traditionally been internalized as a labor process which 
includes female role behavior (service) and a female 
(servile/matriarchal) identity. 
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Feminist perspectives, as they have entered secondary 
socialization in nursing at several points in history, struggle 
to produce deviance -- to overthrow a patriarchal definition of 
reality for nursing. But feminist perspectives in nursing 
education are still weighed down by the contradiction of sexism 
in primary socialization. So long as children are socialized 
via a patriarchal construction of reality under capitalism, it 
seems likely that these attempts to produce deviance in an adult 
labor force will continue to be riddled with contradiction [17J. 
Internalization, externalization and objectivation then are 
the three moments of a dialectical process which is the self-
formative process of man. The dialectic of reality construction 
has been presented as a "steering" mechanism in history. It is 
the mechanism which guides conscious human activity, an 
underlying structural dynamic which directs or steers the 
production of material and ideological conditions of existence. 
4.3 Imagination and Negotiation 
The review of Berger and Luckman brings this investigation 
back full circle to Marxian-existentialist premises about the 
human species and the sociohistorical construction of reality. 
Like Habermas, Berger and Luckman locate relatively invariant 
structures in the natural history of man. They argue that the 
constitution of reality is anthropologically grounded; that it 
is anchored in the survival requirements of man. 
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These are premises which emerge in the step of dialectical 
imagination. In the step of bracketing, the natural attitude is 
suspended. In the step of reconstruction, reflection recovers 
the genesis of our historical selves. Then reflection moves 
through the phenomenological experience of free-variation in 
imagination. This is struggling to identify structures in the 
constitution of reality which are relatively invariant. 
Imagination is a step which struggles to discover if "things 
could be other than thus. 1I It recognizes contingency in the 
genesis of our historical selves. It recognizes that bourgeois 
interpetations of reality are not the only possible 
interpretations available to man. There have been others in the 
past and there could, in principle, be others in the future. 
Dialectical imagination then struggles to recognize how 
"things could be other than thus." It is a step which tries to 
uncover those aspects of the human condition which are changing 
and those aspects which are relatively invariant. It is a step 
which tries to imagine other possibilities -- possibilities 
which coincide with invariant existential requirements of man. 
Dialectical method, on this account, seeks to free all 
being from the appearance of rigidity and from ahistorical 
interpretations. It treats all objects as many-faced, 
coming-into-being, acting and passing away in time. As a 
result, reality is comprehended as a process of becoming in 
which reality as a whole, as well as each particular, 
individual part, is understood as developing out of an 
earlier stage of its existence and as evolving into 
something else. This entails grasping not only an object's 
positive features but also its negative qualities, what the 
historical object has been ••• what it is becoming, and 
what it ;s not -- for all of these contribute to its 
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character [18]. 
Dialectical imagination is then a step which tries to 
discover which aspects of the human condition are changing. It 
struggles to recognize those aspects of reality construction 
which are invariant and those aspects which are becoming 
something different. This is a step which humans undertake 
because they want to know the point at which they may act. 
The purpose of this step is to govern action. 
An active being is concerned with what is not always the 
same as it is, but can also be different. In it, he can 
discover the point at which he has to act. The purpose of 
his knowledge is to govern action [19]. 
Habermas, Berger and Luckman all identify the same 
invariant structures in the natural history of man. These are 
the structures of labor and language. They argue that the human 
condition is tied to the relatively invariant sociohistorical 
categories of labor and language; that the social construction 
of reality moves within boundaries which are established in real 
embodied labor and in ordinary language use. This is the 
argument that in work and in words, man produces his changing 
historical self. 
With an acceptance of this argument, reflection then may 
enter a new experience of ideological struggle. This experience 
can occur, for example, when one recognizes that the human 
condition can change through the categories of labor and 
signification. This is recognizing that social actors can 
change the human condition if they act, in their real embodied 
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labor and in their communicative interaction, to create the 
conditions for that change. In this step, reflexive humans have 
discovered the points at which they can act. 
In nursing, these steps of radical reflection can bring one 
to the final step of negotiation. This is an experience in 
which one puts aside dogma and hypostatized world views and 
enters human discourse as a full, equal partner. This is 
entering coversations in a new way, because one has discovered 
new points at which to act. 
4.4 Negotiation in Nursing 
In the case of reinterpreting the historical experience of 
a group, the authentication of an alternative 
interpretation requires the previous active presence of a 
relevant hypothesis and a properly organized process of its 
negotiation ••• the enlightenment process consists 
therefore in a dialogue in which critical theorists attempt 
to negotiate the alternative meanings they offer and apply 
persuasion to convince their partners of their adequacy. 
Whether they will succeed or not depends, on the whole, on 
the degree of correspondence between the interpretive 
formula contained in the critical theory and the volume of 
experience collectively accumulated and commonsensically 
assimilated by the group. Such correspondence must be 
given the opportunity of being carefully considered and 
scrupulously assessed by all participants ••• The sign of 
authentication is precisely the former patient1s emerging 
from his subordinate position on the receiving end of the 
dialogue and assuming the role of a fully developed 
creative agent of meaning negotiation [20]. 
Remaining sections of this invetigation will present 
hypotheses or an interpetive formula for reflexive nursing 
action. This is locating points in the contemporary reality of 
nursing at which reflexive nurses can act; points at which a 
reflexive nursing praxis could act to improve the human 
condition. 
The Critique of Scientistic 
~sciousness-'n Nursing 
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Beginning sections of this study discussed the epistemolo-
gical frame of reference presented by Habermas. This is a frame 
of reference which can help contemporary nursing discourse to 
clarify the appropriate use of science. It can help nurses to 
understand why scientific inquiry is necessary and helpful in 
some aspects of reality construction and why, at other times, 
the normal science paradigm is inappropriately used to consti-
tute reality. 
The framework presented by Habermas was not a version of 
epistemologcal anarchism. It argued that, while multiple 
interpretations of reality may in principle be possible, the 
history of the human species has been characterized by three. 
These three frames of reference "take precedence" so to speak; 
they are ncessary for species survival. 
The framework of instrumental reason is a mode of reality 
construction which, according to Habermas, is necessary. 
Historically, it has been a frame of reference which allows man 
to engage in successful instrumental action. It allows humans 
to produce and reproduce the material conditions of existence. 
Empirical analytic inquiry is then an important and useful 
part of human being-in-the-world. Sciences which engage in 
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empirical-analytic inquiry provide technologically useful 
information; information which allows humans to predict and 
control natural processes. Empirical-analytic inquiry is then a 
mode of reality construction which enables humans to become 
better and better technicians. 
This argument can help nurses to recognize the appropriate 
use of science in nursing and abuses of science in nursing. 
Nurses can use an empirical-analytic mode of inquiry to 
constitute reality, if we wish to become better technicians. 
Science, in this form, provides technologically useful 
information which nurses could, in principle, use to predict and 
control "natural" processes in the human body. Biochemical 
research, physiological research, and other forms of IIhard ti 
science are then important sources of knowledge in nursing's 
construction of reality. 
But with the ascent of positivism in recent history, 
nurses, along with other social actors in bourgeois society, 
have frequently internalized a contemporary social attitude 
which reifies empirical-analytic inquiry as a privileged 
perspective. This is the tendency in nursing to view empirical-
analytic inquiry as the only legitimate mode of reality 
construction. Such a view reifies sCience; it generates 
IIscientistic" thinking in nursing. 
Scientism means that we no longer understand science as one 
form of possible knowledge but rather identify knowledge---
with science [21]. 
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The struggle against scientistic consciousness in nursing is a 
critically important project for organic nurse-intellectuals 
[22]. The critique of scientism, however, progresses 
eratically. 
Most nurses recognize the one-dimensional nature of 
scientistic thinking, once they reflect about it. Nursing 
represents the accumulated experience of a predominantly female 
labor force whose members are very intimately involved with men 
and women engaged in existential struggle. This kind of 
intimate human contact quickly uncovers the one dimensional 
character of scientific knowledge. Nursing ideology frequently 
expresses this recognition: that scientific understanding only 
provides the technical ground for nursing practice; and that 
genuine authentic, human interaction in nursing practice flows 
from another kind of understanding. Science allows us to be 
competent technicians. Hermeneutic understanding enables us to 
be participants with our patients in authentic human dialogue. 
But the critique of scientistic consciousness in nursing 
does not occur in a vacuum. Critical theorists who struggle to 
counter the influence of scientism in nursing do this within the 
sociohistorica1 context of modern industrial capitalism. This 
is a context where science and technology are "interlocked," a 
context in which there is a systematic, institutionalized 
connection between science and technology. In modern bourgeois 
society, this institutionalized connection has become hegemonic; 
it seems, at times to be steering society, rather than the 
converse. 
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This is an institutionalized connection (between science 
and technology) which has gained ascendency in modern industrial 
society. Habermas would argue that it has gained ascendency 
because it gives humans power over the natural environment. It 
increases man's productive efficiency. 
But under institutionalized social relations in class 
society, social actors do not participate equally in the 
development of science and technology. Under modern industrial 
capitalism, the production of technologically useful information 
is a social enterprise, it is controlled predominantly by the 
upper socioeconomic strata of society whose representatives are 
predominantly caucasian and male. This is recognizing that the 
contemporary institution of science and technology itself 
reflects institutionalized power relations. It reflects the 
power and privilege of gender, class and racial relations in 
modern bourgeois society. 
Nursing may not remove itself from this sociohistorical 
context simply by choosing to ignore it. It ought rather to be 
confronted. The struggle against scientistic consciousness in 
nursing is a struggle which will be waged within the context of 
institutionalized power relations. Scientistic thinking has 
occurred in modern bourgeois society because power relations 
support and nurture this kind of thinking. Those with technolo-
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gically exploitable knowledge do have power and privilege in 
class society. The desire for scientific understanding in nur-
ing is then wrapped up tightly with the desire for power and 
privilege. It is the hope that scientific knowledge can give 
nurses power and privilege in the health care industry. 
These arguments suggest that in modern class society, 
science has been used, at least in part, as an instrument to 
preserve and extend class privilege. Because of its 
embeddedness in class society, scientistic thinking is a 
"mindset" which is especially difficult to dislodge. Nurses in 
alJ areas of practice (service, education, research) may 
recognize its one dimensional character, but because of 
contemporary social aspirations, because of the aspiration for 
social mobility, nurses may continue to accept the legitimacy of 
a scientistic frame of reference. This is hoping that science 
will give nurses power and privilege in class society. It is 
using science to secure (new) class privileges for nurses. 
From a bourgeois perspective, this use of science may seem 
emancipatory for nurses. Using science to extend new class 
privileges to nurses may seem entirely laudable. If nurses can 
become better technicians through science, then why not extend 
class privileges to them? This is a common response; one which 
demonstrates the difficulty of dislodging scientistic thinking 
in modern bourgeois society. 
The activity of technicians can only be rewarded as more 
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valuable than other forms of labor because members of class 
society preserve those value distinctions in categories of 
labor. The dream of socialist society is that labor in all its 
forms is equally valuable; since it is equally necessary for 
species survival that all members of society should participate 
in all forms of labor equally and be rewarded equally. This is 
the utopian dream of an egalitarian society, the dialectical 
imagining of a social formation where technicians, philosophers, 
artists, politicians, and domestic workers experience equal 
privileges because they participate equally in the production of 
existential conditions. But its vision can help nurses to 
recognize important contradictions in our use of and abuse of 
science. 
Scientistic consciousness in nursing is part of a greater 
scientistic consciousness in society writ large. It is a 
consciousness which elevates the understanding of technicians 
above other forms of understanding. This elevation is a 
consequence of power relations as they presently exist in modern 
industrial capitalism. The hegemony of science and technology is 
linked very closely to the power and privilege of class 
position. The erosion of this hegemony (scientistic thinking) 
then seems possible only in conjunction with the erosion of 
superfluous power relations or superfluous domination ;n class 
society. 
The struggle against scientistic consciousness in nursing 
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then appears as part of another contextual struggle, that is the 
struggle against scientistic thinking in society, writ large and 
the struggle against superfluous power relations which prolong 
this thinking. This is recognizing that nursing's social 
reality may not be "decontextualized." The contradictions which 
we experience are only particular instances of contradictions 
found in bourgeois society. Resisting those contradictions in 
nursing seems schizophrenic, unless one also resists related 
contradictions in bourgeois society writ large. 
Details 
The specific details of a critical nursing praxis which 
resists scientistic consciousness in nursing are the responsi-
ility of reflexive nurses, as individuals actors and as a col-
lective. The specific ways in which critical insight intervenes 
in the life of a group are not "written on any wall," and there 
is no "blueprint for action" which can emerge as a conclusion 
from reflexive analysis. 
Instead, these insights must be recognized as hypotheses 
which, if accepted, intervene in the lives of individuals, 
changing attitudes and changing lifestyles. Nurses who accept 
these insights then become different social or political actors. 
They conduct research differently, they practice differently, 
they educate differently, and they administer differently. The 
specific details of this kind of reflexive practice then should 
277 
be seen as something like the experience of a partner who 
emerges from successful psychoanalysis~ It is authentic, 
autonomous human praxis, practice which thinks critically, which 
rejects dogma, which struggles to cultivate virtuous conduct, in 
itself and among others. 
As in psychoanalysis, the specific details of this praxis 
have to emerge from the experience of negotiation itself. 
Neither the patient nor the therapist can know in advance what 
kind of lifstyle will emerge. But political actors in nursing 
could clarify this process by continued critical analysis (in-
cluding empirical analyses) of at least the following critical 
hypotheses. 
1. Secondary education (nursing education) is 
a social institution which legitimates scientistic thinking 
in nursing. 
Nursing's political actors could struggle meaningfully 
against scientistic consciousness by uncovering the ways in which 
nursing education reinforces a scientistic world view among 
nurses. This would be helping nursing educators, researchers, 
administrators and students to resist the contradictions and 
abuses which accompany scientistic consciousness. 
2. Professional organizations are social 
institutions which legitimate scientistic thinking in 
nursing. 
Again, nursing's political actors could resist scientistic 
consciousness by uncovering the ways in which professional 
organizations legitimate scientistic consciousness in nursing. 
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This would include an analysis of the National League for Nursing 
and the American Nurses· Association accreditation criteria, as 
these reinforce scientistic interpretations in nursing education 
and research. 
3. The state is a social institution which 
legitimates scientistic thinking in nursing. 
Finally, political actors in nursing could resist scientistic 
consciousness by uncovering the ways in which the state 
reinforces a scientistic world view among nurses. This analysis 
might describe the way in which state board test pools 
legitimate scientism through the mechanism of licensure; the way 
in which local state support for colleges of nursing reinforces 
scientism among faculty and administrators and finally, the ways 
in which federal support reinforces scientism in nursing 
education and research. 
The Criti1ue of Bourgeois Professional TOeology ~ Nursing 
The critique of scientism in nursing is tied very closely 
to the critique of bourgeois professional ideology in nursing. 
As mentioned earlier, scientistic thinking in nursing is part of 
a greater contextual reality where science has been used, at 
least in part, to preserve and extend class privileges. 
Physicians are an ideal type example of the use of science to 
appropriate professional power and privilege. 
Nursing has experienced a similar, yet oddly less than 
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successful, attempt to appropriate professional power and 
privilege. Nursing ideology has, for years, espoused the belief 
in professionalism as a vehicle which could secure these 
ingredients of power and privilege for nurses. Critical theory 
offers alternative hypotheses which challenge the legitimacy of 
professional ideology. 
Professional status is, of course, accorded to social 
actors who complete an intense socialization process, producing 
something beyond technical competence. Professionals function 
differently than do technicians. They do this partly because 
they have a greater stock of recipe knowledge, but also because 
they are granted more privileges to use their knowledge in their 
labor. Professional status is then tied very closely to 
institutionalized power relations and privilege in bourgeois 
society. Professional status is class status. It is a form of 
institutionalized social relations (power relations). 
It is no wonder that nursing's political elite (mostly its 
educational elite) have repeatedly resurrected the ideology of 
professionalism as a vehicle to appropriate more power and 
privilege for nurses. In the greater context of twentieth 
century industrial society, the professions have, in fact, 
enjoyed greater levels of power and privilege. Participating in 
this reality and experiencing the effects of minimal privileges 
and minimal power, it seems only natural that nursing would have 
internalized bourgeois strategies to improve its own position. 
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But there has been a peculiar tension in this experience. 
While nursing discourse espouses the ideology of professionalism, 
nursing activity, in many contexts, still does not seem like 
other forms of professional activity. There is still a 
widespread recognition that nurses enjoy very little power or 
privilege. The tension in this experience can produce critical 
hypotheses about professionalism in nursing. 
If nurses accept the Marxian-existentialist framework 
expressed in this study, then their critical analyses will begin 
by looking at nursing practice from a different starting point. 
It will begin by looking at the nature of nursing labor, at the 
structural properties which characterize the work of nurses. 
Preceding sections of this study have suggested that 
nursing practice, as it presently exists, resembles Arendt's 
category of labor. It is tied very intimately to the natural 
processes of the human body. It produces no lasting object; it 
is cyclical and repetitive, it serves life. 
Like the dialectic found in domestic labor, nursing labor 
can include moments of externalization, internalization and 
objectification, which become a dissolving thing. 
But in this activity, nurses can and frequently do 
experience a very intimate kind of contact with human life. At 
the staff level, nurses feed and bathe debilitated patients. We 
lift, transfer, reposition and massage immobilized patients. We 
handle body secretions, which is a culturally symbolic activity. 
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We create conditions for rest and we provoke activities of daily 
living. We participate in the moments of childbirth and death. 
We create conversations in which patients reconstruct their 
own existential reality. We witness sorrow and joy and we may 
also share these sentiments with our patients. 
These experiences are tied very closely to the life 
process. Because that process, in its more mundane details, can 
be so cyclical and repetitive, nursing labor seems sometimes to 
be invisible and futile. This futility seems even more salient 
when nurses recognize a relative absence of power and privilege 
within our own ranks to control this labor process. The 
organization of nursing labor frequently moves within parameters 
which are established by others (e.g., administrators, physi-
cians). This is recognizing that conditions of nursing labor 
frequently are established by others who have more power and 
privilege than do nurses. 
These are dimensions of a labor process which make bourgeois 
ideology appealing. It seems legitimate for nurses to 
experience more control over this labor process through the 
appropriation of professional power and privilege. Bourgeois 
ideology then seems emancipatory for nurses. 
But the activity of professionals can only be rewarded as 
more valuable than other forms of labor because members of class 
society preserve these value distinctions in categories of 
labor. Members of society can accord professionals increased 
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power and privilege only if the labor of experts is valued more 
than the labor of practitioners. This is certainly not the only 
possible form of social organization available to historical 
man. While it is common to class society, it could, in 
principle disappear, if social organization ever became 
egalitarian. 
Nursing, of course, has an interest in accepting bourgeois 
ideology. The appropriation of professional privileges holds 
the premise of improving the existential reality of nurses. 
This makes it very difficult to dislodge bourgeois professional 
ideology from the consciousness of nurses. 
But the appropriation of a professional position in society 
commits nurses to a specified structural position vis a vis 
patients. It sets up and reproduces a definite class barrier 
between nurses and patients; also between professional nurses 
and "auxilliary personnel." The struggle for professionalism 
then emerges as a strategy used by nurses to extend or increase 
our own power and privilege in class society. 
While this strategy may seem emancipatory for nurses, it 
seems also to hypostatize or reproduce class barriers as they 
presently exist under modern industrial capitalism. This is a 
situation which has occurred frequently in contemporary 
political reality: the oppressed become oppressors; those who 
have experienced domination appropriate power, are corrupted by 
that power and in turn use their power to dominate others. From 
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this critical perspective, professional ideology in nursing 
appears as the legitimation of professional privilege as a 
struggle to create another subset of professional experts in 
bourgeois society. This is not necessarily an emancipatory 
interest; at least it is not emancipatory for society writ 
large. It is the continuation of an ever-present threat in 
bourgeois society, 
••• the splittinQ of human beings into two classes --
the social engineers and the inmates of closed insti-
tutions [23]. 
Nursing praxis does not have to commit itself to the 
continuation of this split. Nursing praxis could, as an 
alternative, find its identity in its own labor process. It 
could argue that labor, in all its forms, is necessary for 
species survival. The labor of experts is no more valuable 
than the labor of practitioners. The labor of managers is no 
more valuable than the labor of workers. The activity of 
physicians and administrators is no more valuable than that of 
nurses. And the labor of registered nurses is no more valuable 
than the labor of practical nurses or nursing assistants. 
This is a utopian vision of egalitarian society. It is 
admittedly counterfactual; history has yet to see a social 
formation which is genuinely egalitarian. But this is an 
emancipatory possibility which nursing could, in principle, 
struggle for. Struggling for this possibility keeps nursing 
from generating new forms of class barriers; it prevents the 
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further splitting of human beings into two classes: nurse-
social engineers (professional experts) and inmates of closed 
institutions (nonprofessional workers and patients). 
Details 
The specific details of a critical praxis which resists 
bourgeois professional ideology in nursing are again the 
responsibility of reflexive nurses. There cannot be a 
"blueprint" which outlines specific characteristics of an 
alternative ideology for nursing. Instead, the ideology and 
practice which can replace professionalism must emerge in the 
negotiation of reflexive nurses. 
The interpretation of this author is that an alternative to 
bourgeois professionalism can occur in the existential mode of 
democratic (humanistic) socialism. Health workers in this kind 
of egalitarian social formation would not perpetuate class 
barriers. Professionalism would not be an ingredient in this 
form of social organization. Unfortunately, however, there is 
not as yet, an example in history which shows us how to make 
this transition. 
Political actors in nursing could help to clarify this 
process by continued critical investigation of hypotheses like 
those found below. 
1. Professional organizations are social 
institutions which legitimate class barriers. 
Political actors in nursing could struggle meaningfully 
against bourgeois professional ideology by uncovering 
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the ways in which this ideology legitimates class barriers 
between clients and nurses; and the way in which it legitimates 
class barriers between nurses and nonprofessional workers. The 
role of professional organizations and labor unions as they 
legitimate this class barrier is also an important topic for 
critical nursing research. 
2. Secondary education is a primary mechanism for the 
production and internalization of bourgeois professional 
ideology. 
Again, nursing's political actors could resist bourgeois 
professional ideology in nursing by uncovering the ways in which 
secondary education produces this ideology and then promotes its 
internalization among nursing students. This would be helping 
nursing educators and students at all levels to resist the 
contradictions of internalized professional ideology. 
The Critique of Sexism 
in Nursing -
The critique of professionalism in nursing is tied very 
closely to a critique of sexism in nursing. From a Marxian-
existentialist perspective, the desire for professional 
privilege in nursing is related to another contextual struggle, 
which is the emancipation of women from coercive social 
relations. Arguing from feminist premises, nursing and other 
predominantly female labor forces have expressed a growing 
rejection of coercive power relations which spring from the 
sexual division of labor. Feminist perspectives are a growing 
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trend in nursing discourse [24]. 
A critical perspective in nursing would acknowledge the 
relevance of feminist arguments. However it would emphasize the 
need for contemporary nurses to become more reflexive about 
different versions of feminism. 
Two versions of feminism which seem most popular in 
contemporary nursing discourse are liberal and radical feminism. 
Liberal feminism argues that the source of oppression is located 
in a lack of civil rights and educational opportunities. 
Radical feminism argues that the oppression of women cannot be 
removed by related social changes (e.g., educational 
opportunities or the abolition of class society). Radical 
feminism argues that women's liberation can only occur through 
the abolition of institutionalized gender discrimination [25J. 
Socialist feminism, on the other hand, 
••• emphasizes the mutual reinforcement of capitalism and 
patriarchy. Women will not be able truly to determine the 
conditions of their own lives without eliminating the 
double oppression of a classist society and institution-
alized gender relations [26J. 
Socialist feminism is then a perspective which struggles 
for a reversal of coercive power relations along the lines of 
gender and class. It is the perspective expressed in this 
investigation. Critical theory would use this perspective to 
address the social reality of nursing in terms of both class and 
gender. It would argue against liberal feminism that increased 
educational opportunities perpetuate one important source of 
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coercive social relations: class. Professional education may 
improve the educational opportunities of nurses, but it prolongs 
class discrimination. It perpetuates a professional strata in 
society. On this account, liberal feminism may be criticized as 
an elitist strategy which attempts to preserve class privileges 
for "well educated" women. 
Socialist feminism, in contrast, argues that the liberation 
of nurses is tied to both gender and class. It argues that if 
coercive social relations are to be abolished in nursing, this 
will occur with the abolition of capitalism and patriarchy; an 
overcoming of class society and institutionalized gender 
relations. The struggle for a socialist feminist perspective in 
nursing is an important task for organic intellectuals. 
Details 
The specific details of a critical praxis which resists 
sexism in nursing are again the responsibility of reflexive 
nurses. There cannot be a "blueprint" which outlines specific 
characteristics of a socialist feminist form of nursing praxis. 
Instead, the ideology and practice which can replace sexism in 
nursing must emerge in the reflexive negotiation of nurses. 
Political actors in nursing could help to clarify this 
process by continued critical investigation of hypotheses like 
the one expressed below. 
1. Secondary education is a social institution 
which helps to shape a liberal feminist world view. 
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Nursing's political actors could struggle against sexism by 
uncovering the ways in which secondary education shapes a 
feminist world view in nursing. This would be helping nurse 
educators and nursing students at all levels to resist the 
contradictions of sexism. A socialist feminist critique would 
also help nurses to resist the contradictions of liberal and 
radical feminism. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In these last sections, the investigation has presented 
hypotheses for negotiation among political actors in nursing. 
This is concluding the process of radical reflection by inviting 
other nurses to participate in the "negotiation of meanings." 
It is entering new conversations about the social reality of 
nursing; entering into the "pragmatics of persuasion." 
The spririt of these hypotheses is not dogmatic. 
Negotiation is an act which does not presume to impose its 
interpretations of reality upon others. Rather, these 
hypotheses have been presented in the spirit of Antonio 
Gramsci's "good sense." In his Prison Notebooks, Gramsci 
examined the distinction between an unreflexive hegemonic 
conception of reality and a reflexive, critical or skeptical 
conception of the world. He presented this distinction as a 
difference between common sense and good sense • 
• • • everyone is a philosopher, though in his own way and 
unconsciously, since even in the slightest manifestation of 
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any intellectual activity whatever ••• there is contained a 
specific conception of the world [common senseJ. [OneJ 
then moves on to the second level, which is that of 
awareness and criticism [good senseJ ••• one proceeds to 
the question -- is it better to "think" without having 
critical awareness, in a disjointed and episodic way? •• 
Is it better to take part in a conception of the world 
mechanically imposed by the external environment, i.e., by 
one of the many social groups in which everyone is 
automatically involved from the moment of his entry into 
the conscious world ••• 1 Or, on the other hand, is it 
better to work out consciously and critically one's own 
conception of the world and thus, in connection with the 
labors of one's own brain, choose one's sphere of activity, 
take an active part in the creation of the world ••• [27J. 
In coming years, nursing can look forward with eager 
anticipation, hope and optimism to the genesis of its own "good 
sense." This is looking forward, toward a critical nursing 
process: nursing praxis. 
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Endnotes 
1. J. Habermas, Theory and Practice, p. 42. 
2. This section of analysis draws heavily on the work by P. 
Berger and T. Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality 
(New York, Doubleday, 1~). Their extension or-the 
sociology of knowledge framework was the continuation of a 
tradition which included K. Mannheim, A. Schutz and G.H. Mead. 
The Social Construction of Reality was a phenomenological 
TnVestigation which focused on the existential determination 
of the "life-world." 
3. Berger and Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality (pp. 
47-48 (hereafter, SC~ Brackets in these quotes reflect 
editing which has removed the word "man 'I and inserted the 
word "human. II 
4. Ibid., p. 49. 
5. Ibid., p. 61. 
6. Ibid., p. 52. 
7. Intellectuals in nursing have yet to produce a pheno-
menological !examination of this process. This would be 
a descriptive analysis of the invariant structure present in 
nursing labor. It would focus on the real embodied activity 
of nurses and would describe the moments of externalization, 
objectification, and internalization in nursing labor. This 
kind of phenomenological investigation would be an inval-
uable contribution to nursing discourse. It would be an 
an important ideological shift in nursingls self-
understanding, an alternative to the heavy psychological or 
cognitive focus which characterizes so many studies of 
"nursing process." 
8. S. Rowbotham, Woman1s Consciousness, Man's World (Middlesex, 
Penguin, 1973), pp. 70-71. While time and space prevent it 
here, the systematic identification of structural 
similarities in nursing and domestic labor would be an 
invaluable contribution to nursingls feminist discourse. 
Regretfully, the similarities are only barely suggested 
here. 
9. Berger and Luckman, SCR, pp. 60, 34-35. 
10. Ibid., pp. 89, 60. 
11. Ibid., pp. 64, 37, 35. 
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12. To my knowledge, the philosophical frames of reference 
contained in most contemporary nursing theory do not 
identify the role of language in man's self-formative 
process. Theoretical constructions like those of Rogers 
and Newman were actually versions of philosophical 
anthropology, which could have made this connection. 
However, neither of these works appear to recognize the 
importance of language in man's existential reality. 
13. The discussion will acknowledge but not enter the debate 
about language use among other species. For treatment of 
this point, see Z. Bauman, Culture as Praxis (London, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973) pp.~8-52. 
14. This is a rather oblique reference to the early 
Wittgenstein and the analytic philosophy of language. 
Wittgenstein's early work emphasized a universal, logically 
necessary structure in language (syntax) which guides or 
steers the constitution of reality. The compromise between 
this deterministic emphasis on language and a relativistic 
position about language occurred of course in French 
Structuralism. The history of this movement includes the 
controversial Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which posited a close 
relationship between cultural categories and language. 
French structuralism attempted to escape both the 
deterministic and the relativistic consequences of 
linguistic theory by distinguishing deep from surface 
structures in language. This was an important attempt to 
illuminate the relationship between culture and language. 
While there is no space here to analyze this aspect of 
the history of cultural anthropology, good reading includes 
E. Sapir, "The Status of Linguistics as Science," and B. 
Whorf, "The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to 
Language;" both in Hifhpotnts in Anthro~OlO~Y (eds.) 
Bohannon and Glazer,New York~nopf,973 , pp. 143-173. 
15. Berger and Luckman, SCR, pp. 29-30. 
16. The gender specific division of labor cross-culturally has 
been demonstrated repeatedly in ethnography. See, for 
example, the classic study by Murdock and Provost, IIFactors 
in the Division of Labor by Sex: A Cross-Cultural 
Analysis" in Ethnology (Vol. 12),1973. 
17. The issue of sexism in nursing labor is a critically 
important one to pursue. Later sections of this chapter 
discuss different versions of feminism and the way in which 
they can address a sexual division of labor in nursing. 
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18. D. Held, An Introduction to Critical Theory, p. 229. 
19. H.G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 280. 
20. Z. Bauman, Towards a Critical Sociology: An Essay on 
Commonsense and Emancipation, pp. 106-107.-- --
21. J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest, p. 4. 
22. This reference to organic intellectuals in nursing 
acknowledges the work of Antonio Gramsci, Selections from 
the Prison Notebooks (New York, International Press, ~. 
23. J. Habermas, Theory and Practice, p. 282. 
24. See the discussion by P. Chinn, "Women1s Health" in 
Advances in Nursing Science, 1981, 1 (1), 1-125. 
25. See the discussion of these in K. Macpherson, "Feminist 
Methods: A New Paradigm for Nursing Research ll in Advances 
~ Nursing Science, 1 (l), 1983, pp. 17-25. 
26. Ibid., p. 21. 
27. A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 323. 
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